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ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Multi-Dimensional Competition on Education Market Outcomes. 
(August 2012) 
Mustafa Ugur Karakaplan, B.S., METU; M.A., Bilkent University 
 Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Timothy J. Gronberg 
  Dr. Li Gan 
In this dissertation, I analyze the effects of competition in education markets. In 
my first essay, I analyze the effects of different concentration measures on school 
personnel salaries. I find evidence that principals have more bargaining power over their 
salaries than teachers in Washington that through rent-sharing, principals start getting 
positive returns from increasing concentration at lower levels of concentration than that 
of teachers. Moreover, I present that the pattern of teacher salaries versus concentration 
in Washington is similar to that in Texas, but the inflection point in Washington is at 
substantially lower levels of concentration—a finding which can be attributed to 
Washington’s being a union state versus Texas’s being a right-to-work-state. 
In my second essay, I examine the effects of various measures of competition on 
school district cost inefficiency in a stochastic frontier framework. My results show that 
cost frontier is U-shaped in Texas with large positive returns to the scale over a 
relatively big range and mild diseconomies of scale over an extended range. In addition, 
I find that school district cost inefficiency increases significantly when market 
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concentration increases. Furthermore, I present the competitive effect/scale effect trade-
off through a couple of simulation exercises. 
The findings from both of my studies show that the effects of competition are 
barely sensitive to measuring the competition with different sets of relevant competitors. 
On the other hand, sensitivity of the effects of competition to using different definitions 
of the education markets is significant. Yet, the range of these estimated effects is 
relatively small, and the sign and the significance of the effect of competition generally 
do not change when a meaningful definition of education markets is employed to 
measure concentration. 
Furthermore, I present that the concentration measures employed in my essays 
are endogenous. I control for the endogeneity with several instrumental variables 
including degrees of lagged educational outputs in the neighboring schools, lagged 
education market characteristics, and counts of streams. My results imply that the 
hypothesized effects of competition may be underestimated due to the endogeneity. 
While the plausibility of competitive effect’s being underestimated bolsters the 
importance of the competitive effects I find, it also strengthens my criticism of using 
uni-dimensional concentration indices as indicators of competition in the education 
markets.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
2SLS Two-stage least squares 
ACC All public schools and accredited private schools 
ADA Average daily attendance 
ALL All public schools and all private schools 
APR All public schools and approved private schools 
BLS U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
CBSA Core Based Statistical Area 
CCD Common Core of Data, National Center for Education Statistics 
CWI Comparable wage index 
DEA Data envelopment analysis 
f.o.b. Free-on-board 
GMM Generalized method of moments 
GNIS Geographic Names Information System, U.S. Geological Survey 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration 
ISD Independent School District 
IV Instrumental variables 
LEP Limited English proficiency 
MRP Marginal revenue product 
NCES National Center for Education Statistics 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
OMB U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
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OSPI Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, Washington 
PSS Private School Universe Survey, National Center for Education Statistics 
PUB Only public schools 
R15 15-mile radius circle 
R25 25-mile radius circle 
R2T The Race to the Top program 
R50 50-mile radius circle 
SASS Schools and Staffing Survey, National Center for Education Statistics 
SDA Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
TAKS Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills 
TEA Texas Education Agency 
TEPSAC Texas Private School Accreditation Commission 
USGS U.S. Geological Survey 
WADA Weighted average daily attendance  
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... iii 
NOMENCLATURE ........................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xi 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. COMPETITION AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL SALARIES .................................... 4 
2.1. Introduction to the Markets ........................................................................... 5 
2.1.1. The Markets for Products .............................................................. 8 
2.1.2. Determination of the Markets for Labor ...................................... 14 
2.1.3. Monopsony in Labor Markets ..................................................... 19 
2.1.4. Monopsony in Education Labor Markets .................................... 21 
2.2. Models of Education Personnel Wage Determination ................................ 25 
2.2.1. Wages in an Oligopsony Model .................................................. 25 
2.2.2. Wages in a Rent Sharing Model .................................................. 27 
2.2.3. Wages in a Union Model ............................................................. 28 
2.2.4. Reduced Form Models ................................................................. 30 
2.3. Data ............................................................................................................. 31 
2.4. Regression Results ...................................................................................... 39 
2.5. Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................................................... 49 
2.6. Concluding Remarks ................................................................................... 80 
3. COMPETITION AND SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION ......................... 82 
3.1. Introduction to the School District Consolidation ....................................... 82 
3.1.1. History of the School District Consolidation in the USA ........... 86 
3.1.2. History of the School District Consolidation in Texas ................ 97 
3.2. Effects of School District Consolidation ................................................... 103 
3.2.1. Economies of Size ..................................................................... 105 
3.2.2. Research on Size ........................................................................ 111 
viii 
 
Page 
3.2.3. Research on Competition ........................................................... 114 
3.3. A Model of Cost and Consolidation .......................................................... 116 
3.3.1. Specification of the Econometric Model ................................... 122 
3.3.2. The Scaling Property and Further Specifications ...................... 124 
3.4. Data ........................................................................................................... 128 
3.5. Regression Results .................................................................................... 136 
3.5.1. Alternative Specifications .......................................................... 148 
3.5.2. Sensitivity to Different Competition Measures ......................... 153 
3.6. Endogeneity in the Stochastic Cost Frontier Model .................................. 171 
3.6.1. Potential Instrumental Variables................................................ 174 
3.6.2. Addressing the Endogeneity ...................................................... 179 
3.7. Simulations ................................................................................................ 189 
3.7.1. Iso-Expenditure Curves ............................................................. 194 
3.7.2. Simulation of a Consolidation Scenario .................................... 199 
3.8. Concluding Discussion .............................................................................. 211 
4. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 213 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 214 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................ 239 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1.—The Determination of the Education Markets with the Radial Method ......... 51 
Figure 2.—Number of Public Schools, 1869-2010 .......................................................... 90 
Figure 3.—Publics Schools with Elementary Grades, One-Teacher, 1909-2010 ............ 90 
Figure 4.—Average Daily Attendance, 1869-2008.......................................................... 91 
Figure 5.—Total Enrollment in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1869-2008 ........... 91 
Figure 6.—Average Enrollment per School, 1939-2008 ................................................. 92 
Figure 7.—Number of Districts, 1939-1984 .................................................................... 93 
Figure 8.—Number of Districts, 1985-2010 .................................................................... 94 
Figure 9.—Average Enrollment per District, 1939-2008................................................. 94 
Figure 10.—Percent Share of Revenue ............................................................................ 96 
Figure 11.—Number of School Districts in Texas, 1880-2010 ....................................... 98 
Figure 12.—Number of Districts in Texas, 1990-2010.................................................... 99 
Figure 13.—Total Enrollment in K-12 in Texas, 1956-2010 ......................................... 100 
Figure 14.—Average Enrollment in K-12 per District in Texas, 1956-2010................. 101 
Figure 15.—District Size Distribution in Texas in 2010................................................ 102 
Figure 16.—Cost and Expenditure Curves .................................................................... 122 
Figure 17.—Distribution of the HHI-CBSA-ALL ......................................................... 136 
Figure 18.—Predicted Cost per Pupil, Enrollment < 200,000 ....................................... 142 
Figure 19.—Predicted Cost per Pupil, Enrollment > 20,518 ......................................... 143 
x 
 
Page 
Figure 20.—Distribution of Cost Efficiency .................................................................. 144 
Figure 21.—Scatterplot of the HHI-CBSA-ALL versus Cost Efficiency ...................... 145 
Figure 22.—Texas Map of the HHI-CBSA-ALL .......................................................... 146 
Figure 23.—Texas Map of Cost Efficiency ................................................................... 147 
Figure 24.—Scatterplot of the Estimates of Cost Inefficiency ...................................... 192 
Figure 25.—Histograms of the Estimates of Cost Inefficiency ..................................... 193 
Figure 26.—Iso-Expenditure Curves ............................................................................. 195 
Figure 27.—Texas Map of Winners and Loser after the Consolidation ........................ 206 
  
xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1.—Descriptive Statistics, Teacher Category (Multiple Pages) ............................. 36 
Table 2.—Descriptive Statistics, Principal Category (Multiple Pages) ........................... 37 
Table 3.—Linear Estimation of the Main Specification (Multiple Pages)....................... 40 
Table 4.—Descriptive Statistics of the Instrumental Variables ....................................... 44 
Table 5.—IV and GMM Estimations of the Main Specification (Multiple Pages) ......... 46 
Table 6.—Pairwise Correlations Between the HHIs, Washington Data .......................... 53 
Table 7.—Descriptive Statistics of the HHIs, Washington Data ..................................... 54 
Table 8.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 1 (Multiple Pages)............. 56 
Table 9.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 2 (Multiple Pages)............. 59 
Table 10.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 3 (Multiple Pages)........... 62 
Table 11.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 4 (Multiple Pages)........... 65 
Table 12.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 5 (Multiple Pages)........... 68 
Table 13.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 6 (Multiple Pages)........... 71 
Table 14.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 7 (Multiple Pages)........... 74 
Table 15.—GMM Estimation Results with Different HHIs – 8 (Multiple Pages)........... 77 
Table 16.—Descriptive Statistics, Texas Public School Districts.................................. 130 
Table 17.—Modified Marginal Effects, Main Specifications (Multiple Pages) ............ 138 
Table 18.—Modified Marginal Effects, Alternative Specifications (Multiple Pages)... 149 
Table 19.—Pairwise Correlations Between the HHIs, Texas Data ................................ 156 
xii 
 
Page 
Table 20.—Descriptive Statistics of the HHIs, Texas Data ........................................... 157 
Table 21.—Modified Marginal Effects with Different HHIs – 1 (Multiple Pages) ....... 159 
Table 22.—Modified Marginal Effects with Different HHIs – 2 (Multiple Pages) ....... 162 
Table 23.—Modified Marginal Effects with Different HHIs – 3 (Multiple Pages) ....... 165 
Table 24.—Modified Marginal Effects with Different HHIs – 4 (Multiple Pages) ....... 168 
Table 25.—Descriptive Statistics of the Instrumental Variables ................................... 180 
Table 26.—First Stage Statistics of the IV Estimation (Multiple Pages) ....................... 182 
Table 27.—First Stage Statistics of the IV Estimation, Cobb-Douglas Model .............. 185 
Table 28.—Estimation Results with Cobb-Douglas Cost Function (Multiple Pages) ... 186 
Table 29.—First Stage Statistics of the IV Estimation, Cobb-Douglas with HHI ......... 188 
Table 30.—Descriptive Statistics of the Estimates of Cost Inefficiency ....................... 191 
Table 31.—Pairwise Correlation Coefficients of the Estimates of Cost Inefficiency.... 192 
Table 32.—Descriptive Statistics Before Consolidation ................................................ 204 
Table 33.—Descriptive Statistics After Consolidation .................................................. 205 
 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Competition is often overlooked as a determinant of outcomes in the education 
market. While there are important studies in the economics of education literature that 
examine the effects of competition, such as Hoxby (2000), Sass (2006), Taylor (2010), 
Millimet and Collier (2008), and Booker et al. (2008), many studies such as Duncombe 
and Yinger (2007) pay little or no attention to the influence of competition. Moreover, 
even though there are studies addressing competition in education markets, the validity 
and the applicability of the chosen competition measures are subject to question. One 
well-known example of this kind of skepticism is exemplified in Rothstein (2007) 
critique of Hoxby (2000), a critique that cast doubt on Hoxby’s findings. 
The effects of competition in the education market is an active corner of recent 
conversation, and convincing evidence, either proving or refuting theoretical competitive 
predictions in education markets is yet to be developed. But what is the education 
market? Who is competing with whom and for what and how? What is the degree of 
competition? How can competition be measured and does competition and its measures 
change over time? These are some of the questions we can ask once we begin analyzing 
the effects competition in the education markets. 
Competition is a multi-dimensional concept. One shortcoming in the existing 
literature is that the competition measures are uni-dimensional. That is to say, the 
measures are composed of only a single feature of competition. This deficiency in the 
                                                 

 This dissertation follows the style of The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
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literature manifests itself in the common practice of using Herfindahl indices of market 
concentration as the measure of competition. 
A Herfindahl index is basically a measure of the size of the competitors with 
respect to the market. Herfindahl indices are generally employed as indicators of the 
market structure. For instance, Herfindahl indices based on the total number of students 
in school districts in relevant education markets are common in the economics of 
education literature. Because a Herfindahl index is based on the market shares of the 
competitors, it is a uni-dimensional measure of competition which overlooks other 
important characteristics of competition. For example, in the existence of different types 
of competitors, a single uni-dimensional Herfindahl index may be associated with 
multiple degrees of competition in different settings, and therefore, can overstate or 
understate the actual degree of competition. 
Moreover, the definition of the relevant education market is problematic as well. 
Understanding the delineation of the education market is essential for any analysis of 
competition, because measures of competition in a market are created from variables 
measured within that market. For example, taking core based statistical areas or other 
governmental divisions of land as distinct education markets could be misleading. These 
boundaries may be arbitrarily determined, or they may be established for the ease of 
governmental transactions or for the ease of use by statistical agencies in accumulating 
and presenting statistics, and therefore may be irrelevant to creating a measure of 
competition in education. Also, considering school districts as separate education 
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markets could be misleading since Tiebout mobility suggests that inter-district 
competition may be more important than intra-district competition. 
In this dissertation, I try to discover the true nature of competition in education 
markets. In my first essay, I analyze the effects of different concentration measures on 
school personnel salaries. My second essay is an examination of the effects of various 
measures of competition on school district cost inefficiency. The findings from both of 
my essays show that the effects of competition are barely sensitive to measuring the 
competition with different sets of competitors. On the other hand, sensitivity of the 
effects of competition to using different definitions of the education markets is 
significant. But I find that the range, over which the estimated effects of competition 
with different definitions of markets vary, is relatively small, and the sign and the 
significance of the effect of competition generally do not change when a meaningful 
definition of markets is employed to measure concentration. 
Furthermore, I present that the concentration measures employed in my essays 
are endogenous. I control for the endogeneity with several instrumental variables 
including degrees of lagged educational outputs in the neighboring schools, lagged 
education market characteristics, and counts of streams. My results imply that the effects 
of competition may be underestimated due to the endogeneity. While the plausibility of 
underestimated effects of competition further validates the significance of the 
competitive effects I present, it also strengthens my criticism of using uni-dimensional 
concentration indices as indicators of competition in the education markets. 
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2. COMPETITION AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL SALARIES 
Taylor (2010) uses Texas public school teacher data and finds that competition-
based school reform may have an important effect on their wages. Her original idea is 
that if school districts act as typical oligopsonists while hiring teachers, then wages of 
the teachers may increase as the degree of competition among schools increase. 
Nevertheless, if school districts act as typical monopolist while supplying educational 
services, then wages of the teachers may decrease as the degree of competition among 
schools increase. Her results present that as the level of competition increases, wages of 
most of the teachers increase. However, she also find that the same change in the level of 
competition decreases the wages of teachers located in education markets with relatively 
high concentration ratios. 
In this essay, I use a panel data from Washington State’s Office of 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and analyze this reasoning with different education 
personnel, with the intention to focus largely upon two groups of school personnel: 
teachers and principals. The influence of high levels of competition on wages of other 
education personnel would also be expected to be the same as or at least similar to that 
on teachers. On the other hand, the literature tells us that many different characteristics 
of teachers, such as their being the second-earner in the household, may differentiate the 
findings from that of other education personnel. My findings show that principals have 
more bargaining power over their salaries than teachers in Washington, that principals 
start getting positive returns from increasing concentration at lower levels of 
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concentration than that of teachers. Moreover, I present that the pattern of teacher 
salaries versus concentration in Washington is similar to that in Texas, but the inflection 
point in Washington is at substantially lower levels of concentration—a finding which 
can be attributed to Washington’s being a union state versus Texas’s being a right-to-
work-state. While the degree of competitive effect varies over a significant range when 
different measures of competition are employed, my general findings are fairly robust to 
using different competition measures or utilizing different estimation procedures to deal 
with the endogeneity of the concentration measure. 
2.1. Introduction to the Markets 
The standard journey between one's place of residence and place of work or full 
time study is called commuting. Before 19th century, due to the unavailability of access 
to modern forms of transportation such as bicycles, trains, cars or buses, most of the 
workers had to live in walking distance from their workplace. In this day’s industrialized 
societies many people travel every day to their workplaces which are far away from their 
own villages, towns or even cities. This may sometimes happen because of individuals’ 
own preferences, but sometimes they may just do so because of the high cost of 
accommodation in city centers. 
The arrival of new commuting methods has had a very big influence on our lives. 
The most significant effect is that the change has permitted the villages, towns or cities 
to get bigger to such dimensions which were not possible before. This, in turn, has led to 
the creation of the urban periphery. Today, most of the big cities are encircled by typical 
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commuter belts, which are also named as metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area can be 
defined as the agglomeration of one or a limited number of contiguous built-up 
metropolises with a hub characteristic, and peripheral zones which are under the 
influence of these hubs in terms of commerce or employment. Hence, the borders of a 
metropolitan area may expand farther than its urban periphery conditional on the degree 
of the influence of the hubs and integration of the other constituent parts. 
However, there may be inconsistencies in the parameters of metropolitan areas. 
In the United States, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines 
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, or the collective term "Core Based 
Statistical Areas", which is used for collecting, organizing and publishing Federal 
statistics by Federal statistical agencies. By OMB (2007) definition, each metropolitan 
and micropolitan area contains one or more counties including the core urban area, and 
the neighboring counties that have a high degree of economic and social integration with 
the urban core.
1
 
Do these metropolitan statistical areas necessarily determine the labor market 
areas? In the past, economists have not devoted much attention to the determination of 
the markets. The problem was stated by Horowitz (1981) that “because economists, from 
Adam Smith forward, have with confidence and enthusiasm, although not necessarily 
with shared views, written about markets, it is plausible to expect that they would have 
                                                 
1
 The degree of integration is measured by commuting to work. A metropolitan area holds an urban core 
with a population of 50,000 or more, and a micropolitan area holds an urban core with a population of at 
least 10,000 but less than 50,000 (U.S. Census Bureau). These definitions embrace about 93 percent of the 
U.S. population, about 83 percent of which is in metropolitan statistical areas, and about 10 percent of 
which is in micropolitan statistical areas. 1,092 of the 3,141 counties in the United States are in the 363 
metropolitan statistical areas in the United States. 694 counties are in the 577 micropolitan statistical areas, 
and 1,355 counties are not inside the categorization. (OMB, 2007) 
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had quite a bit to contribute to the resolution of the market-definition issue.” In the same 
way, it was noted by Stigler (1982) that “Except for a casual flirtation with cross 
elasticities of demand and supply, the determination of markets has remained an 
undeveloped area of economic research at either the theoretical or empirical level.” 
The mainstream economics defines the notion of market as a formation of buyers 
and sellers trading any kind of goods, services or information. Whether it is bartering or 
exchanging for money, it is natural to have a rate of exchange between the quantities of 
the traded things. Since the market makes it possible to trade, and facilitates the 
allocation and distribution of the resources in a society, the market can be suggested as 
the structure where the rate of exchange, that is price, is determined. The other side of 
the relationship between market and price suggests a key role of price in defining 
geographic or product markets. For example, considering the transportation costs, if a 
certain good, service or information has a single price over a geographical region, then 
this implies that the transactions at any location in this geographical region is taken to be 
a perfect substitute for transactions at any other location in the same geographical region 
by either buyers or sellers or both. Although it was possible to focus on the 
determination of spatial dimension of the markets in this sense, the literature generally 
concentrated on the determination of product markets to examine the degree of 
competition between products and sustain antitrust laws. 
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2.1.1. The Markets for Products 
The product markets were traditionally determined by using the cross-price 
elasticities of demand, since they are associated with the degree of substitutability of two 
different products. The primary efforts to determine the markets by cross-price 
elasticities of demand emerge in the book, Price Theory, of Bain (1952). The U.S. case 
law (1953) explains the method as follows: 
“For every product substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully 
encompass that infinite range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other 
product to which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers 
will turn; in technical terms, products whose ‘cross-elasticities of demand’ are small.” 
Since the cross-price elasticities of demand can measure the sensitivity of the 
change in demand for a product in a certain location, to changes in the price of the 
product in a different location, the degree of sensitivity can be adopted to delineate the 
geographic markets. Nevertheless, this approach of market determination goes through a 
number of weaknesses. The most important of all is that it is not clear how much the 
cross price elasticity of demand has to be so that the two goods can be suggested to be of 
the same market. A monopolist with a goal of profit maximization would usually 
increase the prices of its product up to the level at which the other products turn to be 
close substitutes resulting in the well-known cellophane trap, named after the U.S. 
cellophane case (1956). Therefore, in such cases of misuse of dominance, estimating the 
cross price elasticities of demand using the current market prices would bring incorrect 
conclusion. 
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Another problem of this approach is that the tests for the cross price elasticities 
of demand have rigorous data requirements and introduce extra difficulty (Stigler and 
Sherwin, 1985). To give an example, Werden (1998) utilizes the case of breakfast 
cereals where there are various kinds of brands and notices that the cross price 
elasticities of demand between any pair of cereal brand is very small. Werden states that 
the question of whether one good is in the same market as another good concentrates 
only on the degree of competitiveness between individual substitutes instead of on the 
degree of competitiveness of among all substitutes. 
A regression based approach to determine markets is proposed by Horowitz 
(1981). This partial adjustment approach intends to show the fact that equilibrium price 
adjustments may not happen immediately across goods of the same market or across 
geographic areas. The assumption of the model is that there exists some imperceptible 
but stable long-run equilibrium price variation between the geographic areas or goods, 
and it takes time to approach to this equilibrium price variation. Horowitz utilizes a 
partial adjustment model to find the long run equilibrium price variation and the speed of 
this adjustment. However, there are several limitations of this model. First of all, this 
method obviously requires using a high frequency data, which would not be available for 
the good or service under examination. Also, as stated by Stigler and Sherwin (1985), 
this method does not introduce a valid approach to equilibrium because there is no 
appropriate way to choose the time interval to which price quotations relate and the 
critical variables in the model do not supply information about the rate of approach or 
the number of markets involved. Other major shortcomings of the model are argued by 
10 
 
Slade (1986). First, the approach can generate invalid outcomes if there is 
autocorrelation, a trend or a systematic cyclical movement in prices. Secondly, in terms 
of the dynamic adjustment, this approach is unreasonably restrictive because the 
adjustment is assumed to follow a specific pattern, although an assumption of dynamic 
stability of price differentials would be sufficient. Nevertheless, there cannot be an a 
priori knowledge of the existence of a stable long run price variation since the shipments 
of products work in both directions and the variation in prices may include transportation 
costs. 
In the same article, Slade (1986) suggests another methodology which is based 
on the notion of Granger causality of Granger (1969), Sims (1972) and Wu (1983). This 
methodology would allow testing the hypothesis that the price variations in a good or 
geographic area have perceptible consequences on the price variations in some other 
goods or geographical areas. The Granger causality literature suggests that if 
significantly improved predictions of Y can be obtained when X is included as an 
explanatory variable along with all of the other explanatory variables than the case when 
X is excluded, then the variable X “causes” the variable Y. Since Granger causality tests 
supply a practical tool to have an understanding of the linear prediction and the feedback 
system among variables, these tests are frequently utilized in the literature and often 
interpreted as tests of correlation between variables. However, due to the econometric 
drawbacks of this approach, such tests are not appropriate to determine significant 
results (Kimmel, 1987). Unless the data portray a two-dimensional system, this method 
cannot generate any clear finding about the relationship between the variables. Also the 
11 
 
causality tests are prone to be extremely responsive to the specification of the model as 
indicated by Kaserman and Zeisel (1996). For that reason, if significant explanatory 
variables are not included to the model, the causality test results would become biased, 
which is very likely under the certain limitations in the data. Finally, this methodology 
needs high frequency data, which is unfortunately not available for labor and other 
factors of production. 
Shrieves (1978), Horowitz (1981), and Stigler and Sherwin (1985) propose the 
use of price correlations to determine markets. The logic is that the prices of substitute 
goods cannot independently move too much out of the line. Since the degree of 
substitutability of the products is represented in the price data, the spatial dimension of 
markets can be examined by looking at the price correlations of a certain product in 
several different locations over a geographic area. The idea is expressed by Areeda, 
Turner and Hovenkamp (1978) that “separate markets are indicated for a given product 
where its price in separate areas differs and where price movements are relatively 
uncorrelated.” Likewise, Benson (1980) indicate that “the only way to really determine 
whether or not two firms are in the same geographic market is examination of reactions 
by one firm to price changes of another.” Furthermore, it is reported by Massey and 
O'Hare (1996) that the pricing actions of the firms in the past are sometimes used by the 
EU Commission as a practical indicator of the relevant markets. 
Nevertheless, price correlations exhibit particular limitations for the intention of 
determining markets for competition analysis. There will be a perfect correlation 
between prices of two goods if a certain percentage change in the price of one good 
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causes a consistent percentage change in the price of the other good. Moreover, because 
of the possibility of having high levels of correlation, although the goods under 
examination are not good substitutes, this approach may produce unreliable outcomes. 
As explained in Slade (1986), if the mutually causal factors are not held constant, the 
correlations will be spurious. Specifying a structural model can correct this problem. 
Nonetheless, this specification may diminish the ease, and in turn the superiority of this 
approach to the cross-price elasticity of demand approach, which is suggested by 
Kaserman and Zeisel (1996). 
The two seminal articles of Elzinga and Hogarty (1973, 1978) argue that in most 
of the cases, the only data set that is necessary to determine the geographical markets is 
the physical shipment data. They note that the shipment data should be organized so that 
it will be in two categories at the same time: the origin and the destination. To assess the 
boundaries of geographical markets they suggest an estimation procedure, Elzinga-
Hogarty test, of at least four steps, in which they calculate the percentage of a physical 
product produced in an area that is consumed in that area and the percentage of the 
physical product consumed in an area that is produced in that area. If the levels of both 
percentages are above 75 per cent, then the geographic area under examination is 
proposed to be a single market. The critical value, 75 per cent, is explained to be 
arbitrary which only reflects their view of acceptable cost of estimation. Hence, they 
imply that a higher or a lower benchmark can be substituted for the suggested 75 per 
cent benchmark to be suitable for the objectives of other studies. 
13 
 
Following their estimation procedure, Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) mention that it 
is possible to find two separate geographical market areas. If that is the case, then they 
suggest that it represents a geographic market extension merger. They also state that it is 
possible to find two overlapping areas for geographically separate firms. In this case, 
they propose that if the shipments of the overlapping area constitute more than 25 
percent of the shipments of either area, then the entire area including the overlapping and 
non-overlapping parts can be counted as one geographical market area. 
Nonetheless, the accuracy of the results the shipments data produces is 
questioned in the literature. Werden (1981) suggests that although using shipment data is 
practical to determine the markets, it is not sufficient enough to determine the separation 
of the markets because free-on-board (f.o.b.) prices and transportation costs are not taken 
into account. Therefore, while the Elzinga-Hogarty method have an advantage of 
precision due to its reproducibility, the method cannot be claimed to be superior to other 
methods due to the possibility of getting erroneous outcomes (Werden, 1981). However, 
it may not be proper to propose the absolute cost of transportation or f.o.b. values as key 
variables. Elzinga (1981) explains that if the transportation costs are high enough to 
impede the movement of the product or if there are legal barriers which are effective, 
then shipment data would reflect these. 
Furthermore, the existence or nonexistence of such physical shipment is not a 
necessary or sufficient condition to determine if the area in question is a separate market 
(Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). Stigler and Sherwin suggest that there is a possibility of 
having price discrimination between two separate markets between which are large 
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flows of trade, which may in turn cause price variation isolated from transportation 
costs. Without altering their prices toward equilibrium, manufacturers can detect and 
profit from the variations in demand elasticities between the two geographical areas. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier and as Kaserman and Zeisel (1996) presents, neither 
theoretical nor practical validation for the critical values suggested by Elzinga and 
Hogarty are available. Kaserman and Zeisel also note that the pricing of the producers 
depends on the shipment possibilities from outside of a geographic area. However, 
regardless of these limitations of Elzinga-Hogarty procedure, investigation of observed 
flows of shipment can still be argued as an effective method to identify the geographic 
markets. Especially if the question under investigation is about the determination of the 
labor markets, utilizing the Elzinga-Hogarty approach would be a sensible approach, 
since labor market analogy of shipments of the goods is the commuting behavior of 
labor, that is, job migration. 
2.1.2. Determination of the Markets for Labor 
Determination of labor markets, being a geographic market in essence, has been 
under separate examination in the literature since Carroll (1949). The literature expresses 
that one of the essential elements of the theories of urban geographic structure is the 
relationship between home and work. That is, there is a general consensus that 
commuting patterns inform us about the structure of labor markets. However, the models 
in this commuting literature are not complete enough to understand the partial effects of 
commuting behavior on market delineation. Although these unsophisticated models 
15 
 
ignore many significant issues in the labor market definition, they still give us limited 
insights about the spatial structure of the markets. 
The earliest economic models of labor markets in Wingo (1961), Kain (1962), 
Alonso (1964) and Muth (1969) have drawn attention to the trade-off between 
accommodation costs and commuting costs. These models specifically hypothesize that 
households select their residence location by minimizing the total of residential and 
commuting costs. The trade-off represents the clash between the households’ willingness 
to be closer to their location of work and their willingness to have better accommodation 
and amenities in terms of prices. That is, housing and employment preferences of 
individuals are suggested to be at the core of urban spatial structure. 
If the residential structure of the cities can be assumed to be monocentric, then 
these models with the trade-off approach can be helpful to delineate the labor markets. 
However, as Berry and Kim (1993) points out, because of the complex structure of U.S. 
metropolitan areas, monocentric models are not suitable enough to determine the labor 
markets. Still, the concept of the trade-off between housing location and the workplace is 
relevant to polycentric models. Gordon, Kumar and Richardson (1989) state that the 
significance of accessibility and economic competition as determinants of the urban 
structures cannot be rejected. As explained in Clark and Kuijpers-Linde (1994), the 
evolution in the connections between residences and jobs is very important to 
understanding the commuting behavior and polycentric urban structures. Nevertheless, 
the distribution of employment opportunities is suggested to generate a more complex 
behavioral reaction to the relationship between house and workplace. 
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As Getis (1969) presents, there can be an “indifference zone” in which the 
households are indifferent to access to work. That is, since the distance to work is only 
one out of numerous variables affecting the commuting behavior of households (Quigley 
and Weinberg, 1977), it can be constant within certain geographical zones. Also, Brown 
(1975) reports that if the job location of the household changes to somewhere outside of 
the original work zone the household become more prone to move than if the new job 
location stays in the original work zone. Moreover, according to Clark and Burt (1980) if 
a household is far away from their workplace, when they move, they tend to be closer to 
where they work. 
Cervero and Wu (1997) examine the residential location and commuting in the 
polycentric San Francisco Bay Area. They show that employment in the central cities 
produces longer commuting times than employment in suburban areas. Studies like 
Doorn and Van Rietberger (1990), Bell (1991), Cervero and Landis (1992), and Wachs 
et al. (1993) analyze the effects of workers’ relocation to the suburbs on the commuting 
times and distances. Their results generally propose that commuting structure adjusts to 
the changing metropolitan structure which can also be an automatic process to minimize 
the time to commute and congestion. 
Simpson (1987) points out that due to the unavailability of panel data, most of 
the studies cannot allow for the dynamic nature of the labor market structure. Many of 
the studies such as Smart (1974), Ball (1980), Coombes and Openshaw (1982), 
Coombes, Green and Openshaw (1986), Laan (1991), Kristensen (1998), (Schmitt and 
Henry, 2000), Casado-Diaz (2000), Laan and Schalke (2001), Papps and Newell (2002), 
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Coombes, Raybould and Wymer (2005), and Cladera, Bergadà and Roper (2005) use 
cross sectional data, and delineate or re-delineate the static structure of labor market 
areas. However, due to the unavailability of panel data, these studies could not capture 
the dynamic formation of the labor markets. 
Levinson (1997) uses job-duration and residence duration to deal with the 
absence of panel data. Levinson (1998) presents that the recency of the change in the 
employment of the individual would affect the commuting time and distance. Since 
individuals who have a long duration of employment and residence have stayed stable 
spatially, they are argued to have shorter than average commutes. Although the 
relationship between residential location and workplace is set up well, commuting 
tolerance can only be one of several variables affecting the move, which weakens the 
model. 
Ommeren, Rietveld and Nijkamp (1997), Ommeren (1998), Ommeren, Rietveld 
and Nijkamp (1999), Rouwendal and Rietveld (1994), and Rouwendal (1999) examine 
the relationship between the house and the workplace by utilizing a structure in which 
employment and residential changes are interconnected. The findings in these studies 
present that the increases in current commuting distances are associated with higher 
chances of changing the employment or housing. That is, individuals modify their 
residence and jobs to decrease the commuting distance. Moreover, job location is 
suggested to be more responsive to the commuting distance than residential location, 
mostly because moving the house is more costly. Ommeren, Rietveld and Nijkamp 
(1997) and Clark and Withers (1999) discuss the causal effect of job changes on 
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residential mobility, and they find contradictory results. While Ommeren, Rietveld and 
Nijkamp (1997) claim no significant effect; Clark and Withers (1999) suggest a positive 
causal effect of job change on residential change. Although conflicting conclusions are 
present, this branch of the literature stresses the significance of the house and the 
workplace interconnection. 
If the decisions of the workers in two worker households bind each other’s 
decisions, then individuals do not minimize commuting distances individually. In this 
case, spatial dimension of the markets can only be assessed by considering the 
households’ joint decision process. The literature on dual labor market attachments 
examines the commuting behavior of households with one and two workers, and 
presents that constrains of partners within a household bind each other’s decision 
process. It is reported by Freedman and Kern (1997) that women’s employment 
constraints affect the households’ house and workplace location. Abraham and Hunt 
(1997) presents that women in general could be expected to have shorter commuting 
distances than that of men in two worker households. Sermons and Koppelman (1999) 
show that in two worker households, the residential and workplace locations are 
interdependent for women. MacDonald (1999) explains the difference in the commuting 
distance of men and women by low wages and dual roles of women. Clark, Huang and 
Withers (2003) uses a multimodal model with two worker households. Their findings 
comply with the literature that in two worker households, women’s commuting distance 
is shorter than that of men, and women are more prone than are men to minimize their 
commuting distance if the residential location changes. 
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As presented in Martin (2000), workers commonly reveal their preferences to be 
in a certain location. These strong ties to location, in turn, cause the local labor to be 
fixed spatially and the associated possibility to have variations in wages and other 
characteristics in the local labor markets. Moreover, since the workers are prone to be 
residentially immobile, this kind of sorting would be expected to generate segments 
within labor markets. Consequently, this segmentation within labor markets breeds labor 
markets embedded in labor markets, in which variations in wages, worker attributes and 
work provisions are sustained over time. Boyd et al. (2005) use New York state data and 
show that teachers prefer their workplace to be close to their hometown and similar to it 
in other characteristics. Therefore, the inside story of the spatial fixity of workers may 
also be telling us that the recent residence preferences are connected to childhood 
residence. 
2.1.3. Monopsony in Labor Markets 
In addition to all of the complications associated with the analysis of labor 
market delineation, one should also be cautious about how labor markets may 
demonstrate dissimilar economic structures when categorized under different job titles. 
For example if the local labor markets of a job category are not competitive, employers 
can take advantage of employees’ high moving costs. Such a form of imperfect 
competition can be explained in a monopsony setting, where only one buyer faces many 
sellers –or in a more realistic oligopsony setting, in which competition for the factors of 
production is between small numbers of firms. 
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The term “monopsony” first appears in the book “The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition.” of Robinson (1933). When Joan Robinson and Bertrand Hallward coined 
the term, Robinson’s idea was to describe the differences of labor markets with a single 
buyer firm. Ever since the introduction of the model, many undergraduate text books 
give place to this model, though with a dubious shade due to the questionability of the 
single-buyer supposition. However today, especially after the recent developments in the 
literature, the term “labor monopsony” is widely used with less skepticism. Boal and 
Ransom (1997) explain and cite various examples of how competitive models are not 
satisfactory enough to identify the labor markets, and how job-hunt behavior of the 
individuals produce an upward sloping labor supply in the short run for the firm. 
What can a monopsony model explain? Excess demand, for instance, is an 
enigma, for a competitive model. However, vacancies in a firm can easily be explained 
with an upward sloping labor supply in a monopsony model as explained by Archibald 
(1954) and demonstrated in Yett (1975) with the support of vacancies in the U.S. nurse 
market. Another puzzle for competitive models is the fact that there exists persistent 
differential between wages of equally productive labor at equally appealing positions, as 
mentioned in Dickens and Katz (1987). On the other hand, wage discrepancy within 
markets is a fundamental characteristic of monopsonistic equilibria. Wage 
discrimination, even after the observed productivity discrepancy is controlled, can as 
well be explained within a monopsonistic model if the elasticity of the labor supply of 
the groups other than white men can be demonstrated to be less than that of white men. 
Likewise, a positive effect of minimum wages on aggregate employment can disagree 
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with what competitive models argue, but it is rationalized well by monopsonistic 
models. However, as stated by Brown and Medoff (1989), Green, Machin and Manning 
(1992), what seems to be the major mystery for competitive models is the relationship 
between the size and the location of the employer and the wages of the employees. Boal 
and Ransom (1997) present that the explanation of the relationship would be difficult 
even with some of the monopsony models. For example, what are the effects of the size 
of a public institution on wages? What would be the consequences of consolidating two 
public institutions on wages? Or, how would the wages get affected if the job is in an 
isolated corner of the world? How can these correlations be explained? 
2.1.4. Monopsony in Education Labor Markets 
Economists have been aware of the situation that holders of factors of 
production, which are typically utilized in isolated locations, or in the production of 
public goods or services, can confront monopsony conditions. Bish and O'Donoghue 
(1970) point out that studies such as Samuelson (1954), Musgrave (1959), Sharp and 
Escarraz (1964), Williams (1966), Brainard and Dolbear (1967), Buchanan (1968), and 
Brennan (1969) report incorrect inferences because these studies analyze the socially 
optimum level of public good consumption by considering only the constant-cost 
situations, and overlook the problem of the possible monopsony setting. Shibata (1973) 
states that the potential monopsony situation can take place in the constant cost setting 
too, and he signifies the importance of evaluating both cases considering monopsony 
equilibrium. 
22 
 
Moreover, there are various studies in the literature investigating the monopsony 
effects specifically in certain job markets. Hurd (1973), Link and Landon (1975), 
Feldman and Scheffler (1982), Adamache and Sloan (1982), and Bruggink et al. (1985) 
highlight the monopsony power of the hospital industry and the level of employer 
concentration and the earnings of nurses. Additionally, Sullivan (1989) presents 
estimates of the inverse elasticity of supply of nursing services to a single hospital, 
which is a natural measure of the importance of monopsony power. He also examines 
the dependence of the inverse elasticity on several factors such as the duration of the 
pertinent time interval, whether or not the location of the hospital is in a big metropolitan 
region and the oligopsony setting taking into account the interactions among hospitals, 
and finds remarkably high monopsony effects in the nurse markets. 
Borcherding (1971) draws attention to the fact that some of the military skills are 
solely exploited by the U.S. Government, and hence face a monopsony situation. 
Ransom (1993) presents that contrary to what could be expected for other jobs, higher 
seniority brings lower wages for university faculty because of the monopsonistic 
approach of the universities. Fleisher and Kniesner (1980), Boal (1995), Filer, 
Hamermesh and Rees (1996), Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006), McConnell, Brue and 
MacPherson (2007), and Ehrenberg and Smith (2009) give the example of the isolated 
mining towns of the nineteenth and twentieth century as the classical labor monopsony. 
Since the coal mines are remotely located in rough territories, relocation is costly, and 
hence is the monopsony encountered by the coal miners. 
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Together with the nurses, some military personnel, the university faculty and the 
coal miners, teachers, as well, can find themselves in such an unfavorable situation of 
monopsony. Schools are teachers’ workplace. However, other than the eleven percent2 
of the teachers on the national scale, who work in private schools, teachers are employed 
by the school districts and not by the individual schools. That is, the number of 
competitors for teachers is significantly less than the number of schools. As a result of 
this weak competition, monopsony or oligopsony can reign in several areas. 
The first suggestion of monopsonistic teacher labor markets is presented in 
Landon and Baird (1971). Succeeding articles by Baird and Landon (1972), Lipsky and 
Drotning (1973), Thornton (1975), Gustman and Clement (1977), Cole (1977), and 
Holmes (1979) produced conflicting results about the connection between the 
monopsony power of the school districts and teacher wages. 
Luizer and Thornton (1986) present indications of monopsonistic characteristics 
of the local teacher labor markets in Pennsylvania. Merrifield (1999) shows that in 
Texas, teachers in less competitive labor markets have relatively lower salaries. 
Similarly, Vedder and Hall (2000) explain that increased competition from private 
schools increases the public school teachers’ wage rates in Ohio. Medcalfe and Thornton 
(2006), on the other hand, present that there is no evidence that teachers’ salaries are less 
in less competitive labor markets in Georgia. Finally, using data from Texas school 
districts, Taylor (2010) finds that as the level of competition increases, wages of most of 
the teachers increase. Her original idea, however, is that while school districts may act 
                                                 
2
 In 2009-2010, there are 437,414 private school teachers in the United States compared to about 3.2 
million public school teachers. 
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like typical oligopsonists in teacher labor market, they also may have some monopoly 
power in the education services market, and if teachers are getting some of the rents due 
to this monopoly power, then increased competition in the education market may reduce 
teachers’ pay. Rent-sharing by workers is examined by Blanchflower, Oswald and 
Sanfey (1996), Hildreth and Oswald (1997), and Black and Strahan (2001). Taylor 
(2010), nonetheless, presents the possibility of two different market structures—
oligopsony in teacher labor markets and monopoly in education services market—
playing opposite roles in determining the teacher earnings, that her findings also show 
that in relatively concentrated markets, increase in competition leads lower teacher 
wages. 
In this study, I will analyze the same reasoning with other education personnel, 
with the intention to focus largely upon principals. The influence of high levels of 
competition on wages of other education personnel would also be expected to be the 
same as or at least similar to that on teachers. On the other hand, the literature tells us 
that many different characteristics of teachers, such as their being the second-earner in 
the household, may differentiate the findings from that of other education personnel. I 
check the sensitivity of the results using various kinds of competition measures. In order 
to generate result comparable with Taylor (2010), I utilize an econometric methodology 
similar to hers, and analyze the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental 
variables (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations using a panel 
data set including Washington school district employee information. 
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One main difference between Taylor (2010) and this study is that Texas is a 
right-to-work state, whereas Washington is not. Unions may constitute a force working 
to balance the market power of the employers. Hence, the high level of unionization in 
Washington is likely determinant of wages. In fact, many studies in the literature such as 
Lemke (2004) or Kingdon and Teal (2010) find that there is about a 7-10% wage 
premium to public sector unions. On the other hand, some other studies such as Kleiner 
and Petree (1988) or Lovenheim (2009) find that unionization has no significant positive 
effect on wages. That is, the literature provides mixed findings about the effects of 
unions on wages. My study provides a comparison of a right-to-work state with a union 
state to provide a better understanding of the effects of unions on wages of employees in 
the education markets. 
2.2. Models of Education Personnel Wage Determination 
2.2.1. Wages in an Oligopsony Model 
If the school districts act like oligopsonists, we can use Boal and Ransom (1997) 
Cournot model of oligopsony to model the educational labor markets. In this model, 
each school district would maximize their profits which can be written as 
   
  
  (  )   ( )     (1) 
where school districts choose their own level of employment,   , to maximize the 
difference between their revenue,   , and their cost, which is a function of the inverse 
labor supply function,  ( ), that the total employment by all public districts,  , 
determines a single market wage. The first-order condition for each school district is 
26 
 
   
   
 
  ( )
  
     ( )    (2) 
In equation (2),         is the value of the marginal product of labor to the 
school district, or their marginal revenue product (    ). We can rearrange equation (2) 
to get a measure of exploitation a la Arthur Pigou, that is 
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where   is the wage elasticity of labor supply. Using equation (3), we can write an 
employment-weighted average of school district exploitations as 
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Here, the sum of squared shares of employment is a Herfindahl index of market 
concentration, which we will denote as  . Then we can rewrite equation (4) to isolate   
as 
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 (5) 
As explained in Boal and Ransom (1997), the relationship between   and   is 
not static. That is,   and   are endogenous market outcomes determined by the number 
of school districts and their marginal revenue product. However, if we assume that total 
market demand and labor supply are fixed, then a negative relationship between   and 
  would suggest an oligopsony. 
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2.2.2. Wages in a Rent Sharing Model 
If the public school districts act like oligopolist when providing the educational 
services, any rents generated by a district can be shared by that district’s employees. 
Rent-sharing district employees can be modeled by using the model in Blanchflower, 
Oswald and Sanfey (1996). In their bargaining model, wages are determined in the 
following maximization problem 
   
  
    {[ ( )   ( ̅)]   }  (   )      (6) 
where   [   ] is the bargaining power of the employees of the district,  ( ) is the 
utility function of each employee,   is the wage in the industry,  ̅ is the expected 
opportunity wages outside the industry,   is employment, and   is the profit. The first-
order conditions are 
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where  ( ) is the revenue function. Equation (7) can be rewritten as 
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Here, if we substitute  ( )  ( ̅   )    ( ) in place of  ( ̅), we would get 
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where   (   ) is the relative bargaining strength of the employees and     is the 
rents per employee. We can assume that capital is quasi-fixed in the short-run. So we can 
write the rents per employee as 
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    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     (11) 
where    is the going wage in the local economy, and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the employment 
weighted average marginal revenue product. Since the expected opportunity wages 
outside the industry is a function of the going wage and unemployment in the local 
economy,  , we can write equation (10) as 
   (    )  
 
(   )
 (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    ) (12) 
In equation (12), wages increase as rents increase. In education markets, school 
district inefficiencies can be a source for economic rents. District inefficiency, in turn, is 
a function of competition in the education market, where efficiency increases with more 
competition. Therefore, we can expect that wages in a rent-sharing model is negatively 
related to the level of competition in the education services market. 
2.2.3. Wages in a Union Model 
According to the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) of National Center for 
Education Statistics, almost all of the public school teachers in Washington are in a 
union or employee’s association. This is mainly because Washington is not a right-to-
work state. A right-to-work law protects the employee rights to choose whether or not 
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they want to become a member of a union or financially support it. For example, Taylor 
(2010) examines the determinants of teacher pay in Texas, which is a right-to-work state. 
However, when a state does not have a right-to-work law, a state of forced unionism 
may prevail in that state. The unions in a state may counteract the power of the 
oligopsonistic school districts. 
As explained by Lovenheim (2009), the literature does not provide a complete 
theoretical model of education market unions. Hence, in theory, we do not know for sure 
how the effects of a teachers union on teacher pay or other educational variables would 
be. We can assume that the main goal of a union is to maximize the total welfare of its 
members, but then that would be a function of many variables such as the number of 
members with jobs, their hours of work, their level of benefits as well as their wage 
rates. Hence, basic models of unionization, which do not take into account the 
simultaneous collective bargaining over multiple outcomes, cannot give us unique 
predictions. Empirical examination would give us an idea about the effects of 
unionization, but states such as Washington do not have variation in union membership. 
Therefore, in this study, I compare my results using Washington data with Taylor (2010) 
results to have an understanding of the impact of forced unions and right-to-work laws 
on teacher and principal wage rates.
3
 
                                                 
3
 The teachers unions and the principal union in Washington are separate organizations and these unions 
may have different levels of wage bargaining power. In fact, in this study, I present evidence that 
principals union has more bargaining power than teachers union in Washington. 
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2.2.4. Reduced Form Models 
Reduced form models of the wages in a classical oligopsonistic education 
market, and the wages in the rent-sharing model are very similar. Assuming that the 
labor supply in the education market is a function of expected opportunity wages, the 
reduced form of wages in an oligopsonistic education market can be written as 
     (     
   ) (13) 
where   includes the variables, which affect the marginal revenue of public school 
districts, such as the factors determining the education production technology or the 
local education demand. In the rent-sharing model, we can assume that the Herfindahl 
index of market concentration is one of the determinants of economic rents in the 
education market through school inefficiency, and write the reduced form of wages in a 
rent-sharing model as 
     (     
     ) (14) 
There are two important differences between equations (13) and (14): First, the 
oligopsonistic model predicts that holding other variables constant, the effect of 
education market concentration on wages is negative. The same effect, however, is 
predicted to be positive in the rent-sharing model. The second difference between the 
equations is that the rent-sharing model includes an element,  , which is the bargaining 
power of the employees. This term would be useful to capture the effects of unionization 
in the labor market. Nevertheless, if there is no variation in the unionization across the 
labor markets, this distinction between the equations would not be consequential. One 
possibility is that different employee types in the education markets may have different 
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rates of unionization, which would cause a significant change in the overall findings. For 
example, if the level of public school teacher unionization is different than the level of 
public school administrator unionization, then if the effects of concentration index on the 
wages of teachers and administrators are different, that difference may partially be 
attributed to the different levels of unionization in those employee groups. 
2.3. Data 
The main data for this analysis come from the state of Washington Office of 
Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) school personnel database, and National 
Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) and Private 
School Universe Survey (PSS). The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
identifies 21 Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) in the state of Washington.
4
 These 
CBSAs include 12 metropolitan statistical areas and 9 micropolitan statistical areas. 
There are 39 counties in Washington, 13 of which do not belong to any CBSAs. The 
number of public schools in Washington is about 2000, which are operated by about 300 
public school districts.
5
 Moreover, the number of private schools in Washington is over 
400. About 100 of these private schools are operated by three separate Dioceses or the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church (SDA) in Washington. Hence, the number of private 
school districts is less than the number of private schools if these school systems are 
counted as districts. In the 2003-2004 school year, the smallest public school district has 
                                                 
4
 Two of these CBSAs—Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton and Lewiston metropolitan statistical areas—
cross state borders and include counties from either Oregon or Idaho. I exclude the counties in these cross-
border CBSAs to avoid complications while calculating the concentration measures. 
5
 The number of public school districts is more than 400 before 2001. 
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9 students, and the biggest has 46,636 students. The average public school district 
enrollment in the same year is 3460. The smallest private school district has 5 students 
and the biggest private school district has 20,366 students in the 2003-2004 school year. 
Mean private school enrollment in that school year is 549. Therefore, we can say that the 
range of education market structures is quite wide in Washington. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the public school district personnel. OSPI 
collects and publishes detailed information on the earnings of public school district 
personnel and their characteristics. The OSPI personnel records indicate individuals’ 
gender, ethnicity, major duty assignment, years of experience, percent of certified 
contracted time in major duty, public school district, and building assignment. The OSPI 
records present that there are about 30,000 elementary and secondary teachers, and about 
1,700 principals and administrators in each school year between the 1997-1998 school 
year and the 2005-2006 school year in Washington. 
An important part of my analysis is determining the education market area. The 
market needs to be clearly defined to measure         and   from equations (13) and 
(14). I follow the literature and assume that the education markets are the CBSAs 
identified by the OMB. Therefore, I treat each CBSA as a separate education market. In 
case an education personnel’s location of work is not in any of these CBSAs, I assume 
that their school district’s county is a distinct education market. 
The   variable is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market concentration 
(HHI). In this study, the Herfindahl index of market concentration of an education 
market is the sum of squared enrollment shares of all of the public and private school 
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districts in that education market. In Washington, the Herfindahl index of market 
concentration has a great variation across education markets. For example, in the 2005-
2006 school year, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue CBSA’s Herfindahl index of market 
concentration is 0.033. On the other hand, in the same school year, Garfield County’s 
Herfindahl index of market concentration is 1. Along with the HHI, in order to control 
for a possible nonlinear relationship between the HHI and the salaries, my model 
incorporates the square of the HHI. 
The   variable vector includes the characteristics of the education market which 
affects the marginal revenue product of the districts in that education market. The 
determinants of educational production technology and the local demand for education 
other than the market concentration can be in this vector of variables. The literature 
presents that the size of a school district is an important element in determining the 
educational production technology. Moreover, the relationship between cost of education 
production and its size does not need to be linear. Hence, I add the average district 
enrollment in the labor market and its square in the   vector as two factors of the 
education technology. Voter demographics would determine the local education demand. 
I get the median earnings, the percent of families with school-age children, the percent 
of population older than 65, the percent of the adult population with a high school degree 
but no higher degrees, and the percent of the adult population with a bachelor’s degree 
or higher degrees from Census 2000, and I include these variables in   as the factors 
determining the education demand in the labor market. 
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The prevailing wage in the labor markets and the local unemployment rate are 
the factors which determine the expected wage. For   , I use the comparable wage 
index (CWI) from NCES and Taylor and Fowler (2006). For  , I use the unemployment 
rates provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
In addition to these variables, salaries of the public school district personnel may 
be a function of school district-specific characteristics or individual-specific 
characteristics for compensating differentials. For instance, smaller school districts 
would be expected to have smaller class sizes, which would be perceived as easier to 
teach, manage or administer, which would in turn result in their employing the personnel 
with reduced salary rates. Conversely, it may be the case that school districts with a 
student body that is generally perceived as too difficult to teach or administer can hire 
their personnel only with a premium. Moreover, because of the higher cost of living and 
commuting costs in metropolitan areas, school districts located in the center of these 
areas may be expected to cover up these costs with increase salary rates to be able to 
hire. In order to control for these effects, I used the district size definitions in the State of 
Washington, Joint Legislative Audit & Review Committee’s School District Cost and 
Size Study (2010) and include two district size indicators: small districts have an 
enrollment less than 1,000 students, and medium districts have an enrollment more than 
or equal to 1,000 and less than or equal to 10,000. According to these definitions, there 
are 145 small, 120 medium and 31 large districts in Washington in 2005-2006 school 
year. Additionally, I include the percentage of students in the district eligible to get free 
or reduced lunch, the percentage of migrant students in the district, the percentage of 
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Hispanic students in the district, and the percentage of black students in the district as 
student demographics of districts. Furthermore, my model contains a variable measuring 
the distance from the employee’s school district to the center of the closest metropolitan 
area. 
Finally, in order to control for individual-specific characteristics, my model 
includes indicator variables for the individuals’ highest degree (bachelor’s degree, 
master’s degree, and doctorate degree), assignment to a Special Education program, 
ethnicity, gender, and assignment to a high school grade. I also include a dummy 
variable for the personnel who are in their first year in the district. In addition to that, I 
add the personnel’s years of experience and its square, and their percent of certified 
contracted time in their major duty. There are two personnel categories in my study: the 
first personnel category is teachers, including all major duty elementary, secondary and 
other teachers in the OSPI records; the second personnel category is principals, including 
all major duty elementary and secondary principals, elementary and secondary vice 
principals, and other school administrators in the OSPI records. All of the specifications 
in this study contain dummy variables for each school year available in the data set. 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide descriptive statistics on the variables used in this analysis. 
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TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, TEACHER CATEGORY (MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total final salary 47,882 9,974 29,131 73,024 
HHI 0.134 0.115 0.033 1 
Average district enrollment 6,925 3,455 212 10,441 
Median income 25,351 4,458 9,488 30,088 
Percent households with school 
aged children 
0.285 0.015 0.23 0.307 
Percent population over age 65 0.112 0.022 0.085 0.226 
Percent adults with high school 
degree only 
0.6 0.068 0.488 0.701 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.267 0.088 0.122 0.44 
Unemployment rate 5.963 1.686 1.6 13.5 
Comparable wage index 1.102 0.153 0.766 1.387 
Metropolitan area 0.608 0.488 0 1 
1997-1998 school year 0.103 0.304 0 1 
1998-1999 school year 0.101 0.301 0 1 
1999-2000 school year 0.106 0.307 0 1 
2000-2001 school year 0.108 0.31 0 1 
2001-2002 school year 0.116 0.321 0 1 
2002-2003 school year 0.117 0.321 0 1 
2003-2004 school year 0.115 0.319 0 1 
2004-2005 school year 0.118 0.323 0 1 
2005-2006 school year 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Small district 0.053 0.225 0 1 
Medium district 0.383 0.486 0 1 
Percent low income students 0.21 0.218 0 0.973 
Percent migrant students 0.008 0.046 0 0.962 
Percent Hispanic students 0.11 0.154 0 1 
Percent black students 0.06 0.07 0 0.25 
Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
23.4 16.7 1.6 128 
Years of experience 13.8 9.2 0 53.8 
Bachelor’s degree 0.429 0.495 0 1 
Master’s degree 0.556 0.497 0 1 
Doctorate degree 0.006 0.077 0 1 
Special Education 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.915 0.185 0 1 
Asian 0.026 0.158 0 1 
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TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, TEACHER CATEGORY (MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Black 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Hispanic 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Indian 0.008 0.087 0 1 
Female 0.749 0.434 0 1 
New in district 0.035 0.184 0 1 
High school 0.384 0.486 0 1 
Number of observations = 276,795 
 
TABLE 2.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, PRINCIPAL CATEGORY (MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total final salary 82,212 9,691 64,528 113,603 
HHI 0.124 0.112 0.033 1 
Average district enrollment 7,264 3,361 260 10,441 
Median income 25,681 4,230 9,488 30,088 
Percent households with school 
aged children 
0.285 0.014 0.23 0.307 
Percent population over age 65 0.111 0.021 0.085 0.226 
Percent adults with high school 
degree only 
0.6 0.068 0.488 0.701 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.27 0.088 0.122 0.44 
Unemployment rate 5.909 1.628 1.6 11.9 
Comparable wage index 1.114 0.147 0.766 1.387 
Metropolitan area 0.649 0.477 0 1 
1997-1998 school year 0.089 0.285 0 1 
1998-1999 school year 0.091 0.288 0 1 
1999-2000 school year 0.104 0.305 0 1 
2000-2001 school year 0.112 0.316 0 1 
2001-2002 school year 0.115 0.319 0 1 
2002-2003 school year 0.119 0.324 0 1 
2003-2004 school year 0.119 0.324 0 1 
2004-2005 school year 0.126 0.331 0 1 
2005-2006 school year 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Small district 0.022 0.148 0 1 
Medium district 0.395 0.489 0 1 
Percent low income students 0.214 0.214 0 0.972 
Percent migrant students 0.008 0.043 0 0.539 
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TABLE 2.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, PRINCIPAL CATEGORY (MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percent Hispanic students 0.104 0.14 0 0.946 
Percent black students 0.064 0.074 0 0.25 
Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
22.2 16.4 1.6 128 
Years of experience 19.5 8.2 0 46.5 
Bachelor’s degree 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Master’s degree 0.93 0.256 0 1 
Doctorate degree 0.042 0.201 0 1 
Special Education 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.971 0.129 0 1 
Asian 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Black 0.056 0.23 0 1 
Hispanic 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Indian 0.013 0.112 0 1 
Female 0.486 0.5 0 1 
New in district 0.071 0.257 0 1 
High school 0.098 0.298 0 1 
Number of observations = 15,524 
 
We can write the specification for each personnel category as: 
  (     )             
        
       
              
 
       
        
(15) 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the current total final salary of 
the individual   at the school district   in the education market   in the school year  .   
is a vector of district-specific variables,   is a vector of personnel-specific variables, 
      is the error term, and   (                       ) is the parameter vector to 
be estimated. 
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2.4. Regression Results 
Since the variables in   vector, Herfindahl index, unemployment rate, and 
comparable wage index do not change within the education markets, I correct the 
standard errors by stacking the observations in CBSA clusters and generating a CBSA 
cluster-robust covariance matrix estimator. Table 3 report the OLS estimation results of 
the model in (15). The estimation results with the teacher category illustrate that there is 
a significant relationship between the HHI and total teacher salaries, and the relationship 
is of nonlinear pattern for both of the personnel categories. That is, when the 
concentration in the education market is low, the salaries of the personnel decrease as 
competition in the education market decreases, but when the concentration is high, the 
salaries of the personnel increase as competition in the education market decreases. The 
estimation results with the principal category, on the other hand, show no significant 
relationship between the HHI and total principal salaries. The local minimums of the 
wages with respect to the HHI are different for different personnel: For teachers, the 
salaries increase with concentration if HHI exceeds 0.35. On the other hand, for 
principal, the salaries begin to increase with concentration once HHI is more than 0.68, 
but the test for joint significance of HHI terms rejects such a relationship. 
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TABLE 3.—LINEAR ESTIMATION OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 Teacher Principal 
HHI 
-0.157*** -0.089 
(0.041) (0.062) 
HHI, squared  
0.222*** 0.066 
(0.065) (0.054) 
Average district enrollment 
0.004 0.024*** 
(0.006) (0.007) 
log(Median income) 
-0.046** -0.034 
(0.017) (0.029) 
Percent households with school aged children 
-0.036 0.231 
(0.213) (0.261) 
Percent population over age 65 
0.065 0.332* 
(0.118) (0.180) 
Percent adults with high school degree only 
0.251*** 0.157 
(0.084) (0.113) 
Percent adults with at least bachelor’s degree 
0.059 0.162* 
(0.057) (0.083) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.002 0.002 
(0.001) (0.003) 
Comparable wage index 
0.173*** -0.000 
(0.061) (0.068) 
Metropolitan area 
0.009 0.018** 
(0.005) (0.008) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.973*** 8.496*** 
(0.151) (0.281) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.968*** 8.510*** 
(0.151) (0.280) 
1999-2000 school year 
8.008*** 8.546*** 
(0.152) (0.280) 
2000-2001 school year 
8.024*** 8.580*** 
(0.152) (0.276) 
2001-2002 school year 
8.045*** 8.624*** 
(0.154) (0.273) 
2002-2003 school year 
8.070*** 8.660*** 
(0.153) (0.273) 
2003-2004 school year 
8.074*** 8.668*** 
(0.152) (0.273) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.074*** 8.684*** 
(0.151) (0.273) 
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TABLE 3.—LINEAR ESTIMATION OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.082*** 8.716*** 
(0.150) (0.272) 
Small district 
-0.043*** -0.099*** 
(0.005) (0.010) 
Medium district 
-0.022*** -0.040*** 
(0.003) (0.006) 
Percent low income students 
0.013 -0.029 
(0.014) (0.021) 
Percent migrant students 
0.011 0.023 
(0.013) (0.015) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.036** 0.032 
(0.016) (0.038) 
Percent black students 
-0.100*** 0.045* 
(0.029) (0.026) 
log(Distance from major metropolitan areas) 
-0.005 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Years of experience, squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.048*** -0.021 
(0.005) (0.029) 
Master’s degree 
0.058*** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.026) 
Doctorate degree 
0.074*** 0.033 
(0.009) (0.028) 
Special Education 
-0.011*** -0.020* 
(0.001) (0.011) 
Certified contracted time in major duty 
0.014*** 0.047*** 
(0.002) (0.011) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.007 
(0.001) (0.005) 
Black 
-0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Hispanic 
-0.006*** 0.001 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Indian 
-0.002 -0.012 
(0.005) (0.010) 
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TABLE 3.—LINEAR ESTIMATION OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.027*** -0.012*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
New in district 
-0.022*** -0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
High school 
0.019*** -0.012** 
(0.002) (0.005) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0023 p = 0.3602 
        p = 0.0484 p = 0.3715 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk 
(*) means significance at the 10% level. 
 
The existence of the nonlinear relationship between competition and personnel 
salaries indicates that there are multiple forces shaping the pattern. As I discussed 
before, oligopsony power of the school districts would pull down the salaries of the 
personnel, while the rent-sharing and the power of the unions would increase the wages. 
The results indicate that the oligopsony effect dominates the rent-sharing and union 
power effects in relatively less concentrated education markets. In relatively less 
competitive markets, however, rent-sharing and union power effects dominate the 
oligopsony effect. Taylor (2010) finds that the HHI at which teacher salaries start 
increasing is 0.54 in Texas. In Washington, however, I find the local minimum to be at 
0.35. Texas is a right-to-work state, but Washington is a union state. The difference 
between these two states can be attributed to the increase in the teachers’ bargaining 
power due to unionization. 
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In order to have a better understanding of the effects of HHI on school district 
personnel wages, I handle the endogeneity problem due to the simultaneity of HHI and 
wages. In order to alleviate the endogeneity problem, instruments such as those 
presented in Hoxby (2000) can be used. Hoxby explains that streams played an 
important role in the delineation of the school district boundaries in the eighteen and 
nineteen centuries and hence these natural boundaries are key determinants of supply of 
school districts even though they are not limiting the student transportation today. In a 
comment, Rothstein (2007) offers alternative categories of streams grouped into two 
different size categories as instruments. I follow Hoxby and Rothstein and use the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) Geographic Names Information System (GNIS) data to 
create two categories of streams based on the length of the streams defining streams 
longer than 3.5 miles as large, and others as small.
6
 I consider using the counts of the 
two different types of streams in a district’s county as two separate instruments for our 
endogenous concentration measure. 
Other than these two instrumental variables, I use the land area of the education 
market and the total enrollment per square mile in the education market as instrumental 
variables for the HHI. These instruments would capture the profit potential of the 
education markets, which is explored in Grosskopf, Hayes and Taylor (2004). I measure 
the total enrollment per square mile in the education market with a one year lag in order 
                                                 
6
 The data I use is the one Rothstein mentions in his comment as the “alternative version of GNIS data” 
which includes coordinates of two points for each stream in each county: one of the points is the origin 
where that stream starts traversing that county, and the other point is the destination where that stream 
ends traversing that county. The length between these two points is calculated by using the haversine 
formula. 
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to ensure its exogeneity to the current school year. Summary statistics of all of the 
instrumental variables I employ are presented in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Teacher Category 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Count of small streams in the 
district’s county 
140.5 91.8 0 379 
Count of large streams in the 
district’s county 
65.8 36.5 0 226 
Total land area of the 
education market 
3,887.9 2,112.9 174.9 5,894.0 
Total enrollment per square 
mile in the market 
59.72 37.16 0.48 116.93 
Number of observations = 276,795 
Principal Category 
Count of small streams in the 
district’s county 
145.2 88.3 0 379 
Count of large streams in the 
district’s county 
66.6 33.2 0 226 
Total land area of the 
education market 
4,040.3 2,112.6 174.9 5,894.0 
Total enrollment per square 
mile in the market 
62.77 35.97 0.48 116.93 
Number of observations = 15,524 
 
The first and second columns of Table 5 report the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation results of the model in (15). The endogeneity test statistic is 17.314 
for the HHI and its square—the two potentially endogenous regressors—in the teacher 
column, and 17.263 in the principal column. The probability of the exogeneity of the 
regressors is equal to 0.0002 in both cases. Hence, the test shows that the HHI and its 
square need to be treated as endogenous. The Partial R
2
 of Shea (1997) is 0.2434 for the 
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HHI and 0.0733 for the squared HHI indicating that both of the endogenous regressors 
are not weakly identified. Still, I also test the relevance of potentially endogenous 
regressors with Anderson and Rubin (1949) and Stock and Wright (2000) tests which are 
robust in the presence of weak instruments. The tests reject the null hypothesis 
suggesting that endogenous regressors are not irrelevant. Finally, Hansen’s J statistic is 
26.171 so the test does not reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments for HHI 
and its square are valid. 
According to the 2SLS results, teachers’ salaries begin to increase with 
concentration at a relatively similar level of HHI at 0.36. This would mean that the 
bargaining power of the teachers union in Washington is about the same as that in the 
OLS estimation results. On the other hand, 2SLS results indicate that principals’ salaries 
begin to increase by concentration if concentration is more than 0.23. This finding is 
significantly different than the corresponding finding in the OLS estimation. Here, we 
see that principals may have significantly more bargaining power than what is suggested 
by the OLS results. Moreover, since 0.23 is smaller than 0.36, the inference is that the 
principals union may actually have relatively more bargaining power than the teachers 
union in Washington, or that the number of available principals in the market is 
significantly smaller than the number of teachers, which may give the principals 
relatively more bargaining power. It should also be noted that the results show that other 
variables being constant, the salaries of both teachers and principals are greater in a 
perfectly concentrated market than in a perfectly competitive market. 
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TABLE 5.—IV AND GMM ESTIMATIONS OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
2SLS GMM 
Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
HHI 
-0.208*** -0.193*** -0.172*** -0.187*** 
(0.032) (0.046) (0.030) (0.046) 
HHI, squared  
0.289*** 0.416*** 0.316*** 0.420*** 
(0.066) (0.117) (0.066) (0.116) 
Average district enrollment 
0.003 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.028*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
log(Median income) 
-0.044*** -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.039 0.400** -0.132 0.381** 
(0.104) (0.162) (0.102) (0.160) 
Percent population over age 
65 
0.057 0.366*** 0.042 0.374*** 
(0.058) (0.098) (0.058) (0.097) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
0.270*** 0.185*** 0.223*** 0.188*** 
(0.045) (0.062) (0.043) (0.062) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.073** 0.226*** 0.075** 0.230*** 
(0.031) (0.051) (0.031) (0.051) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.002 0.005** -0.000 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Comparable wage index 
0.161*** 0.028 0.136*** 0.042 
(0.028) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040) 
Metropolitan area 
0.005 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.975*** 8.527*** 8.094*** 8.550*** 
(0.073) (0.142) (0.067) (0.138) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.971*** 8.541*** 8.091*** 8.563*** 
(0.072) (0.141) (0.067) (0.138) 
1999-2000 school year 
8.011*** 8.575*** 8.134*** 8.597*** 
(0.072) (0.140) (0.066) (0.137) 
2000-2001 school year 
8.028*** 8.603*** 8.155*** 8.624*** 
(0.072) (0.137) (0.065) (0.135) 
2001-2002 school year 
8.049*** 8.640*** 8.176*** 8.659*** 
(0.071) (0.135) (0.065) (0.133) 
2002-2003 school year 
8.075*** 8.671*** 8.205*** 8.689*** 
(0.070) (0.134) (0.063) (0.132) 
2003-2004 school year 
8.080*** 8.678*** 8.209*** 8.696*** 
(0.069) (0.134) (0.063) (0.132) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.080*** 8.695*** 8.210*** 8.713*** 
(0.069) (0.133) (0.062) (0.130) 
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TABLE 5.—IV AND GMM ESTIMATIONS OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
2SLS GMM 
Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.089*** 8.729*** 8.216*** 8.746*** 
(0.069) (0.131) (0.062) (0.129) 
Small district 
-0.044*** -0.102*** -0.044*** -0.100*** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Medium district 
-0.022*** -0.039*** -0.023*** -0.039*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Percent low income students 
0.012 -0.023 0.002 -0.022 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
Percent migrant students 
0.012 0.034 0.029 0.034 
(0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.028) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.039*** 0.025 0.026*** 0.023 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) 
Percent black students 
-0.106*** 0.036 -0.114*** 0.036 
(0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.005** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.048*** -0.022 -0.053*** -0.023 
(0.004) (0.021) (0.003) (0.021) 
Master’s degree 
0.058*** -0.003 0.055*** -0.004 
(0.004) (0.020) (0.003) (0.020) 
Doctorate degree 
0.074*** 0.033* 0.065*** 0.032 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.020) 
Special Education 
-0.011*** -0.018** -0.012*** -0.018** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.014*** 0.047*** 0.013*** 0.047*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.002 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.006*** 0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.002 -0.012** -0.004* -0.012** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
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TABLE 5.—IV AND GMM ESTIMATIONS OF THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
2SLS GMM 
Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.027*** -0.013*** -0.029*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.022*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
High school 
0.019*** -0.013*** 0.020*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0000 p = 0.0002 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0002 
        p = 0.0798 p = 0.0073 p = 0.0007 p = 0.0046 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) explain that in the presence of arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is more 
efficient than the standard IV estimator. I find that Pagan and Hall (1983) general test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Therefore, I also estimate the 
second stage of the IV regression with GMM. The results from the second stage GMM 
regression are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 5. As can be seen, 
according to the GMM estimation results, the HHI break point where teachers’ wages 
start increasing with concentration is 0.27—lower than the break point level found with 
2SLS. For the principals, GMM results verify the 2SLS finding that the break point is at 
0.22. All in all, the GMM results, along with the OLS and 2SLS results, present that 
there is a u-shaped relationship between the salaries of teachers and principals, and the 
concentration of the education market. I found that the local minima of these u-shapes 
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are at relatively lower concentration levels compared to the results of Taylor (2010), 
which is probably due to the personnel’s increased bargaining power with the help of 
unions. Furthermore, I present that the break point concentration levels at which salaries 
start increasing with concentration are different for teachers and principals. 
2.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented in Table 3 and Table 5 may be sensitive to how 
competition in the education market is measured. The common approach in the literature 
is to use Herfindahl-Hirschman indices to measure the market concentration. However, 
different sets of potential competitors and the geographic definition of the market would 
change these indices, which, in turn, may change the coefficient estimates, signs and 
significance of the HHI variables in the regression. 
First, the HHI used to generate the results in Table 3 and Table 5 assumes that 
public school districts and all of the private schools (ALL) belong to the set of potential 
competitors. This, however, may not be true if private schools are not direct competitors 
with the public school districts. Hence, measuring the HHI with only public schools 
(PUB) is one of the alternative approaches that I explore in this section. 
Alternatively, the concentration measure may include approved private schools 
along with the public school districts (APR). In Washington, State Board of Education 
accepts applications from private schools to approve their standards of health, safety and 
education. That is, the approval of a private school may indicate that that school is a 
good substitute for public schools while other private schools which do not have any 
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approval from the State Board of Education may not be considered so. So the potential 
market participants may include only the approved private schools along with the public 
schools districts.
7
 
Furthermore, the assumption that the education markets are the CBSAs 
determined by the OMB may not be suitable. The OMB has certain guidelines based on 
urban core populations to determine the CBSAs. However, these guidelines do not 
necessarily delineate the education markets. Several alternative assumptions about the 
borders of the education markets can be made which would result in a completely 
different set of education markets. For instance, one equally plausible assumption can be 
that counties, instead of the CBSAs, are the separate education markets. This assumption 
would increase the number of education markets in a state, and would generate different 
concentration ratios for the counties within a CBSA. 
It is also possible to define the district-specific markets by the spatial distribution 
of the competitors. Simple geometrical shapes such as circles around schools in a district 
can be used to delineate the relevant education markets for that district. In order to 
calculate the HHI with such a market definition, I assume that the relevant geographic 
market for each school district includes all of the districts with at least one school within 
a 15-mile radius circle (R15) around each of the district’s own schools. Figure 1 
illustrates this method. In the figure, rectangles represent school districts, and black spots 
represent schools. There are three schools in the district with the star. When circles of 
                                                 
7
 Out of 594 private schools in 2011-2012 school year, 379 are approved by the Washington State Board 
of Education. Total private enrollment is 72,629. Enrollment in approved private schools: 57,268 which 
corresponds to %79 of the total private enrollment. 
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the specified radius are drawn around those schools, we see that four other districts 
surrounding the star district have schools in those circles. Those districts along with the 
star district are shaded in gray which represents the education market for the star district. 
Of course, 15-mile radius is arbitrarily chosen. In order to check the sensitivity on the 
measure with respect to the size of the radius, I generate two other indices with 25-mile 
radius (R25), and 50-mile radius (R50) criteria. 
FIGURE 1.—THE DETERMINATION OF THE EDUCATION MARKETS WITH THE RADIAL 
METHOD 
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Finally, I explore the possibility of the rings in education markets, in which the 
schools at the outer rings contribute to the competition in the education market less than 
the schools at the core. This would somehow incorporate the distance between the 
competitors to the concentration measure. In a sense, rings measure is similar to the 
radial measure of competition that I assume that the relevant core for each school district 
includes all of the districts with at least one school within a 15-mile radius circle around 
each of the district’s own schools. In addition to that, however, I also assume that the 
relevant periphery for each school district includes all of the districts with at least one 
school within a ring formed by a 15- mile radius and a 50-mile radius circle around each 
of the district’s own schools. I assume that the contribution of the districts in the 
periphery to the concentration index is by half of what would normally be counted in a 
Herfindahl index. Because of the peripheral contribution, the ring HHI of concentration 
for a district would always be smaller than (or in some cases equal to) the 15-mile radius 
HHI of concentration. Table 6 displays the pairwise correlations between the different 
HHIs presented in this section, and Table 7 reports their summary statistics. 
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TABLE 6.—PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE HHIS, WASHINGTON DATA 
  a b c d e f g h 
HHI-CBSA-ALL a 1.00        
HHI-R15-ALL b 0.37 1.00       
HHI-R25-ALL c 0.37 0.89 1.00      
HHI-R50-ALL d 0.35 0.70 0.80 1.00     
HHI-County-ALL e 0.85 0.33 0.32 0.27 1.00    
HHI-CBSA-PUB f 0.99 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.84 1.00   
HHI-R15-PUB g 0.39 0.94 0.86 0.78 0.35 0.38 1.00  
HHI-R25-PUB h 0.38 0.80 0.89 0.87 0.33 0.38 0.89 1.00 
HHI-R50-PUB i 0.34 0.60 0.69 0.92 0.26 0.35 0.72 0.87 
HHI-County-PUB j 0.85 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.97 0.86 0.34 0.33 
HHI-CBSA-APR k 0.99 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.85 0.99 0.38 0.38 
HHI-R15-APR l 0.37 1.00 0.89 0.71 0.33 0.36 0.95 0.81 
HHI-R25-APR m 0.38 0.88 0.99 0.83 0.33 0.37 0.86 0.91 
HHI-R50-APR n 0.35 0.68 0.78 0.99 0.28 0.35 0.77 0.87 
HHI-County-APR o 0.84 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.98 0.84 0.34 0.33 
HHI-Rings-ALL p 0.38 0.98 0.92 0.81 0.33 0.37 0.96 0.86 
          
  i j k l m n o p 
HHI-R50-PUB i 1.00        
HHI-County-PUB j 0.27 1.00       
HHI-CBSA-APR k 0.35 0.86 1.00      
HHI-R15-APR l 0.62 0.32 0.37 1.00     
HHI-R25-APR m 0.73 0.32 0.38 0.89 1.00    
HHI-R50-APR n 0.94 0.28 0.36 0.69 0.81 1.00   
HHI-County-APR o 0.27 0.97 0.86 0.32 0.32 0.28 1.00  
HHI-Rings-ALL p 0.71 0.33 0.38 0.99 0.92 0.79 0.33 1.00 
Note: The tags following the HHI names denote the market definition and the set of 
competitors. 
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TABLE 7.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE HHIS, WASHINGTON DATA 
Teacher Category 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
HHI (HHI-CBSA-ALL) 0.134 0.115 0.033 1 
HHI-R15-ALL 0.059 0.114 0.007 1 
HHI-R25-ALL 0.042 0.072 0.007 1 
HHI-R50-ALL 0.023 0.034 0.007 0.642 
HHI-County-ALL 0.177 0.116 0.069 1 
HHI-CBSA-PUB 0.148 0.124 0.039 1 
HHI-R15-PUB 0.071 0.125 0.01 1 
HHI-R25-PUB 0.055 0.085 0.01 1 
HHI-R50-PUB 0.036 0.048 0.012 0.728 
HHI-County-PUB 0.196 0.123 0.09 1 
HHI-CBSA-APR 0.136 0.116 0.033 1 
HHI-R15-APR 0.06 0.115 0.007 1 
HHI-R25-APR 0.044 0.074 0.007 1 
HHI-R50-APR 0.024 0.037 0.008 0.67 
HHI-County-APR 0.181 0.12 0.073 1 
HHI-Rings-ALL 0.041 0.07 0.007 0.821 
Number of observations = 276,795 
Principal Category 
HHI (HHI-CBSA-ALL) 0.124 0.112 0.033 1 
HHI-R15-ALL 0.058 0.107 0.007 1 
HHI-R25-ALL 0.042 0.07 0.007 0.983 
HHI-R50-ALL 0.023 0.033 0.007 0.513 
HHI-County-ALL 0.169 0.11 0.069 1 
HHI-CBSA-PUB 0.138 0.122 0.039 1 
HHI-R15-PUB 0.07 0.118 0.01 1 
HHI-R25-PUB 0.055 0.084 0.01 1 
HHI-R50-PUB 0.036 0.048 0.012 0.536 
HHI-County-PUB 0.187 0.117 0.09 1 
HHI-CBSA-APR 0.127 0.113 0.033 1 
HHI-R15-APR 0.059 0.108 0.007 1 
HHI-R25-APR 0.044 0.073 0.007 0.983 
HHI-R50-APR 0.024 0.036 0.008 0.513 
HHI-County-APR 0.173 0.113 0.073 1 
HHI-Rings-ALL 0.04 0.066 0.007 0.757 
Number of observations = 15,524 
Note: The tags following the HHI names denote the market definition and the set of 
competitors. 
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Table 8 through Table 15 present the GMM estimation results of the model in 
with different measures of competition. First, the results show that holding everything 
else constant, measuring the HHI with three different sets of competitors does not 
change the signs or significance of the results. For the teacher category, the location of 
the minimum wage with respect to the HHI is at HHI=0.29 in the HHI-CBSA-PUB 
column, and at HHI=0.27 in the HHI-CBSA-APR column. For the principal category, 
the location of the minimum wage with respect to the HHI is at HHI=0.24 in the HHI-
CBSA-PUB column, and at HHI=0.22 in the HHI-CBSA-APR column. That is, the 
location of the local minimum with respect to HHI does not seem to change much as the 
sets of competitors used to measure the HHI change. 
Secondly, employing different market definitions change the results. The results 
with the HHIs measured with the market defined as counties are somewhat similar to 
that with the market defined as CBSAs. Radial measures of the HHI present a non-linear 
relationship between personnel salaries and the HHI as well. The significance and the 
pattern of this relationship, however, are different than that when the market is defined 
as CBSAs, and they change as the size of the radius changes. To give an example, for 
the teacher category, the location of the minimum wage with respect to the HHI is at 
HHI=0.46 in the HHI-R15-ALL column and the HHI terms are jointly significant at the 
1% level. In the HHI-R25-ALL column, however, teachers’ minimum wage with respect 
to the HHI is at HHI=0.41 with a joint significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 8.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-ALL HHI-R25-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-0.762*** -0.445 -1.620** -0.937 
(0.235) (0.283) (0.699) (0.719) 
Specified HHI, squared  
0.831*** 0.908** 1.956** 2.216** 
(0.269) (0.376) (0.962) (0.937) 
Average district enrollment 
-0.001 0.030*** -0.008 0.028*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
log(Median income) 
0.020 0.014 0.072 0.019 
(0.034) (0.057) (0.065) (0.080) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.274 0.322 -0.458 0.030 
(0.205) (0.197) (0.340) (0.293) 
Percent population over age 
65 
0.060 0.416*** -0.232 0.065 
(0.150) (0.159) (0.258) (0.209) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
-0.008 0.009 -0.090 -0.038 
(0.092) (0.150) (0.157) (0.212) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
-0.227** 0.034 -0.350** -0.034 
(0.092) (0.157) (0.166) (0.243) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.008*** 0.001 -0.011** -0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Comparable wage index 
0.039 -0.072 -0.076 -0.161 
(0.067) (0.093) (0.145) (0.146) 
Metropolitan area 
0.004 0.016* -0.030 0.005 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.025) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.785*** 8.130*** 7.624*** 8.367*** 
(0.205) (0.341) (0.319) (0.366) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.785*** 8.146*** 7.629*** 8.387*** 
(0.203) (0.338) (0.315) (0.361) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.836*** 8.187*** 7.686*** 8.432*** 
(0.201) (0.334) (0.309) (0.354) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.890*** 8.221*** 7.769*** 8.480*** 
(0.198) (0.325) (0.292) (0.329) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.920*** 8.272*** 7.794*** 8.537*** 
(0.196) (0.320) (0.293) (0.325) 
2002-2003 school year 
7.966*** 8.316*** 7.854*** 8.591*** 
(0.193) (0.313) (0.284) (0.311) 
2003-2004 school year 
7.975*** 8.325*** 7.865*** 8.605*** 
(0.192) (0.310) (0.281) (0.305) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.006*** 8.350*** 7.915*** 8.638*** 
(0.190) (0.304) (0.271) (0.291) 
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TABLE 8.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-ALL HHI-R25-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.019*** 8.386*** 7.932*** 8.676*** 
(0.189) (0.302) (0.269) (0.288) 
Small district 
-0.048*** -0.117*** -0.046*** -0.100*** 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
Medium district 
-0.013*** -0.035*** -0.015*** -0.035*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Percent low income students 
0.012 -0.042** 0.043 -0.035 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.025) 
Percent migrant students 
0.091* 0.065 0.144 0.081 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.090) (0.075) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.003 0.039 -0.029 0.031 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.037) (0.047) 
Percent black students 
-0.105*** 0.030 -0.117*** 0.023 
(0.021) (0.034) (0.030) (0.038) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.001 -0.016*** 0.004 -0.013* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.049*** -0.020 -0.052*** -0.017 
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.024) 
Master’s degree 
0.058*** -0.001 0.054*** 0.001 
(0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.022) 
Doctorate degree 
0.070*** 0.033 0.068*** 0.035 
(0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.023) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.017** -0.010*** -0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.017*** 0.058*** 0.016*** 0.057*** 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.007*** 0.000 -0.006*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.004 -0.015*** -0.003 -0.012** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
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TABLE 8.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-ALL HHI-R25-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.028*** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
High school 
0.018*** -0.017*** 0.018*** -0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0040 p = 0.0237 p = 0.0671 p = 0.0352 
        p = 0.6466 p = 0.0093 p = 0.5330 p = 0.0200 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 9.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-ALL HHI-County-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-3.824* -1.669 -0.318*** -0.379*** 
(2.157) (1.130) (0.066) (0.091) 
Specified HHI, squared  
14.081 10.990 0.504*** 0.582*** 
(13.380) (7.915) (0.103) (0.147) 
Average district enrollment 
0.007 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Median income) 
0.099 -0.011 -0.048*** -0.035* 
(0.080) (0.045) (0.012) (0.019) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.230 0.279 0.044 0.665*** 
(0.420) (0.289) (0.123) (0.185) 
Percent population over age 
65 
-0.315 0.141 0.096 0.450*** 
(0.453) (0.392) (0.070) (0.098) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
-0.171 0.054 0.283*** 0.285*** 
(0.247) (0.124) (0.054) (0.064) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
-0.274* 0.137 0.121*** 0.287*** 
(0.165) (0.112) (0.035) (0.057) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.006 0.005 -0.000 0.005** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Comparable wage index 
-0.177 -0.078 0.108*** -0.028 
(0.206) (0.108) (0.033) (0.042) 
Metropolitan area 
-0.046* 0.011 0.011*** 0.014*** 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.370*** 8.357*** 7.971*** 8.322*** 
(0.348) (0.285) (0.091) (0.162) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.379*** 8.375*** 7.969*** 8.337*** 
(0.341) (0.282) (0.090) (0.161) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.441*** 8.414*** 8.014*** 8.374*** 
(0.330) (0.279) (0.089) (0.161) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.493*** 8.450*** 8.035*** 8.408*** 
(0.328) (0.263) (0.088) (0.158) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.520*** 8.491*** 8.061*** 8.452*** 
(0.317) (0.268) (0.087) (0.156) 
2002-2003 school year 
7.581*** 8.529*** 8.091*** 8.487*** 
(0.303) (0.262) (0.085) (0.155) 
2003-2004 school year 
7.593*** 8.541*** 8.099*** 8.497*** 
(0.298) (0.261) (0.085) (0.155) 
2004-2005 school year 
7.652*** 8.571*** 8.097*** 8.514*** 
(0.284) (0.246) (0.084) (0.154) 
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TABLE 9.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-ALL HHI-County-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
7.672*** 8.611*** 8.105*** 8.550*** 
(0.274) (0.249) (0.084) (0.152) 
Small district 
-0.046** -0.100** -0.047*** -0.106*** 
(0.020) (0.044) (0.003) (0.006) 
Medium district 
-0.020*** -0.037*** -0.024*** -0.040*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Percent low income students 
0.038 -0.028 -0.007 -0.038*** 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.010) (0.014) 
Percent migrant students 
0.137 0.039 0.033 0.037 
(0.098) (0.064) (0.025) (0.031) 
Percent Hispanic students 
-0.021 0.036 0.029*** 0.041** 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.009) (0.019) 
Percent black students 
-0.161*** 0.034 -0.111*** 0.055* 
(0.042) (0.054) (0.021) (0.033) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.020 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008*** 
(0.022) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.039*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.050*** -0.021 -0.052*** -0.021 
(0.004) (0.023) (0.003) (0.021) 
Master’s degree 
0.055*** -0.001 0.055*** -0.002 
(0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (0.020) 
Doctorate degree 
0.071*** 0.033 0.065*** 0.036* 
(0.006) (0.023) (0.005) (0.020) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.018* -0.012*** -0.017** 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.008) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.017*** 0.057*** 0.014*** 0.046*** 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.010) 
Asian 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.000 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.002 -0.013 -0.002 -0.011* 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) 
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TABLE 9.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-ALL HHI-County-ALL 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.027*** -0.013*** -0.028*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.021*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
High school 
0.018*** -0.014 0.019*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0329 p = 0.3153 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0001 
        p = 0.3667 p = 0.1863 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0009 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 10.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-CBSA-PUB HHI-R15-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-0.169*** -0.183*** -1.315*** -0.585* 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.416) (0.309) 
Specified HHI, squared  
0.296*** 0.381*** 1.346*** 1.006** 
(0.060) (0.104) (0.480) (0.408) 
Average district enrollment 
0.010*** 0.028*** -0.004 0.027*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
log(Median income) 
-0.057*** -0.052*** 0.086 0.042 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.060) (0.061) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.127 0.375** -0.134 0.224 
(0.100) (0.156) (0.370) (0.223) 
Percent population over age 
65 
0.031 0.354*** -0.040 0.364** 
(0.059) (0.096) (0.281) (0.178) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
0.226*** 0.183*** -0.158 -0.015 
(0.043) (0.062) (0.158) (0.151) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.079*** 0.225*** -0.392*** -0.005 
(0.030) (0.050) (0.151) (0.152) 
Unemployment rate 
0.000 0.006*** -0.012** 0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Comparable wage index 
0.135*** 0.038 -0.078 -0.062 
(0.027) (0.040) (0.127) (0.094) 
Metropolitan area 
0.012*** 0.017*** -0.026* 0.007 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) 
1997-1998 school year 
8.086*** 8.528*** 7.450*** 7.948*** 
(0.065) (0.139) (0.358) (0.379) 
1998-1999 school year 
8.082*** 8.541*** 7.455*** 7.965*** 
(0.065) (0.139) (0.355) (0.377) 
1999-2000 school year 
8.126*** 8.576*** 7.512*** 8.005*** 
(0.064) (0.138) (0.350) (0.372) 
2000-2001 school year 
8.146*** 8.602*** 7.580*** 8.035*** 
(0.063) (0.136) (0.345) (0.367) 
2001-2002 school year 
8.167*** 8.637*** 7.617*** 8.083*** 
(0.062) (0.134) (0.341) (0.362) 
2002-2003 school year 
8.195*** 8.667*** 7.681*** 8.127*** 
(0.061) (0.133) (0.334) (0.355) 
2003-2004 school year 
8.200*** 8.674*** 7.696*** 8.136*** 
(0.060) (0.133) (0.332) (0.353) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.201*** 8.691*** 7.748*** 8.169*** 
(0.060) (0.132) (0.325) (0.346) 
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TABLE 10.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-CBSA-PUB HHI-R15-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.207*** 8.725*** 7.767*** 8.206*** 
(0.060) (0.130) (0.323) (0.344) 
Small district 
-0.044*** -0.101*** -0.041*** -0.112*** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
Medium district 
-0.023*** -0.039*** -0.005 -0.033*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
Percent low income students 
0.004 -0.020 0.017 -0.041** 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) 
Percent migrant students 
0.029 0.036 0.199** 0.097* 
(0.022) (0.028) (0.096) (0.053) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.025*** 0.021 -0.027 0.024 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) 
Percent black students 
-0.116*** 0.035 -0.183*** 0.011 
(0.019) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.002 -0.009*** -0.015 -0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.052*** -0.023 -0.049*** -0.018 
(0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.024) 
Master’s degree 
0.055*** -0.004 0.056*** 0.000 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.004) (0.022) 
Doctorate degree 
0.066*** 0.032 0.073*** 0.034 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.023) 
Special Education 
-0.012*** -0.018** -0.010*** -0.017** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.013*** 0.047*** 0.018*** 0.057*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) 
Asian 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.004*** 0.002 -0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.006*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Indian 
-0.004* -0.012** -0.003 -0.013** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
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TABLE 10.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-CBSA-PUB HHI-R15-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.029*** -0.013*** -0.027*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.023*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
High school 
0.020*** -0.013*** 0.018*** -0.017*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0000 p = 0.0002 p = 0.0067 p = 0.0305 
        p = 0.0005 p = 0.0039 p = 0.8870 p = 0.0154 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 11.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R25-PUB HHI-R50-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-1.807** -1.324* -3.616*** -1.638** 
(0.714) (0.715) (1.240) (0.717) 
Specified HHI, squared  
2.726** 2.454** 12.247** 7.559** 
(1.209) (1.148) (4.950) (3.109) 
Average district enrollment 
0.004 0.031*** 0.000 0.019** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
log(Median income) 
0.106 0.077 0.129** -0.004 
(0.070) (0.084) (0.063) (0.037) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.422 -0.081 -0.348 0.081 
(0.406) (0.365) (0.364) (0.218) 
Percent population over age 
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-0.360 0.090 -0.437 0.087 
(0.328) (0.277) (0.312) (0.283) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
-0.122 -0.153 -0.141 0.020 
(0.170) (0.211) (0.165) (0.091) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
-0.343** -0.164 -0.297** 0.036 
(0.157) (0.213) (0.140) (0.082) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.010* -0.003 -0.004 0.004* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Comparable wage index 
-0.176 -0.226 -0.140 0.011 
(0.174) (0.191) (0.116) (0.076) 
Metropolitan area 
-0.047** -0.019 -0.036** 0.016 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.017) (0.012) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.389*** 7.990*** 7.132*** 8.428*** 
(0.368) (0.422) (0.341) (0.222) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.397*** 8.014*** 7.140*** 8.443*** 
(0.363) (0.415) (0.337) (0.220) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.459*** 8.062*** 7.199*** 8.475*** 
(0.356) (0.405) (0.331) (0.217) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.530*** 8.123*** 7.249*** 8.514*** 
(0.344) (0.388) (0.325) (0.209) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.567*** 8.181*** 7.277*** 8.550*** 
(0.341) (0.380) (0.323) (0.209) 
2002-2003 school year 
7.635*** 8.243*** 7.334*** 8.586*** 
(0.329) (0.366) (0.315) (0.204) 
2003-2004 school year 
7.651*** 8.262*** 7.347*** 8.596*** 
(0.326) (0.360) (0.312) (0.203) 
2004-2005 school year 
7.713*** 8.313*** 7.411*** 8.629*** 
(0.315) (0.344) (0.298) (0.195) 
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TABLE 11.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R25-PUB HHI-R50-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
7.740*** 8.356*** 7.439*** 8.664*** 
(0.311) (0.339) (0.292) (0.193) 
Small district 
-0.042*** -0.097*** -0.048*** -0.095*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) 
Medium district 
-0.009 -0.031*** -0.014*** -0.037*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Percent low income students 
0.021 -0.030 0.025 -0.020 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
Percent migrant students 
0.169* 0.121 0.153** 0.083 
(0.091) (0.075) (0.076) (0.054) 
Percent Hispanic students 
-0.023 -0.003 -0.011 0.008 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.021) (0.026) 
Percent black students 
-0.193*** -0.011 -0.159*** 0.048 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.033) (0.039) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.020** -0.020** -0.024*** -0.010* 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.052*** -0.011 -0.049*** -0.020 
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.023) 
Master’s degree 
0.053*** 0.005 0.056*** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.024) (0.004) (0.022) 
Doctorate degree 
0.070*** 0.040* 0.074*** 0.035 
(0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.022) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.022** -0.010*** -0.012 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.018*** 0.053*** 0.018*** 0.053*** 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) 
Asian 
0.006*** 0.005* 0.007*** 0.006** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Hispanic 
-0.004** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.017* 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
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TABLE 11.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R25-PUB HHI-R50-PUB 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.027*** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
New in district 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
High school 
0.018*** -0.011** 0.018*** -0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0384 p = 0.0869 p = 0.0031 p = 0.0519 
        p = 0.1196 p = 0.0299 p = 0.0213 p = 0.0153 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 12.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 5 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-County-PUB HHI-CBSA-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-0.359*** -0.384*** -0.170*** -0.187*** 
(0.063) (0.085) (0.030) (0.045) 
Specified HHI, squared  
0.520*** 0.552*** 0.314*** 0.418*** 
(0.093) (0.129) (0.065) (0.116) 
Average district enrollment 
0.007*** 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.028*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
log(Median income) 
-0.042*** -0.029 -0.058*** -0.055*** 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
0.090 0.668*** -0.129 0.386** 
(0.123) (0.179) (0.101) (0.159) 
Percent population over age 
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0.103 0.454*** 0.042 0.374*** 
(0.071) (0.098) (0.058) (0.097) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
0.306*** 0.279*** 0.223*** 0.187*** 
(0.051) (0.060) (0.043) (0.062) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.148*** 0.303*** 0.076** 0.229*** 
(0.037) (0.054) (0.031) (0.051) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.001 0.005** 0.000 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Comparable wage index 
0.088*** -0.045 0.137*** 0.041 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.028) (0.040) 
Metropolitan area 
0.008** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.910*** 8.288*** 8.092*** 8.546*** 
(0.090) (0.157) (0.067) (0.138) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.910*** 8.304*** 8.089*** 8.559*** 
(0.089) (0.157) (0.067) (0.138) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.955*** 8.343*** 8.132*** 8.593*** 
(0.088) (0.156) (0.066) (0.137) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.977*** 8.375*** 8.153*** 8.620*** 
(0.088) (0.154) (0.065) (0.135) 
2001-2002 school year 
8.003*** 8.419*** 8.174*** 8.655*** 
(0.086) (0.152) (0.065) (0.133) 
2002-2003 school year 
8.035*** 8.455*** 8.202*** 8.685*** 
(0.085) (0.151) (0.063) (0.131) 
2003-2004 school year 
8.042*** 8.465*** 8.206*** 8.691*** 
(0.084) (0.151) (0.063) (0.131) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.045*** 8.485*** 8.208*** 8.709*** 
(0.084) (0.149) (0.062) (0.130) 
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TABLE 12.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 5 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-County-PUB HHI-CBSA-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.052*** 8.521*** 8.213*** 8.742*** 
(0.083) (0.148) (0.062) (0.129) 
Small district 
-0.047*** -0.107*** -0.044*** -0.101*** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Medium district 
-0.024*** -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.039*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Percent low income students 
-0.006 -0.034** 0.002 -0.021 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) 
Percent migrant students 
0.034 0.038 0.028 0.034 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.032*** 0.039** 0.026*** 0.023 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) 
Percent black students 
-0.118*** 0.046 -0.115*** 0.036 
(0.019) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.004* -0.009*** -0.002 -0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.052*** -0.021 -0.052*** -0.023 
(0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.021) 
Master’s degree 
0.055*** -0.002 0.055*** -0.004 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.020) 
Doctorate degree 
0.065*** 0.035* 0.065*** 0.032 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.020) 
Special Education 
-0.012*** -0.017** -0.012*** -0.018** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.013*** 0.046*** 0.013*** 0.047*** 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.003* 0.001 -0.004*** 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.007*** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.002 -0.011* -0.004* -0.012** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
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TABLE 12.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 5 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-County-PUB HHI-CBSA-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.028*** -0.013*** -0.029*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.023*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
High school 
0.019*** -0.014*** 0.020*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0000 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0002 
        p = 0.0000 p = 0.0005 p = 0.0005 p = 0.0044 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 13.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 6 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-APR HHI-R25-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-0.785*** -0.433 -1.806** -1.026 
(0.244) (0.273) (0.767) (0.716) 
Specified HHI, squared  
0.819*** 0.885** 2.249** 2.320** 
(0.269) (0.361) (1.145) (0.987) 
Average district enrollment 
-0.003 0.030*** -0.008 0.028*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
log(Median income) 
0.028 0.015 0.104 0.033 
(0.036) (0.058) (0.076) (0.086) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.305 0.303 -0.502 -0.013 
(0.220) (0.197) (0.398) (0.326) 
Percent population over age 
65 
0.011 0.407*** -0.324 0.036 
(0.167) (0.157) (0.310) (0.226) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
-0.004 0.016 -0.116 -0.058 
(0.093) (0.145) (0.177) (0.211) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
-0.232** 0.038 -0.378** -0.056 
(0.094) (0.151) (0.180) (0.240) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.008*** 0.001 -0.012** -0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Comparable wage index 
0.027 -0.073 -0.152 -0.194 
(0.071) (0.094) (0.176) (0.167) 
Metropolitan area 
-0.000 0.015 -0.043* -0.000 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.027) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.745*** 8.115*** 7.448*** 8.287*** 
(0.212) (0.345) (0.378) (0.401) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.746*** 8.132*** 7.456*** 8.309*** 
(0.211) (0.342) (0.372) (0.394) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.797*** 8.172*** 7.517*** 8.355*** 
(0.209) (0.338) (0.365) (0.387) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.854*** 8.207*** 7.606*** 8.407*** 
(0.204) (0.328) (0.346) (0.360) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.884*** 8.257*** 7.632*** 8.465*** 
(0.203) (0.324) (0.346) (0.356) 
2002-2003 school year 
7.932*** 8.301*** 7.701*** 8.522*** 
(0.199) (0.316) (0.334) (0.340) 
2003-2004 school year 
7.941*** 8.310*** 7.713*** 8.537*** 
(0.198) (0.313) (0.331) (0.334) 
2004-2005 school year 
7.975*** 8.336*** 7.769*** 8.574*** 
(0.195) (0.307) (0.319) (0.318) 
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TABLE 13.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 6 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-APR HHI-R25-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
7.987*** 8.371*** 7.790*** 8.613*** 
(0.194) (0.305) (0.316) (0.315) 
Small district 
-0.048*** -0.116*** -0.046*** -0.098*** 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) 
Medium district 
-0.012*** -0.035*** -0.014** -0.035*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Percent low income students 
0.014 -0.042** 0.047 -0.034 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.024) 
Percent migrant students 
0.093* 0.064 0.162* 0.086 
(0.050) (0.043) (0.098) (0.072) 
Percent Hispanic students 
-0.000 0.040 -0.036 0.028 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.041) (0.046) 
Percent black students 
-0.108*** 0.029 -0.135*** 0.017 
(0.022) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.001 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.014* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.050*** -0.020 -0.052*** -0.015 
(0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.024) 
Master’s degree 
0.057*** -0.001 0.054*** 0.002 
(0.004) (0.022) (0.005) (0.023) 
Doctorate degree 
0.070*** 0.033 0.069*** 0.037 
(0.005) (0.022) (0.006) (0.023) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.017** -0.010*** -0.023*** 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.017*** 0.058*** 0.017*** 0.057*** 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.007** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.007*** 0.000 -0.005*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.003 -0.015*** -0.003 -0.012** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
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TABLE 13.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 6 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R15-APR HHI-R25-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.028*** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
High school 
0.018*** -0.017*** 0.018*** -0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0041 p = 0.0228 p = 0.0625 p = 0.0446 
        p = 0.8324 p = 0.0097 p = 0.4969 p = 0.0254 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 14.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 7 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-APR HHI-County-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-4.087* -1.635 -0.307*** -0.364*** 
(2.202) (1.060) (0.064) (0.087) 
Specified HHI, squared  
15.762 10.185 0.478*** 0.553*** 
(12.089) (6.295) (0.099) (0.140) 
Average district enrollment 
0.007 0.029*** 0.007*** 0.022*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Median income) 
0.131 -0.011 -0.043*** -0.028 
(0.093) (0.044) (0.012) (0.019) 
Percent households with 
school aged children 
-0.163 0.322 0.048 0.660*** 
(0.452) (0.262) (0.122) (0.183) 
Percent population over age 
65 
-0.390 0.135 0.092 0.438*** 
(0.415) (0.337) (0.071) (0.098) 
Percent adults with high 
school degree only 
-0.215 0.038 0.276*** 0.272*** 
(0.273) (0.118) (0.053) (0.063) 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
-0.296 0.130 0.117*** 0.282*** 
(0.184) (0.092) (0.036) (0.056) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.005 0.006* -0.001 0.005** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Comparable wage index 
-0.233 -0.069 0.101*** -0.042 
(0.221) (0.108) (0.032) (0.042) 
Metropolitan area 
-0.053* 0.012 0.011*** 0.014*** 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.003) (0.004) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.153*** 8.369*** 7.929*** 8.279*** 
(0.454) (0.270) (0.094) (0.165) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.163*** 8.386*** 7.929*** 8.296*** 
(0.447) (0.267) (0.093) (0.165) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.227*** 8.424*** 7.974*** 8.333*** 
(0.435) (0.264) (0.092) (0.164) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.277*** 8.459*** 7.996*** 8.368*** 
(0.431) (0.251) (0.092) (0.162) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.307*** 8.501*** 8.020*** 8.411*** 
(0.421) (0.254) (0.090) (0.159) 
2002-2003 school year 
7.372*** 8.538*** 8.052*** 8.447*** 
(0.405) (0.248) (0.089) (0.158) 
2003-2004 school year 
7.384*** 8.548*** 8.058*** 8.457*** 
(0.400) (0.246) (0.088) (0.158) 
2004-2005 school year 
7.446*** 8.578*** 8.059*** 8.476*** 
(0.382) (0.233) (0.088) (0.157) 
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TABLE 14.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 7 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-APR HHI-County-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
7.472*** 8.619*** 8.068*** 8.513*** 
(0.370) (0.234) (0.087) (0.155) 
Small district 
-0.048*** -0.101*** -0.047*** -0.106*** 
(0.018) (0.034) (0.003) (0.006) 
Medium district 
-0.018*** -0.037*** -0.024*** -0.040*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Percent low income students 
0.032 -0.031 -0.005 -0.036** 
(0.046) (0.039) (0.010) (0.014) 
Percent migrant students 
0.151 0.051 0.031 0.038 
(0.106) (0.061) (0.025) (0.031) 
Percent Hispanic students 
-0.016 0.034 0.028*** 0.039** 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.009) (0.018) 
Percent black students 
-0.167*** 0.040 -0.116*** 0.052 
(0.043) (0.048) (0.020) (0.033) 
log(Distance from major 
metropolitan areas) 
-0.026 -0.014 -0.003 -0.008*** 
(0.021) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, 
squared 
-0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.050*** -0.022 -0.052*** -0.020 
(0.004) (0.023) (0.003) (0.021) 
Master’s degree 
0.055*** -0.002 0.055*** -0.001 
(0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (0.020) 
Doctorate degree 
0.072*** 0.032 0.065*** 0.036* 
(0.006) (0.023) (0.005) (0.020) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.017* -0.012*** -0.017** 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.008) 
Certified contracted time in 
major duty 
0.017*** 0.057*** 0.014*** 0.046*** 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.010) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.001 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.004 -0.014 -0.002 -0.011* 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) 
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TABLE 14.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 7 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-R50-APR HHI-County-APR 
 Teacher Principal Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.027*** -0.013*** -0.028*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
New in district 
-0.021*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
High school 
0.017*** -0.015** 0.019*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0397 p = 0.2596 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0001 
        p = 0.2426 p = 0.1135 p = 0.0000 p = 0.0010 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags following the 
HHI names denote the market definition and the set of competitors. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. 
Double asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 15.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 8 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-Ring-ALL 
 Teacher Principal 
Specified HHI 
-1.328*** -0.730* 
(0.408) (0.444) 
Specified HHI, squared  
2.440*** 2.723** 
(0.831) (1.097) 
Average district enrollment 
-0.001 0.030*** 
(0.006) (0.006) 
log(Median income) 
0.025 0.010 
(0.034) (0.053) 
Percent households with school aged children 
-0.339 0.287 
(0.235) (0.210) 
Percent population over age 65 
-0.117 0.219 
(0.174) (0.201) 
Percent adults with high school degree only 
-0.003 0.025 
(0.088) (0.139) 
Percent adults with at least bachelor’s degree 
-0.212** 0.073 
(0.083) (0.139) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.007** 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Comparable wage index 
-0.004 -0.097 
(0.078) (0.103) 
Metropolitan area 
-0.005 0.016 
(0.009) (0.010) 
1997-1998 school year 
7.828*** 8.220*** 
(0.191) (0.290) 
1998-1999 school year 
7.830*** 8.238*** 
(0.189) (0.287) 
1999-2000 school year 
7.883*** 8.280*** 
(0.187) (0.283) 
2000-2001 school year 
7.937*** 8.308*** 
(0.182) (0.275) 
2001-2002 school year 
7.967*** 8.362*** 
(0.181) (0.270) 
2002-2003 school year 
8.016*** 8.405*** 
(0.178) (0.263) 
2003-2004 school year 
8.025*** 8.415*** 
(0.177) (0.260) 
2004-2005 school year 
8.062*** 8.440*** 
(0.174) (0.254) 
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TABLE 15.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 8 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-Ring-ALL 
 Teacher Principal 
2005-2006 school year 
8.078*** 8.479*** 
(0.173) (0.252) 
Small district 
-0.049*** -0.123*** 
(0.007) (0.018) 
Medium district 
-0.013*** -0.035*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Percent low income students 
0.013 -0.053** 
(0.021) (0.024) 
Percent migrant students 
0.103* 0.060 
(0.053) (0.046) 
Percent Hispanic students 
0.000 0.048 
(0.021) (0.030) 
Percent black students 
-0.118*** 0.033 
(0.023) (0.035) 
log(Distance from major metropolitan areas) 
-0.007 -0.021** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Years of experience 
0.038*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Years of experience, squared 
-0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Bachelor’s degree 
-0.050*** -0.022 
(0.004) (0.023) 
Master’s degree 
0.057*** -0.003 
(0.004) (0.022) 
Doctorate degree 
0.070*** 0.029 
(0.005) (0.022) 
Special Education 
-0.010*** -0.016** 
(0.001) (0.008) 
Certified contracted time in major duty 
0.017*** 0.057*** 
(0.002) (0.011) 
Asian 
0.007*** 0.005 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Black 
-0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Hispanic 
-0.006*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.003) 
Indian 
-0.005* -0.018*** 
(0.003) (0.007) 
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TABLE 15.—GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 8 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 HHI-Ring-ALL 
 Teacher Principal 
Female 
-0.028*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
New in district 
-0.020*** -0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.003) 
High school 
0.018*** -0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.005) 
Observations 276,795 15,524 
   0.9998 0.9999 
              p = 0.0046 p = 0.0313 
        p = 0.0400 p = 0.0085 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Total final salary). The tags 
following the HHI names denote the market definition and the set of 
competitors. Standard errors are in parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) 
means significance at the 1% level. Double asterisk (**) means 
significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means significance at the 
10% level. 
 
Furthermore, when the markets are defined as rings, the results show that the 
teachers’ salaries begin to increase with concentration at HHI=0.27 and the principals’ 
salaries begin to increase with concentration at HHI=0.13. While most of the measures 
of concentration I explore indicate a significant non-linear relationship between the 
personnel salaries and the HHI, different HHIs result in different levels of HHIs where 
the minimum wage occurs. The results in Table 8 to Table 15 present that the salaries of 
teachers start increasing when concentration exceeds the HHI level somewhere in the 
[0.13, 0.49] range, and the salaries of principals start increasing when concentration 
exceeds the HHI level somewhere in the [0.08, 0.35] range. 
In conclusion, the findings in Table 8 through Table 15 indicate that the 
significance and the pattern of the relationship between salaries and concentration are 
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not too sensitive to adding the private schools in the set of competitors. Changing the 
definition of education markets, on the other hand, changes the significance and the 
pattern of the relationship significantly. Yet, most of the measures of concentration I 
employ validate the non-linear relationship between the salaries of the school personnel 
and the concentration in the education market. Moreover, almost all of the results in the 
tables imply that salaries of principals start increasing at a lower level of concentration 
compared to the level at which teachers’ salaries start increasing. This, again, may be an 
indication of principals’ relatively higher bargaining power. 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
I summarize the major findings of my analysis of the relationship between 
competition and education personnel salaries in Washington as follows: First, I find that 
the relationship between wages and market concentration is of a nonlinear pattern for 
both of the personnel categories. I present that when the concentration in the education 
market is low, the salaries of the personnel decrease as competition in the education 
market decreases, but when the concentration is high, the salaries of the personnel 
increase as competition in the education market decreases. Secondly, when I control for 
the endogeneity of the concentration measure, my findings show that the nonlinear 
pattern of the relationship is significant. Furthermore, I report evidence that principals 
have more bargaining power over their salaries than teachers in Washington, that 
principals start getting positive returns from increasing concentration at lower levels of 
concentration (at around 0.225) than that of teachers (at around 0.315). I also compare 
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the pattern of teacher salaries versus concentration in Washington with that in Texas (at 
around 0.54), and show that the inflection point in Washington is at lower levels of 
concentration. This finding can be attributed to Washington’s being a union state versus 
Texas’s being a right-to-work-state. 
Additionally, I test the sensitivity of my analysis to using different measures of 
competition. My results indicate that the effects of competition on wages are robust to 
measuring the competition with different sets of competitors. On the other hand, I find 
that the effect of concentration on education personnel salaries is rather sensitive to 
using different definitions of the education markets. When the education markets are 
defined in different ways, the effect of concentration on wages is not significant in a few 
cases, or if the concentration effect is significant, the nonlinear relationship between 
wages and concentration distorts to some extent. All in all, however, I find that the 
teacher salaries start increasing when market concentration exceeds the HHI level 
somewhere in the [0.13, 0.49] range, and the principal salaries start increasing when 
concentration exceeds the HHI level somewhere in the [0.08, 0.35] range. 
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3. COMPETITION AND SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION8 
3.1. Introduction to the School District Consolidation 
The famous education report of the 1960s, better-known as Coleman Report 
(1966),  warned the USA about issues within the education system. The study was 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education and funded by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce to identify problems in the education system and to promote solutions. 
The massive report highlighted the importance of student background and 
socioeconomic status in determining educational outcomes, while predicting the ever-
growing tragedy of the malfunctioning education system in the USA today. 
The report of former President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on 
Excellence in Education was a second landmark in the U.S. education history. The title 
of the report was “A Nation at Risk” (1983),  and the focus of the report was mainly the 
failing of the American education system and the threat associated with persistent 
mediocrity. This was yet another effort to alert the American people about the defective 
education system. 
45 years have passed since the Coleman Report, and 28 years since “A Nation at 
Risk” but not much has changed in the U.S. education system. Many people, families, 
students, teachers, administrators and public officials are not happy with the current 
performance of the U.S. elementary and secondary public schools. Debates and 
disagreement has been ongoing, but the dissatisfaction and disappointment have 
                                                 
8
 Some parts of this chapter represent joint work with Timothy J. Gronberg, Dennis W. Jansen, and Lori L. 
Taylor. 
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remained. Most of the problems identified in the Coleman Report or in “A Nation at 
Risk” have not been addressed well; they have gotten even more complicated leaving the 
U.S. far behind other nations. Below is a summary of the current state of the U.S. 
education system: 
1- The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) was announced on July 
24, 2009 by President Barack Obama. The Race to the Top (R2T) program is a part of 
the act, which is designed to promote reforms in state and local district K-12 education 
by distributing additional funds from a $4.35 billion budget. 
2- According to the 2009 Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), the U.S. is ranked 30
th
 in math, 23
rd
 in science, and 17
th
 in reading. If the 
ranking is restricted to OECD countries, the U.S. is ranked 22
nd
 in math, 15
th
 in science, 
and 13
th
 in reading. On December 6, 2010, President Barack Obama referred to these 
rankings as “our generation’s Sputnik moment” when he was addressing a group of 
community college students in North Carolina about continued investments in education. 
He stated that “in the race for the future, America is in danger of falling behind.” He 
emphasized that the U.S. cannot afford to cut back on education but has to spend even 
more because “[education has] the biggest impact on our economic growth”. On the 
same day, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan titled the findings of PISA 2009 
as “an absolute wake-up call for America”, and underlined his urge to become more 
serious about investing in education. 
3- The goal of former President George W. Bush’s “No Child Left Behind Act” 
(2001)  is to have all of the students in every school in every state—including 
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disadvantaged and special education students—reach the same state proficiency level in 
math and reading by 2014. After 10 years, however, Barack Obama gave a speech on 
March 14, 2011 at Kenmore Middle School in Virginia about No Child Left Behind 
Act’s (NCLB) successes and failures, and he revealed that 4 out of 5 schools in the U.S. 
will be labeled as failing according to NCLB. He explained this astonishing number as a 
result of the improper method used by NCLB to measure accomplishment. He stated that 
15 states have lowered their standards so that they could meet the target on time and not 
get penalized, which is yet another reflection of how the system is degraded. He 
expressed the necessity to fix NCLB, and stressed that the reforms will cost money. 
4- President Barack Obama announced that a new version of NCLB will be 
coming by August, 2011. At this point, we can only speculate about the success of the 
reincarnation of NCLB. One thing is clear, however: if the new act gets passed, it will be 
costly. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama proclaimed that the unavoidable costs of 
education reforms will be confronted by excluding education spending from the five-
year freeze on annual domestic spending. 
It seems that education in the U.S. is still failing to perform to expectations. 
While parents turn to charter schools, private schools, home-schooling and other 
attempted solutions, the U.S. government is still spending hundreds of billions of dollars 
to solve the chronic problem. Resources per pupil have been increased and teacher-
student ratios have declined. Vouchers and charters have been promoted to encourage 
more competition among schools, in the hope of generating incentives for schools to 
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improve. The federal government has been pushing states and school districts to try 
performance-based pay for teachers. 
In addition to these attempts, re-delineation of school districts through 
consolidation and/or deconsolidation has been attempted with the idea of improving the 
education system. School districts have been consolidated with the expectation of cost 
saving, with the savings used to increase educational quality. The benefits of 
consolidation are based on cost economies. Public school districts, however, are cost 
inefficient institutions by realization. Hence the benefits of public school district 
consolidation depend on the cost efficiency of the districts as well as on scale 
economies. Cost efficiency, in turn, may be a function of the level of competition in the 
education market. Since consolidation decreases the number of available school districts 
in an education market while increasing district size, said consolidation may also change 
the level of competition in the education market. If consolidation decreases the level of 
competition, some or all of the cost savings from scale economies may turn into wasteful 
expenditures or inefficiency. In some cases, the impact of a decrease in the level of 
competition due to consolidation of school districts may cause such inefficiency that the 
outcome of consolidation regarding costs is not economically desirable compared to the 
initial situation. 
Most of the studies in the literature concentrate on scale economies. In this study, 
we examine the second impact what we call the competitive effect. We follow the 
guidelines presented in Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor (2011a) and use a stochastic cost 
frontier model to evaluate how a traditional public school district would be affected by 
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competition in the education market. Our findings show that the competitive effect is 
important to understand the net effect of consolidation on the economic performance of 
school districts, especially the cost of education. We present results showing that 
increases in the concentration cause the estimated cost inefficiency to increase. That is, 
more competition in the education market results in more district cost efficiency. 
Consolidation, however, reduces competition and therefore reduces efficiency. 
We check the sensitivity of our findings to various alternative measures of 
competition. We use several measures of competition all of which are versions of a 
Herfindahl index of market concentration. The indices are based on different definitions 
of the education market and different sets of competitors and all of the indices are 
designed to capture certain dimensions of competition. We find that our results about the 
relationship between competition and school district efficiency are robust to alternative 
measures of competition. 
3.1.1. History of the School District Consolidation in the USA 
One of the most drastic changes in the public education system in the United 
States was the school district consolidation during the twentieth century. Tyack (1974) 
explains that traditionally, local school districts, which are the major division of 
American public education, were unofficial and unauthorized in organizational structure, 
and small in size. In the 1800s, the communities owned the rural schools. On many 
occasions, schools were the heart of the communities so that people considered them as 
their extended families. Nevertheless, the community schools were voluntary 
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organizations, and therefore they were different than and incidental to the family. For 
example, attendance of the students shows a big discrepancy between two subsequent 
days or seasons because of the conditions of the weather, the degree of the need for 
workers at home, and the fondness or fright aroused by the teacher. As stated in Howell 
(2005), towards the end of the nineteenth century, more and more people started noticing 
the problems in the public education system. Finally, starting in the 1890s and increasing 
the impetus in the early 1900s, the reformers organized a confrontation with the rural 
education problem. They considered random assignment, assortment and administration 
of the teachers, control and regulation problems, and voluntary school attendance, and 
curriculum, equipment and building problems, as indicators of much more complicated 
problems. For the most part, what was not working in this education system was that 
country people operated their schools without knowing what would be suitable for their 
evolving society. (Tyack, 1974) 
The progress of school district consolidation is only a component of a bigger 
movement on the way to the professionalization of education which started in the late 
nineteenth century. The administrative progressives of the period viewed the 
concentration of power over education in the hands of experts as a treatment for the 
parochialism of rural education organizations and the corruption of urban education 
structures. First, the cities started to consolidate schools and districts to change the 
political education systems into professional education systems. Rural areas followed 
cities in consolidation movement to transform their retrogressive school systems to 
efficient institutions. Consolidation, of course, meant larger schools, which actually was 
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the main aim of the reform in education. Ellwood P. Cubberley (1919), who was the 
most important education reformist of the period, advocated three key claims supportive 
of school district consolidation. Firstly, the ratio of school officials and administrators to 
teachers was needlessly high in small schools. According to Cubberley, larger schools 
allocated the administration more efficiently. Secondly, consolidation would allow 
specialization by separating children with respect to their grades. While teachers in small 
schools had to be good at every grade and subject, teachers in larger schools would be 
able to specialize by grades and subjects. Moreover, larger schools would let students 
concentrate in different fields by offering specialized training to them. Finally, 
consolidation can make superior services and amenities available at lower cost. Overall, 
according to Cubberley and the other progressive colleagues, consolidation was 
promising economies of scale in management, education, and amenities. 
The number of schools districts and schools in the U.S. started to decrease 
sharply in the beginning of 1920s, which reflects the victory of Cubberley and the other 
reformists. Until the 1930s, most of the local school districts were controlling no more 
than two small schools. However, from 1939 to 1984, the number of school districts 
decreased from 117,108 to 15,747, through a fast evolution in the direction of 
professionalization and centralization. In other words, consolidation eliminated more 
than 90 percent of the school districts that had survived until the 1930s. In the same era, 
the number of public schools decreased from 226,762 to 84,178, more than a 60 percent 
decrease, and total enrollment in elementary and secondary public schools increased 
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roughly from 25 million to 40 million, a 60 percent increase. (U.S. Department of 
Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2010)  
Figure 2 shows the decline in the number of public schools from 271,319 in 1920 
to 83,165 in 1989. With the decrease, number of schools with one teacher also decreased 
precipitously. Figure 3 shows that the number declined from 212,448 in 1910 to 237 in 
2009. During the same period the number of students in attendance and total enrollment 
was increasing. Figure 4 reports that average daily attendance of all students in public 
elementary and secondary schools increased from 15 million students in the beginning of 
1920s to 46 million students towards the end of 2000s. Figure 5 shows that total 
enrollment in elementary and secondary schools increases roughly from 7.5 million 
students to 50 million students between 1870 and 2008. Figure 6 reports that while the 
number of schools decreases the average enrollment per school increases. During the 
time period from 1939 to 2008, the enrollment per school increases from about 100 to 
500. Since many other factors can affect the enrollment rates such as wars or recession 
periods, the rapid increase in enrollment between 1950 and 1970 would also be due to 
the baby boom and the coinciding institutional consolidation movements of the period. 
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FIGURE 2.—NUMBER OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1869-2010 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
FIGURE 3.—PUBLICS SCHOOLS WITH ELEMENTARY GRADES, ONE-TEACHER, 1909-2010 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
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FIGURE 4.—AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE, 1869-2008 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
FIGURE 5.—TOTAL ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 
1869-2008 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
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FIGURE 6.—AVERAGE ENROLLMENT PER SCHOOL, 1939-2008 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
Consolidation of schools was directly associated with the need to consolidate 
districts. Cubberley and his progressive colleagues suggested that on average, one 
consolidated school should include five to seven schools present (Cubberley, 1919). 
Nevertheless, school districts of the period operated two schools on average, and most of 
the rural districts had only one school. Hence, in order to consolidate five to seven 
schools, district consolidation was necessary. Because of this reason, the number of 
districts began to decrease through consolidation movement. As shown in Figure 7, the 
number of districts in 1939 was about 120,000. In 1984, the number is less than 20,000. 
After 1980s, however, the speed of the decrease slows down, and Figure 8 indicates that 
in year 2009, the number of districts is roughly 14,000. These figures report that between 
1939 and 2009, more than 100,000 districts have vanished by consolidation. As shown 
in Figure 9, with the increasing enrollment, average enrollment per district increases 
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from less than 250 to more than 3500—more than fourteen folds—between 1939 and 
2009. 
FIGURE 7.—NUMBER OF DISTRICTS, 1939-1984 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
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FIGURE 8.—NUMBER OF DISTRICTS, 1985-2010 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 90 
FIGURE 9.—AVERAGE ENROLLMENT PER DISTRICT, 1939-2008 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 35 
Throughout the consolidation movement, state governments had an important 
position. Hooker and Mueller (1970) report that the districts generally confronted 
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consolidation ferociously. However, state governments either encouraged consolidation 
by offering economic inducements or required consolidation by changing the boundaries 
of the districts legislatively. Strang (1987) explains that the gradual change in the control 
mechanism was established by the abolition of school boards which are locally 
designated, and the power of the boards left behind was worn down as state governments 
progressively broaden their power over locally dealt problems like curriculum and 
accreditation. Briefly, while the schools were becoming larger, the school boards were 
getting less connected to local communities and having less power compared to the state 
governments or professional officials and managers. 
The centralization of the school finance reflects the increasing importance of the 
state governments in public education. Figure 10 demonstrates the decrease in the 
percent share of local revenues from 83 in 1920 to 45 in 1978. Over the same period, 
percent share of state revenues increase from 16 to 45. Since 1978, local governments 
and states have supplied about the same amount of funding to public education. 
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FIGURE 10.—PERCENT SHARE OF REVENUE 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Digest of Education, 2010, Table 180 
As Berry (2007) states, this short yet dynamic course of time gave birth to the 
American public education system of today. Community controlled schools and local 
school districts changed into complex systems of educational bureaucracies, which are 
professionally operated and some running hundreds of schools and schooling more than 
a hundred of thousand pupils (Howell, 2005). Since school district consolidation is 
generally considered as a method for school districts to reduce costs this movement is 
still continuing throughout the U.S. In the year 2009, there were only 13,809 regular 
public school districts, and the total enrollment in elementary and secondary schools was 
about 50 million (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education 
Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2010). Even though there is a significant 
slowdown in the speed of school district consolidation since the 1970s, several states 
offer inducements to consolidate even today. Haller and Monk (1988) state that some 
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states have building or transportation aid plans to encourage school district 
consolidation. Gold, Smith and Lawton (1995) mention at least eight states, including 
New York, which promote district reformation, generally in the fashion of consolidation, 
thorough general aid programs. On the contrary, Huang (2004) point out that 
approximately one-third of the states in the U.S. offer operating aid programs, which 
counterbalance the sparseness and smallness of school districts to dissuade school 
district consolidation. As Duncombe and Yinger (2007) explain, even though researchers 
do not have a consensus on the cost effects of school district consolidation, we can 
expect consolidation will be present in the public education policy plans in many states, 
especially if the beleaguered school districts want to reduce their costs and increase the 
performance of their pupil. 
3.1.2. History of the School District Consolidation in Texas 
The attempts to have better educational cost efficiency in the state of Texas 
follow a similar pattern to those all over the U.S. Figure 11 presents the number of 
traditional public school districts in Texas between 1880 and 2010. In 1880s, there were 
about 2500 districts. Until 1910s, the number kept increasing and there were more than 
8000 public school districts in Texas by 1920. Then the consolidation process began: the 
number of Texas traditional public school districts decreased sharply from 7,153 in 1938 
(29th Biennial Report, State Department of Education 1934-1935 and 1935-1936)  to 
1,799 in 1956 (Annual Statistical Report, Part 1, 1975-1976; Texas Education Agency, 
1976). The consolidation process somehow slowed down after this sharp decrease; the 
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number of traditional public school districts fell to 1050 between 1956 and 1991, and the 
number decreased further to 1030 between 1991 and 2010. In 1995, however, the 
amendment of the Texas Education Code started a new type of public school, commonly 
known as a charter school, which increased the number of public school districts to 1237 
at the end of 2009 (Texas Public School Statistics Pocket Edition 1991-2010, Texas 
Education Agency, 2010). Figure 12 presents this change. 
FIGURE 11.—NUMBER OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN TEXAS, 1880-2010 
 
Source: Texas Department of Education, Report of the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction 1886-1988 to 1906-1908; Texas Education Agency, Annual Statistical 
Report, Part 1, 1975-1976; Texas Education Agency, Biennial Report; Texas Education 
Agency, Texas Public School Statistics Pocket Edition 1991-1992 to 2007-2008. 
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FIGURE 12.—NUMBER OF DISTRICTS IN TEXAS, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Texas Education Agency, Texas Public School Statistics Pocket Edition 
1991-1992 to 2007-2008. 
While the consolidation process has been constructing larger school districts in 
Texas, public school enrollment in general has been increasing too, which adds to the 
size of the districts. Figure 13 depicts the continuous growth. According to the “Annual 
Statistical Report” of the Texas Education Agency (TEA) (1975-1976),  the Texas 
statewide public school K-12 enrollment in 1956-57 school year was 1,815,509. The 
enrollment increased to 3,130,151 by 1984 (Biennial Report, TEA, 1982-1984)  and by 
1991, there were 3,460,378 public school K-12 students in Texas (Texas Public School 
Statistics Pocket Edition 1991-1992, Texas Education Agency, 1992). The growth in 
public school K-12 enrollment has been steady, and the number reached 4,824,778 
students by 2010 (Texas Public School Statistics Pocket Edition 2009-2010, Texas 
Education Agency, 2010). That is, the 55-year change in Texas statewide public school 
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K-12 enrollment between 1955 and 2010 is 165 percent, and more growth in future is 
predicted by National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). 
FIGURE 13.—TOTAL ENROLLMENT IN K-12 IN TEXAS, 1956-2010 
 
Source: Texas Education Agency, Annual Statistical Report, Part 1, 1975-1976; 
Texas Education Agency, Biennial Report; Texas Education Agency, Texas Public 
School Statistics Pocket Edition 1991-1992 to 2007-2008. 
As the number of Texas school districts has been decreasing, district size kept 
increasing. Figure 14 presents that the district size increased from about 1010 to 3900 
between 1955 and 2010—a 286% increase. Between 1992 and 2010, the enrollment in 
districts with a size of 5,000 and over has risen from 71.5% to 77.5% of the total 
enrollment, whereas the enrollment in districts with a size less than 1,600 has fallen from 
11.3% to 9.9% of the total enrollment, and the enrollment in district with a size between 
1,600 and 5000 has fallen from 17.2% to 12.6% of the total enrollment (TEA pocket 
edition 1991-1992, and 2009-2010, TEA) Today, more than 28 percent of enrollment in 
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Texas is in districts with a size of 50,000 and over and more than 67 percent of 
enrollment in Texas is in districts with a size more than 10,000 (TEA pocket edition 
2009-2010). Moreover, only about 23 percent of the enrollment in Texas is in districts 
with a size less than 5,000 in the present day. Currently, 169 out of 1,237 public school 
districts in Texas have an enrollment more than 5,000. In short, Texas education 
geography is now being surrounded by bigger school districts, as never before. 
FIGURE 14.—AVERAGE ENROLLMENT IN K-12 PER DISTRICT IN TEXAS, 1956-2010 
 
Source: Texas Education Agency, Annual Statistical Report, Part 1, 1975-1976; 
Texas Education Agency, Biennial Report; Texas Education Agency, Texas Public 
School Statistics Pocket Edition 1991-1992 to 2007-2008. 
Nevertheless, the growth of the average district size conceals the great variation 
in the school district size in Texas. In 2010, the smallest district in Texas, Guardian 
Angel Performance Arts AC in Bexar Country, had only one school with an enrollment 
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other hand, had 294 schools with a total enrollment of 200,944 students, which makes 
the district the biggest in Texas. Figure 15 reflects this disparity clearly. In 2010, the size 
of most of the districts in Texas—1,139 out of 1,237 to be exact—was smaller than 
10,000. 714 of these districts had a size smaller than 1,000. But 3 districts in Texas —
Houston ISD, Dallas ISD, and Cypress-Fairbanks ISD—had an enrollment more than 
100,000 students. This huge variation in the school district size is a significant 
characteristic of Texas. 
FIGURE 15.—DISTRICT SIZE DISTRIBUTION IN TEXAS IN 2010 
 
Source: Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Common Core of Data. 
According to the design of the education funding system in Texas, smaller 
districts receive additional funds per student. The formula states that school districts with 
an average daily attendance (ADA) less than 1,601 qualify for the small district 
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district adjustment. The adjustments are designed to be a decreasing function of the 
ADA, so that the smallest district can get the biggest additional fund. Considering the 
district ADA in 2010, 858 districts in Texas are qualify for small district adjustment and 
210 districts qualify for mid-size district adjustment—86% of the districts is Texas are 
eligible for a funding adjustment. Texas House of Representatives (2004)  reports that 
the adjustment for small districts costs $330 million per year and adjustment for mid-size 
districts cost $91 million per year, which adds up to $421 million per year. These 
adjustments add to the already high cost of K-12 education to the state of Texas. 
As for many other states in the U.S., school district consolidation keeps being an 
option on table for Texas to reduce costs. In January 2011, State Representative Fred 
Brown, R-Bryan, offered a bill (House Bill 106) which reduces the number of public 
school districts in Texas from 1,235 to 254—one for each county. He suggests that the 
savings from administrative cost would be in the billions each year, which could be 
spent to improve the education in Texas. Actual outcomes of such a consolidation 
scenario, however, may depend on multiple effects of school district consolidation. 
3.2. Effects of School District Consolidation 
Before beginning to analyze the consequences of consolidation, we must first 
define clearly what consolidation means. There is a mixture of terms used by the public, 
policy makers and researchers to explain the consolidation. For example Fitzwater and 
Reed (1953) describes consolidation as the process of merging two or more attendance 
areas to produce a larger school. This restructuring implies that consolidated schools will 
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no more be independent schools, but be one large and new education institution. Some 
states such as Kansas used different terminologies to describe the reorganization. The 
consolidation movement in Kansas in the 1960s was called as unification. Moreover, the 
restructured school districts were not identified as consolidated or reorganized districts 
but as “unified school districts” (House Bill 377). However, as Bard, Gardener and 
Wieland (2006) points out, regardless of the terminology selected by the public, policy 
makers or researchers, the majority of the society keep using the term consolidation to 
identify all kinds of restructuring, reorganization, unification, or merger of schools or 
school districts. 
In spite of the existence of various terms and the nuance between them, what we 
know for sure is that consolidation refers to a change in the size and the number of the 
education units available. For instance, a merger of two small school districts would give 
birth to one large school district. The change in the size of the education units is the first 
effect to attract attention, and as a matter of fact, the change in the size is the main goal 
of the consolidation movement as mentioned earlier. That would explain why there is a 
relatively larger literature on the effects of consolidation through changes in the size of 
districts and school (see Fox (1981) and Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger (2002)). 
However another important consequence of consolidation—the change in the number of 
education units available—had long been ignored in the literature and never been taken 
into consideration until Hoxby (2000). Hoxby noticed how the number of available 
education units to choose from is subject to consolidation, and hence, a Tiebout (1956) 
like mechanism would as well be working in the school district consolidation movement. 
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After Hoxby (2000) influential study on the relationship between consolidation and 
competition among schools, relatively a smaller literature formed around this idea. 
Nevertheless the literature on competition faced many issues about how to measure 
competition and handle the endogeneity in their models. Eventually, the tendency in the 
literature to overlook some of the effects of consolidation brought conclusions which 
cannot be generalized. But in order to understand the general results of consolidation, we 
must investigate the structure as a whole. In this section, we first go through the branch 
of literature on the size effects of consolidation. Then we will review the small literature 
on competition effects in detail. 
3.2.1. Economies of Size 
Consolidation could increase or decrease per-pupil cost by changing the size of 
consolidating districts. In this part, we discuss how changes in size are incorporated with 
the costs of education. First, economies of scale decrease in average unit costs, which 
can be accredited to increases in the scale of production. Selection of the unit would be 
very simple in various standard economic productions. Nevertheless, when the 
production is education, the selection would be problematic because the unit can denote 
many different components of education such as the enrollment rate, attendance rate, 
student achievement or the range of education. 
The literature uses the term economies of scale mostly for either the economies 
associated with the scale or production of the firms, or the economies related to the size 
of the firms. There are several dimensions of scale. Pratten (1991) lists fifteen main 
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dimensions of scale under three categories, which are “dimensions affecting the 
efficiency of production”, “dimensions affecting selling and distribution costs” and 
“overall dimensions of scale”. 
“Dimensions affecting the efficiency of production” includes eight main 
dimensions: the total output, the duration of production, the rate of production, the extent 
of standardization, the capacity of the production units, the total capacity of the plants, 
the overall size of the production site, and the extent of vertical integration. “Dimensions 
affecting selling and distribution costs” consists of four main dimensions: sales to each 
consumer, the total number of consumers, the geographic concentration of the 
consumers, and the size of delivery to the consumers. “Overall dimensions of scale” 
contains three main dimensions: the size of the firms, the scale of the industry, and the 
scale of the national economy. 
The education literature generally concentrates on the relationship between the 
enrollment rate and per pupil expenditure, which can simply be called economies of size. 
Economies of size can be estimated by regressing the education cost per pupil on student 
achievement, direct input prices, environmental variables and other related variables. If 
the estimation gives a result of negative enrollment elasticity of cost, then there said to 
be economies of size. Conversely, if there is a positive enrollment elasticity of cost then 
there are diseconomies of size. 
Possible sources of economies of size and diseconomies of size are summarized 
in Pratten (1991) and Tholkes (1991). The sources of economies of size can be discussed 
under eight categories: Indivisibilities, the economies of specialization, the economies of 
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increased dimensions, the learning effect, the economies of massed resources, superior 
techniques of organizing production, economies associated with vertical integration, and 
price gains from size. 
Indivisibilities: Over particular ranges of output, some of the costs are at least 
partially independent of scale, that is, with respect the output, these costs are completely 
or partially indivisible. In the education sector, as the number of students increases in 
certain ranges, one teacher’s services supplied to each student do not decrease in quality. 
Moreover, no matter how many students the district has, there needs to be a school board 
and the superintendent as the central administration of the district. Within some range of 
enrollment, no additional administrators would be necessary to have the same degree of 
control. 
The Economies of Specialization: As the production of a firm becomes larger, 
the opportunities for specialization of the capital equipment and labor force increase. 
That is to say, increased output may make it possible for the firm to hire a worker with 
special skills or a worker with better skills compared to the current ones, or to utilize a 
special device or equipment in the firm. For instance it may be easier for larger schools 
to employ more specialized teachers. It is mentioned in Haller and Monk (1988) that 
consolidation can be defended by specialization argument that it enables high schools to 
offer more specialized classes to students. 
The Economies of Increased Dimension: Both initial costs and operating costs of 
most capital equipment increase less quickly than the capacity of the equipment. Since 
there are relatively less parts to produce, bigger units are less costly. Operating costs, as 
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well, are not much affected by the size, since the total direct labor cost of operating units 
of equipment does not increase as much as the size. Moreover, maintenance costs are 
generally proportional to the capital cost, and hence not get changed much by the size. 
For example, a larger school may be able to produce the same quality of education with 
a lower average cost, since they can utilize more efficient classrooms, or they may be 
able to produce a better quality of education with the same average cost, since they can 
have a new science laboratory. 
The Learning Effect: Learning is a source of economies, which is connected to 
the changes in the size by the cumulative production and the duration of production. 
Technically, the learning effects can be generated by the invention during the production 
process, or by the other cost-reducing outcomes of the continuous production. To give 
examples, bigger districts can put into practice the improvements in a curriculum with 
lower costs. Also, teachers can become more prolific in a bigger school, because the 
available accumulated experience by the teacher body increases with size of the school. 
The Economies of Massed Resources: Economies of massed resources can be a 
generated by the procedure of the law of large numbers. That is, a bigger firm can take 
greater risks because they can spread the risks better. Economies of massed resources 
can be achieved for specific types of labor, raw materials, monetary resources and 
production plants. 
Superior Techniques of Organizing Production: It can be easier for larger firms 
to utilize more efficient techniques of organizing production. For instance, automatic 
equipment can replace manually operated equipment in larger firms. It can also become 
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possible by the increased size to substitute a better method of flow production to have a 
higher rate of production. In education, in larger schools, computerized education can be 
made available to every student, which in turn increases the pace of education. 
Economies Associated with Vertical Integration: Integration of some of the 
production processes can bring some technical economies of scale. Such benefits can 
arise from transportation costs or transaction costs. Decreased number of production 
locations may enable economies for transportation costs. Also, less need to control the 
quality of the production can result in economies for transaction costs. 
Price Gains from Size: As the company gets bigger, they may have more control 
over the price of the production material. For example, a larger district can negotiate 
better for the prices of education equipment, because they would buy in bulks. Also, as 
stated by Merrifield (1999), they can have more power in the teacher labor market to 
decrease the wage rates of the teachers. 
While one or more of the economies mentioned above can realize with an 
increase in the size of the firm, it is also possible for the firm to experience some 
diseconomies due to the same increase in the size. Possible sources of diseconomies of 
size can be analyzed in five groups: Technical forces, management, consumer relations, 
labor relations, and selling and distribution. 
Technical Forces: Some technical forces are associated with diseconomies of 
scale. In fact there are two types of additional costs to deal with the technical difficulties 
due to the increase in the size. First, more expensive and durable equipment may be 
required to support the overuse. Secondly, there can be some initial costs to foresee the 
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technical limitation and to take the precautions before the increase in the size. 
Technically, school equipment can face severer wearing out with as the enrollment 
increases. Also there are costs of planning and managing the merging of schools and 
districts, in order to avoid technical complexities. 
Management: Since the efficiency of management can worsen as the size 
increases, the costs of management may increase more than the relative proportional 
increase in the size. If that is the case, than there would definitely be an optimum size for 
the firm both in horizontal scale and vertical scale. For example, as the size of the 
district increases, since the chain of management gets more intricate, decision-making 
process may slow down and the information network may deteriorate within. 
Consumer Relations: Smaller firms may be able to develop improved relations 
with their customers. Moreover, consumers may involve in the feedback process more 
efficiently with the smaller firms. In education, teachers can get to know their students 
better in small schools and help them more effectively. Students may feel more attached 
to smaller schools, and their sense of connection may improve the motivation and 
therefore the quality of education. In addition, parents of the students may keep contact 
with the teachers better and smaller schools may take advantage of a more intense 
parental involvement. 
Labor Relations: As the size of the firm gets bigger, the work produced by the 
workers in the firm may become less satisfactory. The decrease in the performance of 
the workers may be due to several factors such as the loss of the family spirit, or the 
weak connection with the managers. Teachers may simply find it difficult to teach in 
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larger schools, and the quality of the education may decrease. Moreover, it may be easier 
for the teachers to unionize in a larger district to counteract the monopsony they face. 
Hence, these types of teacher organizations increase the price of teacher labor, and 
increase the costs. 
Selling and Distribution: One of the potential sources of increased costs at higher 
scales of output is the selling and distribution. As the size of the firm increases, average 
length of haul increases as well. Hence, transportation costs would increase for the 
average unit of production sold. In the education sector, average transportation distance 
increases as the schools or districts get larger. As mentioned in Kenny (1982), average 
transportation time for students increases as well. 
3.2.2. Research on Size 
Most of the research in the literature dealing with the question of consolidation 
and economies of size focuses on the estimation of education cost functions by utilizing 
total or operating expenditures data. Almost all of these studies, however, face 
methodological problems, which are extensively pointed out in Fox (1981), Cotton 
(1996), and Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger (2002). The relatively more up to date 
studies somehow try to cope with these concerns in modeling and estimating the cost 
functions. 
The studies in the literature generally use the average test scores to measure the 
student performance. Most of them use data on math and reading scores; however some 
of the studies prefer using the graduation rates instead of the average test scores. Prices 
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of factors of production, and mainly the teacher wages are incorporated in several 
studies, and a few studies including Riew (1986) put teacher quality measures in their 
equations instead of teacher wages. There are some other studies such as Downes and 
Pogue (1994), Duncombe, Ruggiero and Yinger (1996), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1997, 
2001), Duncombe and Yinger (1997, 1998, 2000), and Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004a), 
which realize that there can be some endogeneity due to the simultaneous determination 
of the teacher wages with the school’s financial plans and educational goals, and 
therefore make some quality adjustments and take the teacher wages as endogenous. 
Ratcliffe, Riddle and Yinger (1990), and Downes and Pogue (1994) approach to the cost 
modeling engages demand for education to integrate the customers’ behavioral 
background, and they estimate expenditure functions in reduced form. In addition to this 
attempt to integrate the demand side, Downes and Pogue (1994), Duncombe, Ruggiero 
and Yinger (1996), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1997, 2001), Duncombe and Yinger 
(1997, 1998, 2000), and Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004a) take the educational 
performance and student outcomes as endogenous. 
Some of the latest studies in the literature try to control for the unobserved 
elements in the cost functions, mainly the efficiency. Deller and Rudnicki (1992), and 
Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1995) utilize stochastic frontier models to incorporate 
efficiency in the picture. Nevertheless, with respect to the variables of enrollment, they 
do not report big dissimilarities between the OLS and stochastic frontier estimation 
results. In order to control for district-specific effects, Downes and Pogue (1994) use 
panel data methods, and they report statistically significant association between 
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expenditures and enrollment. Instead of a stochastic frontier analysis, Duncombe, 
Ruggiero and Yinger (1996) employed a technique called data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), which generates an efficiency index with linear programming. A similar 
methodology is utilized in many other studies such as Duncombe and Yinger (1997, 
1998, 2000), Reschovsky and Imazeki (2001) and Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004a). 
What is remarkable about the size literature is that even though the studies employed 
different methodologies and analyzed different geographical locations, nearly all of these 
studies reach a consensus: Over a certain range of enrollment, there exist economies of 
size. 
Although expenditure regressions with cross sectional data can offer some 
support for economies of size, using panel data with appropriate methodology would be 
a better way to reach a conclusion. Nonetheless, there is no study in the literature, which 
follows such a direction to evaluate the size effects. Benton (1992), Hall (1993), Piercy 
(1996), and Weast (1997) try to control for the pre and post consolidation, but their data 
are not adequate enough and they concentrate on no more than one specific district, 
which means there is no control group. Streifel, Foldesy and Holman (1991) use a data 
set including 19 school district and they evaluate the finance data in the pre and post 
consolidation period. Yet, they do not control for many important variables such as 
teacher wages, variations in the student body, or student performance, and hence, their 
results are not representative. Howley (1994) states that since there is no study in the 
literature handling the pre and post consolidation information, our knowledge about the 
gains from consolidation is not well-backed and thus not reliable. Duncombe and Yinger 
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(2007) make an effort to fill this gap in the literature by using panel data, which covers 
periods of pre and post-consolidation. They introduce the first structural method to 
analyze the association between consolidation and educational cost efficiency. 
Nevertheless, their findings do not serve as an overall analysis of consolidation because 
they pay no attention to the changes in the degree of competition due to the changes in 
the number of available school districts. 
3.2.3. Research on Competition 
There are many studies in the literature which analyze the relationship between 
Tiebout competition and student performance. Belfield and Levin (2002) and Taylor 
(2000) present surveys of the literature on this relationship. For instance, Zanzig (1997) 
reports that student test scores in California increase as competition among public school 
districts increases. Borland and Howsen (1992, 1993, 1996) use data from schools in 
Kentucky and present parallel findings. Hoxby (2000) analyzes the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth and shows that students get higher scores on standardized 
tests, complete more years of schooling, and earn higher salaries if they attend a high 
school in a more competitive education market. 
Competition from the charter schools is also examined in the literature. For 
example, Hoxby (2003) presents that traditional public schools’ student test scores in 
math and reading improve when the introduction of charter schools increases 
competition. Moreover, Sass (2006) and Booker et al. (2008) report similar results for 
Florida and Texas, relatively. Bettinger (2005) and Bifulco and Ladd (2006), however, 
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cannot find any significant impact of charter school competition on the achievement of 
traditional public schools, and Ni (2009) presents that charter schools in Michigan had a 
negative impact on traditional public school students’ performance. 
The effect of competition from private schools on public schools is analyzed by 
several researchers. The private school enrollment is possibly endogenous. Couch, 
Shughart and Williams (1993), Dee (1998) and Hoxby (2000, 2002, 2003) control for 
the endogeneity of private school enrollment by using instrumental variables and show 
that when expenditures are held constant, public school performance improves with 
more competition from private schools, or similarly, when outcomes are held constant, 
cost of education decreases with more private schools competition. 
Some of the studies in the literature examine the relationship between 
competition and the relative efficiency of public schools. For example, Imazeki and 
Reschovsky (2004b) use competition as an independent variable in their education cost 
model in which the relationship between competition and efficiency is with the 
assumption. Husted and Kenny (1997) follow a different methodology and estimate 
school efficiency frontiers for different states. They show that states with a number of 
school districts per capita below a certain threshold have lower levels of education 
system efficiency. Grosskopf et al. (1999, 2001) present that urban Texas school districts 
are more inefficient in metropolitan areas with less competition from public and private 
schools. Millimet and Collier (2008) use Illinois data and find evidence that the 
efficiency of a school district increases as the efficiency of neighboring school districts 
increases. They attribute this finding to the relationship between school district 
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competition and efficiency. Furthermore, Kang and Greene (2002) show that New York 
school districts in more concentrated counties are less efficient. Duncombe, Miner and 
Ruggiero (1997), however, argue that as private school enrollment increases, their index 
of cost efficiency for New York public school districts decreases. Nevertheless, they do 
not control for private school endogeneity which may be the reason why they find an 
inverse relationship between competition and school district efficiency. 
Moreover, several researchers investigate the possibility of a critical level of 
competition such that increased competition is beneficial for governments in markets on 
one side of that critical point while more competition is not beneficial for the 
governments on the other side. Borland and Howsen (1993), Zanzig (1997), Grosskopf 
et al. (1999, 2001) Hoxby (2003), and Bettinger (2005) present such a switching point. 
In this study, we explicitly allow for the threshold effects in competition when modeling 
the trade-off between competition and school district consolidation. 
3.3. A Model of Cost and Consolidation 
In order to analyze the direct and indirect effects of school district consolidation 
on school district costs, we use a stochastic cost frontier methodology. Especially for the 
examination of public and other non-profit supplier behavior, the stochastic cost frontier 
methodology is very suitable. The possibility of cost inefficiency increases drastically 
when the suppliers do not have any incentive to maximize the profits of the institution. 
Furthermore, the cost efficiency incentives may get even weaker if there is no 
competition in the market or competition from other similar suppliers is not strong. With 
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the stochastic cost frontier methodology, it is possible to evaluate the degree of cost 
inefficiency while determining the features of the true cost function. Gronberg, Jansen 
and Taylor (2011a) presents the benefits of employing a stochastic cost frontier 
methodology to estimate the school cost function. They also explain possible challenges 
associated with using the methodology. 
In a standard stochastic frontier model, expenditure can be specified as 
   (     )      (   ), (16) 
where   is actual or observed spending,  (     ) is the cost frontier, 
  {                    } is a vector of variables affecting the frontier level of 
cost,    are input prices,    are quasi-fixed inputs,   is outcome(s),   is the cost 
parameter vector to be estimated,   is a two-sided exogenous random shock component 
such as bad weather conditions during the testing day, and   is a one-sided error term 
that captures cost inefficiency. The cost frontier here is the true neo-classical cost 
function. The frontier analysis finds what this deterministic cost frontier is along with 
the cost inefficiency, which increases the cost above minimum cost. So     , and cost 
efficiency is defined as        (   )   . 
Educational outcomes have a quantity dimension and a quality dimension. The 
number of students served represents a quantity dimension, and the human capital 
produced represents a quality dimension. We follow Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger 
(2002), and let   denote school district enrollment and   denote student achievement. In 
the education literature, it is a common practice to estimate an average or per pupil 
expenditure. Taking   as quantity we incorporate these features into equation (16) as 
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 (                           )     (   )
 
 (17) 
Taking the natural logarithms of both sides of the equation (17) gives 
        ( )          (18) 
Duncombe and Yinger (1993) explain that economies of scale can be measured 
with respect to quantity,  , or with respect to quality,  .9 In the education literature 
enrollment measure is more common which is probably due to the direct relationship 
between enrollment and school district consolidation. Andrews, Duncombe and Yinger 
(2002) refer to the enrollment measure as economies of size. We follow them and define 
economies of size as the enrollment elasticity of per pupil expenditures (  
 ln    ln ), holding student achievement  , input prices  , quasi-fixed inputs  , and 
cost inefficiency constant. Using (18), we get 
      (19) 
where    ln   ln  is the enrollment elasticity of total cost. Economies of size exist 
if    , or correspondingly if    . 
The level of competition in the education market in which the district operates 
may be an essential characteristic of the decision-making environment faced by the 
public school district officials. That is, since public officials do not have a direct 
incentive to maximize the profits of the public institution they work for, they may be 
more prone to involve in excessive spending. Competition, on the other hand, may be an 
                                                 
9
 They actually present three different measures of economies of scale: along with   and  , they also 
explain that there are economies of scale in the production of the public facility (or school activities),  , 
which is not an output but an intermediate input into the final output of student achievement. We don’t 
have the data for  , and for that reason, we model the cost frontier as a reduced form of their model. 
119 
 
important force that disciplines this wasteful behavior through various mechanisms. 
Hence, the prediction of our competition hypothesis is that increased competition in a 
district’s education market would result in a decrease in that district’s cost inefficiency. 
The stochastic cost frontier methodology lets us model the one-sided error term, 
 , and hence test our competition efficiency hypothesis. That is, we can specify that 
   (   )         (20) 
where   is a vector of environmental cost efficiency factors, including a measure of 
competition, and   is a parameter vector. We can substitute expression (20) into the per 
pupil expenditure equation in (18) to yield 
        ( )         (   )         (21) 
We analyze school district consolidation as changes in  . Then the model in (21) 
yields two potential effects of a school district consolidation on per pupil expenditures: 
changes in   due to consolidation causes direct economies of scale effect on per pupil 
expenditures, and that consolidation may also change the school district cost efficiency 
through changing the degree of concentration of the school district’s market. Let    be 
the competition measure of the district that a greater value of    means a more 
competitive environment. Differentiating (21) with respect to ln  gives 
  (   )  (
  
   
)  (
   
  
)    (22) 
We can decompose the observed reaction of per pupil spending to a change in N 
by a consolidation into two effects: a scale effect (   ) and a competitive efficiency 
effect (     ⁄ )  (     ⁄ )   . Our competitive efficiency hypothesis infers that 
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(     ⁄ )    and (     ⁄ )   , so assuming that (   )   , consolidation’s 
expected cost savings due to the economies of scale would be reduced, if not completely 
offset and outweighed, by the increases in the expenditures due to increased cost 
inefficiency. 
We illustrate the mathematical derivation above in a cost and expenditure curves 
figure below. In Figure 16 , there is a hypothetical set of cost and expenditure curves 
which are U-shaped in enrollment by assumption. In the figure, we portray a 
consolidation scenario between district   of size    and a second district of size 
(     ). Consolidation of these two districts would create a new district (district  ), 
which would have a total enrollment of     Before consolidation, district  ’s frontier log 
cost per pupil is       , log expenditure per pupil is     
  , and the distance from the 
frontier,    ,      
 . Point   on the log expenditure per pupil curve show district  ’s 
position before consolidation which is associated with the competitive environment   . 
If the two districts consolidate, after consolidation, district  ’s frontier log cost per pupil 
would be equal to       which is at a lower level than      . If the change in the 
competitive environment due to the consolidation had no effect on the inefficiency, point 
F would be presenting the level of log expenditure per pupil after consolidation as the 
distance     is equal to   , and the cost savings would be equal to            , or in 
other words the vertical distance between points A and F. Our competitive efficiency 
hypothesis, however, implies that inefficiency after consolidation,    , is greater than 
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  . Hence log expenditure per pupil curve associated with the new competitive 
environment after consolidation should be on a higher level relative to     (  ). If the 
economies of scale effect on cost dominates the competitive effect on inefficiency, there 
would still be some positive realized cost savings but the savings would be smaller than 
the true savings of economies of scale. That is, if the competitive environment after 
consolidation is     then point    on the associated log expenditure per pupil curve 
would be representing the level of the new district’s per pupil expenditure (     
 ), and 
the realized savings due to consolidation would be     
       
   . If the competitive 
effect dominates the scale effect, however, all of the savings due to the economies of 
scale would be wiped out by the increased inefficiency resulting in realized losses. That 
is, if the competitive environment after consolidation is     then point    on the 
associated log expenditure per pupil curve would be representing the level of the new 
district’s per pupil expenditure (     
 ), and the realized losses due to consolidation 
would be      
      
   . 
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FIGURE 16.—COST AND EXPENDITURE CURVES 
 
3.3.1. Specification of the Econometric Model 
The econometric specification of our model is a version of the cost frontier 
model presented in (21) which captures the effects of key variables relevant to the 
expenditure setting of Texas public school districts. Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor 
(2011a) use a similar model. Since other restricted functional forms such as Cobb-
Douglas can be nested in a translog specification by setting the interaction terms equal to 
zero, and since classical linear models can be nested in a frontier model by setting the 
one-sided error term equal to zero, we decide to model  ( ) as a modified translog cost 
frontier.
10
 
                                                 
10
 Modification of the standard translog cost frontier is in two ways: First, since the variables in 
percentages can take on values of zero, we do not take the natural logarithm of those variables and assume 
that these percentage variables are the natural logarithm of the absolute values of the variables. Second, 
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The natural logarithm of the expenditures per pupil (  ) is the dependent variable 
in (23). The right-hand-side variables are    output variables including enrollment, 
     , and the quality measures    ,    input prices denoted by    , and    
environmental factors denoted by   . All of the right-hand-side variables except those 
that are already percentages are in natural logarithms. As discussed in the data section 
below, there is a big variation in school district size in Texas. Because of this variation, 
some researchers such as Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004a) exclude the largest districts 
in Texas from their analysis. In this study, however, instead of dropping some districts, 
we decide to keep all of the districts with complete data, and include a cubic term for log 
enrollment in the model to control for multiple inflection points in the cost frontier. 
Hence the model for district expenditures per pupil is: 
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(23) 
where we impose the usual symmetry restrictions,           , for            . 
                                                                                                                                                
cubic term of enrollment is added to the model as an extension for further investigation of multiple 
inflection points in the cost frontier. 
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3.3.2. The Scaling Property and Further Specifications 
Our analysis is predicated on the assumption that competition affects school 
district efficiency, but not the educational production technology itself. Therefore, in 
order to avoid the biases associated with the traditional estimation methods of stochastic 
cost frontiers, we think that it is essential to incorporate a systematic element called the 
scaling property into our models. The integration of the scaling property allows us to 
take advantage of several powerful features, which are consistent with our public school 
data, and are not provided within conventional models. 
Simar, Lovell and Eeckaut (1994) suggest the semi-parametric method, which is 
later named as the “scaling property” by Wang and Schmidt (2002), and Alvarez et al. 
(2006), to accounting for exogenous effects in the stochastic frontier models. The scaling 
property defines   as, 
   (    )   (    )   
  (24) 
where    is a nonnegative variable, which is random and not a function of the 
environmental cost efficiency factors    such as size or competition, and  (    ) is a 
nonnegative function of   . 
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The fundamental characteristic of the scaling property is the fact that the 
variation in    redefines the scale but it does not alter any other aspect of the shape of the 
                                                 
11
 Since the scaling property results in  [ ]   (    )   [ 
 ], the method implies more than just 
introducing heteroskedasticity to the model. In order to avoid biases, Simar, Lovell and Eeckaut (1994) 
uses this property to build a nonlinear least squares estimator free of a pre-specified distribution. Later, 
with their Monte Carlo analysis, Wang and Schmidt (2002) present strong evidence of critical biases with 
the traditional estimators of the parameters of a stochastic frontier which pay no attention to the scaling 
property, and the estimates of   of Jondrow et al. (1982). Wang and Schmidt’s line of reasoning and 
findings are also valid for the traditional estimates of cost factors and cost efficiency. 
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distribution of  . This happens because the scaling function  (    ) only determines the 
scale, and the shape is defined by the basic distribution of   , which does not depend on 
  . In other words, the scaling property lets the school heterogeneity to show up by 
stretching or contracting the horizontal axis through changing the horizontal scale 
without altering the underlying shape.
12
 This captures the intuitively sensible and 
attractive idea that for all schools, the shape of the distribution of  , that is the random 
part of the residual, is the same. 
This fundamental characteristic of the scaling property is not only statistical: The 
economic interpretation of this characteristic is important, and it is desirable in our 
stochastic cost frontier model. The scaling property decomposes  (    ) into two 
logically and economically independent terms: The basic random term    can be viewed 
as the school’s initial cost efficiency level which captures the random elements in the 
model such as administrator’s innate talents. Nevertheless, when these innate talents are 
employed to run the school, the degree of their contribution to the cost efficiency 
depends heavily on other factors such as the education level or experience of the 
administrator, or other environmental variables like the location of the school. Hence, 
the final level of cost efficiency depends also on this second term  (    ), which is a 
function of   . 
A second appealing characteristic of the scaling property is that it allows clear 
explanations of how    affects school’s cost inefficiency since the property does not 
                                                 
12
 To be more specific, assume that  (  ) is the density function of   , and   is equal to     , where   is 
a constant. Therefore, the density of   is (  ⁄ )   (  ⁄ ) which practically has the same shape as  (  ) 
because appropriate adjustment of the axes would portray two identical graphs of densities. 
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necessitates any assumption for the basic distribution. As such, the property makes it 
possible to acquire consistent estimates of   and  . So the expenditure equation in (21) 
becomes 
        (    )         (   )     (25) 
As discussed by Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008), there are several candidates 
for the scaling function  (   ).13 The basic distribution of    has some candidates as 
well.
14
 We followed Wang and Schmidt (2002) and define   as 
    [        (       
 ) ] (26) 
Our   can be rewritten as    ( )     and thus has the scaling property.15    
here has a half-normal distribution and the variance of  ,   
  , is defined as     (     
  
 ). In our final model, the mean and standard deviation of   change as the    changes, 
but the shape of the distribution does not change. 
Measurement error is generally a function of school district size. To account for 
the effect of district size heterogeneity on the two-sided error, we model the variance of 
  as 
  
     (      
 
 
) (27) 
where         (    
 ). With our specification above, the log-likelihood function can 
be written as 
                                                 
13
 Suitable scaling function candidates include the linear,       , or the exponential,     (    
 ). 
14
 Suitable basic distribution specifications include half normal, exponential or truncated normal 
distributions. 
15
 An example of such a specification is presented in Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995). 
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where    √        ,       ⁄  ,           , and  ( ) is the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. In our paper the maximization 
of the likelihood function with respect to the parameters is accomplished by using a 
looping algorithm of 10 Newton-Raphson iterations followed by 100 Berhdt-Hall-Hall-
Hausman iterations to get the maximum likelihood estimates of all parameters. Once we 
have the estimates of all parameters, we have estimates of    , which carry information 
about    . Jondrow et al. (1982) offer two different estimates of cost efficiency, both of 
which are based on the conditional distribution of   given  . The estimates can be 
obtained using either the expected value or the mode of the conditional distribution 
 (     ). That is 
 ̂    (       )        {
 (      ⁄ )
   (      ⁄ )
}      (29) 
 ̂    (       )  {
            
            
 (30) 
where     (    
 ) (  
    
 )⁄  ,         √        , and  ( ) is the standard normal 
density function. Using one of the point estimates of   offered by Jondrow et al. we can 
predict the log expenditure per pupil of a district as 
   ̂ 
   (     
                  )   ̂     
  ̂ 
   ̂   (31) 
where   
  is a vector of variables in the translog specification, and  ̂  and  ̂  are the 
maximum likelihood estimates of    and    , respectively. In order to analyze the 
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marginal effect of each variable that explains the variance of cost inefficiency on the 
cost inefficiency, we take the derivative of  ̂   with respect to that    variable. Appendix 
A presents how we calculate   ̂     ⁄ . Jondrow et al. estimate the cost efficiency by 
substituting one of these two point estimates of    into    {   } . The cost efficiency 
can also be estimated a la Battese and Coelli (1988) using equation (32) 
     {   (   )    }  {
   (         )
   (       )
}   exp (     
 
 
  
 ) (32) 
Since e  { (       )} is not equal to and is just a first order approximation to 
 {   (   )    }, we prefer presenting the cost efficiency findings a la Battese and Coelli 
in our paper. The cost frontier is the standard against which the     above is estimated. 
Hence       would mean perfect cost efficiency, whereas       would mean 
perfect cost inefficiency. 
3.4. Data 
For our analysis, we get the data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The unit of analysis is the public 
school districts. Our analysis incorporates all 952 traditional public school districts, 
which provide K-12 education in 2006-07 school year, and have compete data for that 
school year. We excluded charter school districts from this study because they may not 
have the same education production technology public school districts have. Table 16 
presents the summary statistics of the variables we used. 
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We use the natural logarithm of actual current operating expenditures as the 
dependent variable. We do not include the transportation expenditures with an argument 
similar to that of Gronberg et al. (2005) that the transportation expenditures would cause 
additional noise because they are not likely to be identified by the factors that identify 
the student performance. Also, we do not include food expenditures in order to avoid 
similar kind of unwanted noise, and due to the fact that the value of the food and other 
in-kind transfers that public school lunch programs get cannot be measured well. 
Moreover, as in Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor (2011b), we do not include 
intergovernmental payments, facility acquisition and construction, community service, 
and debt service. When we exclude these costs, we find that the mean of Texas public 
school district operational expenditure per pupil is $8,444 in our sample, with a 
minimum of $4,745 and a maximum of $25,232. 
We include both quantity and quality dimensions of output as independent 
variables. The quantity dimension we use in this study is measures as the total number of 
students in a public school district in fall enrollment. This quantity measure varies 
between 50 and 202,449, with a mean of 4,690 and a median of 1,015. 
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TABLE 16.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Operational expenditure per 
pupil 
8,444 2,225 4,745 25,232 
Enrollment 4,690 13,016 50 202,449 
Change in TAKS passing rate 0.013 0.042 -0.12 0.25 
Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.183 0.088 0 0.853 
Lagged passing rate 0.701 0.105 0.407 0.977 
Percent low income students 0.532 0.183 0 0.999 
Percent limited English 
proficiency 
0.077 0.092 0 0.687 
Percent Special Education 
students 
0.124 0.033 0.04 0.305 
Percent high school students 0.301 0.04 0.088 0.557 
Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
107.2 81.2 3.4 365.3 
Hedonic predicted salary 1.209 0.092 1 1.463 
High school comparable wage 
index 
3.067 0.454 2.493 3.995 
Chapter 41 district 0.173 0.379 0 1 
HHI-CBSA-ALL (all public 
and private schools) 
0.318 0.233 0.059 1 
Number of observations = 952 
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We use two indicators of quality dimension of output. Our first quality indicator 
is the annual change in passing rates on the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills 
(TAKS). This test is given to students in grades 3 to 11 once a year to assess their 
mathematics and reading/language arts knowledge. We compute the percentage of 
students in each public school district who passed the exam in 2006-07 school year by 
analyzing the administrative data on individual student scores, and then we calculate the 
difference in passing rates by comparing this percentage to the passing rate among the 
same student body in 2005-06 school year. This difference in the passing rates for a 
perfectly matched student cohort is our value-added measure. In our sample, the range of 
this measure is [-0.12, 0.25] and the mean is 0.013, which shows that on average, there is 
almost no change in the percent passing rates, 
With our second quality indicator, we deal with the general critic of how 
standardized examination like TAKS can intentionally be made easier to pass. It is a 
common argument that the states have lowered their performance standards to increase 
the passing rates. Hence, in order to measure the cost effects of higher levels of 
performance, we introduce an additional public school district performance indicator, 
which is the percentage of students who completed and advanced course. In our sample, 
this measure has a mean of 0.183 with a high standard deviation of 0.088. Along with 
that, the minimum of the measure is zero, while the maximum of it is 0.853, implying 
that there is a great variation in this quality measure in Texas. 
In addition to the quality and quantity measures of output, we employ price 
indicators for three major educational inputs, teachers, non-teachers and classroom 
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materials, as independent variables. For the teacher price, we use the hedonic wage 
index of beginning teacher salaries from Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor (2011a). For the 
salaries of other personnel, we use the comparable wage index (CWI) for high school 
graduates used by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
16
 We do not add the wage 
rates of other professionals and administrators as independent variables since they are 
very highly correlated with the teacher salaries. 
To measure the cost of the classroom material and instructional equipment, it 
would the best to add direct indicators of local prices of these materials. Nevertheless, 
local price data for these materials do not exist. Actually, the local variation in prices of 
these materials is mainly due to the transportation costs because the prices for 
educational material such as notebooks or pencils are mostly determined in the national 
market. Hence, a sensible approach to measure the non-personnel input prices is to add a 
measure of geographic isolation as a proxy for the differences in local prices of 
classroom material. We employ the Haversine formula to calculate the great-circle 
distance from the location to the closest major metropolitan area and use it as a measure 
of geographic isolation. 
Other than the output and purchased input indicators, our model also includes 
numerous environmental factors, which are not purchased but affect the district cost. In 
order to measure the changes in costs due to the differences in needs of the students, we 
use the percentages of students in each public school district who are classified as 
economically disadvantaged, high school, special education or limited English proficient 
                                                 
16
 More information about the comparable wage index for high school graduates without a college degree 
is available at http://fastexas.org/ 
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(LEP) students. Moreover, since the previous years’ achievement level can make it 
easier or more difficult to increase the passing rates in the current school year, we 
include the two year lagged (2004-05) TAKS passing rates for grades 3 to 11. 
One of the variables that we use to explain the cost efficiency is the Chapter 41 
of the Texas Education Code. For the Texas school finance system, school districts are 
categorized as either property-poor or property-wealthy. The wealth category of a 
district is determined by calculating the wealth per student of that district, which is equal 
to the district’s prior year tax base divided by Chapter 41 weighted average daily 
attendance (WADA), and comparing this ratio to a predetermined per student wealth 
level. In 2006, a district is considered to be property-wealthy (or Chapter 41 district) if 
the wealth per student of that district is greater than or equal to $319,500. Chapter 41’s 
goal is to redistribute the wealth from property-wealthy school districts to property-poor 
districts to help the public education in property-poor districts. Accumulation of wealth 
in districts would result in unproductive, wasteful spending. To analyze this possible 
effect of capital accumulation on cost inefficiency, we include a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the district is property-wealthy sometime between 1994 and 2007. 
An important contribution of our study is that the model incorporates the 
competitive effect in school cost inefficiency. For that reason, a competition measure is 
required for the analysis. Many researcher such as Hoxby (2000), Grosskopf et al. 
(2001), Holmes, Desimone and Rupp (2006), and Booker et al. (2008) employ 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices (HHI) of market concentration to measure the 
competition in the education market. We follow the literature and use a Herfindahl-
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Hirschman index (HHI) of education market concentration based on total district 
enrollments. 
We use all public schools including the charter schools and all private schools—
both accredited and nonaccredited—as market participants when calculating the 
concentration index (ALL). Data on the enrollment and location of the schools come 
from the Texas Education Agency, National Center for Education’s Common Core of 
Data (CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSS). PSS is carried out every 2 years 
with the initial collection during the 1989-1990 school year, and last collection during 
the 2007-2008 school year. The unit of the survey is private elementary and secondary 
schools, excluding institutions or organizations that offer base for home schooling 
without providing in-class education for the students. According to the PSS data, there 
are 2851 private schools in Texas. We assumed private school systems with no 
administrative connection with other schools to be individual private school districts 
including the entire grade level that private school system offers. Within each county, all 
of the Catholic Diocesan schools are controlled by a private central authority, and hence, 
we found it very sensible to gather these schools as a private school district. We also 
aggregated Seventh-Day Adventist schools within each county as a private school 
district. Moreover, we considered some other private schools, which are reported by 
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TEA to be directed by one central authority, to be in one private school district. 
Following these guidelines, we determined 2413 private school districts. 
We assume that the education markets are the CBSAs identified by the OMB.
17
 
Therefore, we treat each CBSA as a separate education market. In case a school district 
is not in any of these CBSAs, we assume that their school district’s county is a distinct 
education market. So the concentration index of a public school district (HHI-CBSA-
ALL) is the sum of squared enrollment shares of all of the public school districts and 
private districts in that district’s CBSA, or county if that district is not in a CBSA.18 
Figure 17 plots the distribution of our school competition measure across the 952 
school districts in our sample. As the figure illustrates, the delivery of education services 
is highly concentrated in many markets in Texas. According to the standards of the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice these education markets would have 
been considered as either moderately concentrated (HHI = [0.10, 0.18]) or concentrated 
(HHI > 0.18), if these markets were private sector markets. 
                                                 
17
 According to the Office of Management and Budget, a metropolitan area contains a core urban 
population of 50,000 or more, and a micropolitan area contains an urban core population of more than 
10,000 but less than 50,000. Each metropolitan or micropolitan area contains counties with the core urban 
areas and any neighboring counties with a high degree of social and economic integration with the urban 
core. 
18
 There are many Texas school districts which are in multiple counties geographically. The TEA, 
however, officially associates each public school district with only a single county. If a school district is 
not in a CBSA, we use the county designated to that district by the TEA as its education market. 
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FIGURE 17.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE HHI-CBSA-ALL 
 
3.5. Regression Results 
Maximization of the likelihood function presented in equation (28) is 
accomplished by using a looping algorithm of 10 Newton-Raphson iterations followed 
by 100 Berhdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman iterations. Table 17 presents modified marginal 
effects from our estimates of the model in equation (23). The parameter estimates from 
the modified translog model are used to calculate the implied marginal effects on log 
expenditures per pupil from a change in one of the explanatory variables. Because of the 
interaction terms in equation (23), these marginal effects depend not only on the 
estimated model parameters but also on the values of the explanatory variables 
themselves. One implication is that these marginal effects will, in general, differ for each 
district. In Table 17, we report the marginal effects of each linear variable evaluated at 
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the mean of all other explanatory variables, and the estimated marginal effects of the 
quadratic or cubic terms. In the same table, we also present the marginal effects at the 
means of the values of all of the explanatory variables including the squared and cubic 
terms. To give an example, the modified marginal effect of enrollment (  ) presented in 
the table as “log(Enrollment), linear” is: 
        ∑      
  
   
 ∑      
  
   
 (33) 
where    and    are the means of    and    respectively. The estimate of squared 
enrollment (    ) presented in the table as “log(Enrollment), squared” is equal to     , 
and the estimate of cubic enrollment (  
 ) presented in the table as “log(Enrollment), 
cubed” is equal to    . The marginal effect of enrollment at the means of the values of 
all of the explanatory variables including the squared and cubed terms is presented in the 
table as “log(Enrollment), joint” and is equal to: 
        ∑      
  
   
 ∑      
  
   
               
 
 (34) 
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TABLE 17.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, MAIN SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
No HHI 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Linear 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Quadratic 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.768 *** -0.771 *** -0.773 *** 
(0.132) (0.131) (0.131) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.068 *** 0.069 *** 0.070 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.095 *** -0.094 *** -0.094 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.219 ** 0.254 ** 0.254 ** 
(0.109) (0.108) (0.108) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-0.967  -1.034  -1.004  
(1.469) (1.455) (1.457) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.195 * 0.228 ** 0.229 ** 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.374 ** 0.367 ** 0.366 ** 
(0.148) (0.147) (0.147) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.531  -0.521  -0.515  
(0.324) (0.322) (0.321) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.180 *** 0.176 *** 0.177 *** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
-0.181  -0.074  -0.066  
(0.602) (0.605) (0.606) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
0.111  0.039  0.035  
(0.431) (0.432) (0.433) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.025  -0.019  -0.017  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.151  0.137  0.131  
(0.241) (0.239) (0.239) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.120  0.135  0.140  
(0.221) (0.219) (0.219) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.279 *** 0.281 *** 0.280 *** 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.054  -0.077  -0.073  
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.196  0.238  0.229  
(0.480) (0.480) (0.481) 
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TABLE 17.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, MAIN SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
No HHI 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Linear 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Quadratic 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.024  -0.040  -0.038  
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-1.006  -1.043  -1.026  
(0.749) (0.744) (0.745) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
6.828 ** 7.018 ** 6.951 ** 
(2.794) (2.774) (2.779) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.688 *** 0.699 *** 0.699 *** 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.137) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-2.991 *** -3.228 *** -3.235 *** 
(0.901) (0.895) (0.898) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.184 *** 5.536 *** 5.548 *** 
(1.438) (1.427) (1.431) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.130  0.105  0.105  
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.100 ** -0.101 ** -0.100 ** 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.034 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.408  -0.349  -0.380  
(0.625) (0.653) (0.654) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.503  2.253  2.346  
(1.629) (1.713) (1.716) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.527 *** 0.493 *** 0.497 *** 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.834 *** -2.344 ** -2.319 ** 
(1.090) (1.109) (1.113) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
1.190 ** 0.997 ** 0.987 ** 
(0.491) (0.498) (0.499) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.192 *** -0.131 ** -0.127 ** 
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
Observations 952 952 952 
Log Likelihood 864.7 870.9 871.2 
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TABLE 17.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, MAIN SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
No HHI 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Linear 
HHI-CBSA-
ALL 
Quadratic 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.829 *** 1.655 *** 1.666 *** 
(0.303) (0.288) (0.307) 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 
 1.411 *** 2.274 * 
 (0.412) (1.307) 
HHI-CBSA-ALL Squared 
  -0.825  
  (1.181) 
Constant 
-5.187 *** -5.526 *** -5.696 *** 
(0.388) (0.442) (0.543) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
28.244 *** 27.310 *** 26.979 *** 
(2.562) (2.580) (2.607) 
Constant 
-9.250 *** -9.154 *** -9.092 *** 
(0.456) (0.466) (0.479) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
The estimated properties of the core cost function are generally consistent with 
theoretical expectations. It costs significantly more to produce higher levels of output 
quality. This is true for both quality measures—changes in passing rates and percent of 
students taking advanced courses. Districts that must offer higher teacher wages have 
higher per pupil costs. Districts that operate in environments that require the adoption of 
more resource intensive instructional technologies also have higher costs. Relevant 
environmental factors here include the percentage of economically disadvantaged 
students, percentage of special education students and remoteness from large 
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metropolitan areas. For an example, when evaluated at the sample mean values for all 
explanatory variables (including the squared term), the cost of educating an 
economically disadvantaged student is 28 percent higher than is the cost for educating a 
student who is not eligible for free or reduced lunch. 
One focus of our analysis is upon evidence of the existence and extent of 
economies to student population size. Figure 18 and Figure 19 plot predicted cost per 
pupil against enrollment.
19
 The predicted cost in these figures are generated for a 
hypothetical representative district with all cost factors except for scale held constant at 
sample mean values. We find that the impact of scale is not the traditional U-shape. We 
do find a region of increasing average cost per pupil from $6,477 to $6,608 over the 
enrollment range from 20,518 to 303,028 students, but the increase in average cost per 
pupil is with a decreasing speed after 78,850 students at $6,542 per pupil, and average 
cost starts declining as the district size exceeds 303,028 students. Thus there may be 
continual economies of scale associated with extremely large enrollments but since there 
is only two data points over that range, this finding cannot be strongly suggested. Yet, 
this second region of declining average costs is, to the best of our knowledge, unique to 
our study of school costs.
20
 This finding is fundamentally due to the inclusion of the 
cubic enrollment in our model specification. If we drop the cubic term and estimate the 
                                                 
19
 The figures are over a scale from 50 to 736,972 because 50 is the minimum enrollment in our sample 
and 736,972 is the total enrollment in Harris, the biggest county in Texas in terms of enrollment. A district 
size of 736,972 can realize in Texas if a consolidation scenario to convert each county to a single district 
were to put into practice. This consolidation scenario is actually proposed, and consequences of such a 
scenario are examined thoroughly in our simulation section. 
20
 The biggest district in Texas in terms of enrollment is Houston ISD with 202,449 students in 2006-07 
school year. A consolidation of districts at county level would result in a district, “Harris ISD,” which 
would have 736,972 students. Hence, some cost savings due to being in the second region of declining 
average costs can actually realize in Texas if the competitive effect does not dominate the scale effect. 
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standard quadratic- in-enrollment type of model, we estimate a traditional U-shaped 
average per pupil cost curve, with increasing average costs to enrollments greater than 
18,137. A likelihood-ratio test, however, rejects the restricted quadratic model in favor 
of the cubic model specification.
21
 
FIGURE 18.—PREDICTED COST PER PUPIL, ENROLLMENT < 200,000 
 
                                                 
21
 Likelihood-ratio test is         and probability of a larger value of   ( )        . Therefore, the 
cubic term results in a statistically significant improvement in the model fit. 
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FIGURE 19.—PREDICTED COST PER PUPIL, ENROLLMENT > 20,518 
 
Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor (2011a) argue that the stochastic frontier approach 
is a theoretically sound response to the faux-cost-function criticisms. If school districts 
were largely efficient, then no response would be necessary, and there would be no 
advantage to using stochastic frontier analysis. The one-sided error term would be 
negligible, and frontier analysis would yield the same coefficient estimates as would 
classical linear regression. However, our analysis finds evidence of significant one-sided 
error in the regression, implying substantial cost inefficiency. As presented in the 
baseline column of Table 17, Chapter 41 has a positive and significant effect on the 
variance of cost inefficiency implying that capital accumulation contributes to the cost 
inefficiency. In the second column, we present that HHI-CBSA-ALL also has a positive 
and significant effect on the variance of cost inefficiency. We find that the marginal 
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effect of HHI-CBSA-ALL on cost inefficiency is 0.030. Furthermore, we test if the 
variance of cost inefficiency is a quadratic function of HHI. As presented in the third 
columns, however, the likelihood ratio test rejects the inclusion of the squared HHI term. 
In Figure 20, we show the distribution of estimated efficiency values for each 
school district in our sample. The distribution is heavily skewed, with observations 
piling up between 90 and 98 percent efficiency and a long left tail of observations 
extending to a minimum value of 53 percent efficiency. The average level of efficiency 
among the traditional public school districts in our sample is 92 percent. By way of 
comparison, Gronberg, Jansen and Naufal (2006) reported estimates centered around 90 
percent for a variety of efficiency estimates for Texas schools. 
FIGURE 20.—DISTRIBUTION OF COST EFFICIENCY 
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Figure 21 provides information on the relationship between estimated 
inefficiency and measured competition for our Texas sample of districts. The graph 
shows the scatterplot of HHI against our estimated cost efficiency. We see that the plots 
are concentrated in the HHI range of 0 to 0.6 and cost efficiency index values in the rage 
of 0.8 to 1. That is, most districts are between 80% and 100% efficiency, and have 
concentration measures between 0 and 0.6. However, there are many values for smaller 
values of the cost efficiency index and many values with HHI values above 0.6. 
FIGURE 21.—SCATTERPLOT OF THE HHI-CBSA-ALL VERSUS COST EFFICIENCY 
 
In Figure 22 and Figure 23, we present a map of our concentration measure and a 
map of Texas school district cost efficiency. In Figure 22, darker shades indicate more 
concentration, and in Figure 23, darker shades indicate more cost efficiency. When we 
146 
 
compare the maps, we see that the relatively more cost efficient districts are 
concentrated around the metropolitan areas where HHI values are relatively lower. The 
cost efficiencies of the districts in western Texas, however, are generally between 50% 
and 90%, where HHI values are more than 0.50. 
FIGURE 22.—TEXAS MAP OF THE HHI-CBSA-ALL 
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FIGURE 23.—TEXAS MAP OF COST EFFICIENCY 
 
As noted earlier, the one-step scaling approach to stochastic frontier analysis 
allows us to model the one-sided inefficiency error term. In our case, the two critical 
theoretical determinants of inefficiency are Chapter 41 status and competition. The 
principal point of departure in our study is the assessment of the competition-efficiency 
relationship. As reported in Table 17, the estimated relationship between inefficiency 
and the Herfindahl concentration index is positive and significant. Since higher values 
for the Herfindahl index are associated with a less competitive market structure, our 
results support the hypothesis that a decrease in competitive market structure is 
associated with an increase in cost inefficiency. Quantitatively, the estimated marginal 
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effects suggest that an increase of 0.1 in the HHI-CBSA-ALL results in an increased 
inefficiency of less than 1% (0.3%). Thus a fairly large increase in market concentration 
has a small but positive impact on school district inefficiency. 
3.5.1. Alternative Specifications 
In order to examine the sensitivity of our results presented in Table 18, we ran 
several alternative specification of our model in equation (23). Table 18 shows modified 
marginal effects from our alternative specifications. In the first column, we exclude 
Houston ISD and Dallas ISD from our sample and estimate our model. Houston ISD and 
Dallas ISD are the two biggest public districts in Texas and can be considered as two 
outliers in terms of enrollment. For that reason, the results presented in the second 
column of Table 17 may be sensitive to including these districts in our sample. The first 
column of Table 18, however, presents that the estimation results do not change in sign 
or significance, and their magnitudes do not change much either, implying that the 
results in the second column of Table 17 are not sensitive to inclusion of Houston ISD 
and Dallas ISD. 
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TABLE 18.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
Houston & 
Dallas 
Excluded 
Low 
Density 
Excluded 
High 
Density 
Excluded 
Spline 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.775 *** -0.605 *** -0.699 *** -0.776 *** 
(0.149) (0.141) (0.176) (0.131) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.070 *** 0.050 *** 0.059 *** 0.070 *** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.001 * -0.002 * -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.094 *** -0.088 *** -0.103 *** -0.094 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.254 ** 0.269 ** 0.270 ** 0.258 ** 
(0.108) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-1.035  -1.845  -0.985  -0.977 
(1.452) (1.527) (1.433) (1.460) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.228 ** 0.223 ** 0.245 ** 0.234 ** 
(0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.103) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.369 ** 0.312 * 0.422 *** 0.368 ** 
(0.147) (0.177) (0.153) (0.146) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.525  -0.391  -0.679 ** -0.508 
(0.322) (0.410) (0.342) (0.318) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.177 *** 0.170 *** 0.178 *** 0.182 *** 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
-0.078  0.068  -0.419  -0.056 
(0.605) (0.628) (0.626) (0.606) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
0.042  -0.059  0.269  0.028 
(0.433) (0.449) (0.448) (0.433) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.019  -0.014  -0.042  -0.016 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.137  0.207  -0.003  0.118 
(0.239) (0.249) (0.259) (0.239) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.135  0.070  0.271  0.150 
(0.219) (0.230) (0.240) (0.219) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.281 *** 0.281 *** 0.284 *** 0.278 *** 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.075  -0.104  -0.110  -0.069 
(0.120) (0.121) (0.130) (0.120) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.243  0.389  0.370  0.244 
(0.485) (0.507) (0.545) (0.481) 
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TABLE 18.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
Houston & 
Dallas 
Excluded 
Low 
Density 
Excluded 
High 
Density 
Excluded 
Spline 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.038  -0.044  -0.058  -0.031 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.093) (0.086) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-1.051  -0.653  -1.392 * -0.977 
(0.743) (0.774) (0.765) (0.749) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
7.051 ** 5.670 * 8.214 *** 6.790 ** 
(2.771) (2.915) (2.818) (2.794) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.699 *** 0.757 *** 0.667 *** 0.708 *** 
(0.137) (0.136) (0.142) (0.138) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-3.221 *** -3.205 *** -3.383 *** -3.241 *** 
(0.898) (0.926) (0.941) (0.900) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.522 *** 5.517 *** 5.784 *** 5.564 *** 
(1.431) (1.485) (1.496) (1.435) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.105  0.097  0.114  0.109 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.126) (0.121) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.102 ** -0.121 ** -0.087  -0.100 ** 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.062) (0.050) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.015 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 ** 0.015 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.030 *** 0.026 *** 0.033 *** 0.028 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.347  0.022  -0.214  -0.409 
(0.652) (0.723) (0.645) (0.657) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.258  1.077  2.009  2.464 
(1.712) (1.898) (1.743) (1.725) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.496 *** 0.428 *** 0.513 *** 0.512 *** 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.108) (0.104) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.353 ** -2.420 ** -2.004 * -2.327 ** 
(1.110) (1.139) (1.149) (1.125) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
1.000 ** 1.033 ** 0.841  0.991 ** 
(0.498) (0.509) (0.519) (0.504) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.133 ** -0.112 ** -0.152 *** -0.125 ** 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.057) (0.055) 
Observations 950 904 904 952 
Log Likelihood 867.3 871.7 800.2 872.4 
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TABLE 18.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS, ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
Houston & 
Dallas 
Excluded 
Low 
Density 
Excluded 
High 
Density 
Excluded 
Spline 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.643 *** 1.524 *** 1.609 *** 1.769 *** 
(0.275) (0.355) (0.242) (0.492) 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 
1.373 *** 1.124 ** 1.118 *** 3.870 ** 
(0.402) (0.469) (0.389) (1.835) 
(HHI – 0.303) × D(HHI > 
0.303) (CBSA-ALL) 
   -3.010 
   (1.938) 
Constant 
-5.477 *** -5.560 *** -5.214 *** -6.192 *** 
(0.413) (0.572) (0.337) (1.036) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
27.316 *** 25.695 *** 26.022 *** 25.794 *** 
(2.600) (2.844) (2.743) (2.827) 
Constant 
-9.169 *** -8.884 *** -9.042 *** -8.861 *** 
(0.467) (0.514) (0.486) (0.584) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
District density may be suggested to play an important role in getting the results 
in Table 17. We define density of a district as the enrollment in that district over the 
geographical size of the district. Hence, districts with low density are those with greater 
land area but lower levels of enrollment relatively, and districts with high density are 
those with smaller land area but higher levels of enrollment relatively. Extremely low 
density districts may be expected to be consistently low performers in terms of 
efficiency for the reason that these districts are generally located in remote urban areas 
with lower levels of competition. Extremely high density districts may be expected to be 
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consistently high cost efficiency districts for the reason that high density districts are 
commonly found in highly competitive locations. Therefore, extremely low density and 
high density districts in our sample may be the driving force in our findings. In order to 
test these possibilities, we first exclude the districts with a density lower than the 5
th
 
percentile from our sample. The results from that estimation are presented in the second 
column of Table 18. We find that excluding the low density districts does not change our 
findings much in magnitude, sign or significance. Secondly, we exclude the districts 
with a density higher than the 95
th
 percentile from our sample. The results from that 
estimation are shown in the third column in Table 18. Again, our findings present that 
our main results in Table 17 are not sensitive to including the extremely high density 
districts to the sample. 
For the last column of Table 18, we search for a possible break point on the cost 
inefficiency variance function with respect to the HHI-CBSA-ALL. To search for such a 
point, along with the HHI variable, we include (         )   (         ) as an 
explanatory variable of the variance of cost inefficiency. Here,       stands for the 
point where the variance of cost inefficiency is continuous but not differentiable, and 
 (         ) is equal to 1 if          , and 0 otherwise. We try all the available 
HHI values in our sample as       and find that the log likelihood of the estimation 
maximizes when       is equal to 0.303. The statistical significance, signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients other than that of HHI presented in the Spline column in 
Table 18 are similar to those in Table 17. Nevertheless, according to the likelihood ratio 
test, the inclusion of (         )   (         ) does not result in a statistically 
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significant improvement in the model fit at 5% level. Hence we do not include the 
variable as an explanatory variable of the variance of cost inefficiency. 
3.5.2. Sensitivity to Different Competition Measures 
The results presented so far may be sensitive to how competition in the education 
market is measured. The common approach in the literature is to use Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices to measure the market concentration. However, different sets of 
potential competitors and the geographic definition of the market would change these 
indices, which, in turn, may change the coefficient estimates, signs and significance of 
the HHI variables in the regression. 
First, the HHI used to generate the results in Table 17 assumes that public school 
districts and all of the private schools (ALL) belong to the set of potential competitors. 
This, however, may not be true if private schools are not direct competitors with the 
public school districts. Hence, we measured the HHI with only public schools (PUB) as 
one of the alternative approaches. Alternatively, the concentration measure may include 
accredited private schools along with the public school districts (ACC) since 
accreditation status of private schools can be used to determine their degree of 
substitutability. In the state of Texas, the Texas Private School Accreditation 
Commission (TEPSAC) accredits non-public primary and secondary educational 
organization by controlling and endorsing those institutions and ensuring their quality. 
Going to an accredited non-public school has the advantage of transferability of student 
credits earned in the accredited non-public schools to Texas public schools. So, one 
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would expect accredited private schools to be good substitutes for public schools. Hence, 
potential market participants may include the accredited private schools along with the 
public schools districts.
22
 
Furthermore, the assumption that the education markets are the CBSAs 
determined by the OMB may not be suitable. The OMB has certain guidelines based on 
urban core populations to determine the CBSAs. However, these guidelines do not 
necessarily delineate the education markets. Several alternative assumptions about the 
borders of the education markets can be made which would result in a completely 
different set of education markets. For instance, one equally plausible assumption can be 
that counties, instead of the CBSAs, are the separate education markets. This assumption 
would increase the number of education markets in a state, and would generate different 
concentration ratios for the counties within a CBSA. 
It is also possible to define the district-specific markets by the spatial distribution 
of the competitors. Simple geometrical shapes such as circles around schools in a district 
can be used to delineate the relevant education markets for that district. In order to 
calculate the HHI with such a market definition, we assume that the relevant geographic 
market for each school district includes all of the districts with at least one school within 
a 15-mile radius circle (R15) around each of the district’s own schools. Figure 1 
illustrates this method. In the figure, rectangles represent school districts, and black spots 
represent schools. There are three schools in the district with the star. When circles of 
                                                 
22
 Out of 1,116 private schools in 2006-07 school year, 577 are accredited by TEPSAC. In that school 
year, total private enrollment in Texas is 193,393 and enrollment in approved private schools is 151,952, 
which corresponds to %79 of the total private enrollment. 
155 
 
the specified radius are drawn around those schools, we see that four other districts 
surrounding the star district have schools in those circles. Those districts along with the 
star district are shaded in gray which represents the education market for the star district. 
Of course, 15-mile radius is arbitrarily chosen. In order to check the sensitivity on the 
measure with respect to the size of the radius, we generate two other indices with 25-
mile radius (R25), and 50-mile radius (R50) criteria. 
Finally, we explore the possibility of the rings in education markets, in which the 
schools at the outer rings contribute to the competition in the education market less than 
the schools at the core. This would somehow incorporate the distance between the 
competitors to the concentration measure. In a sense, rings measure is similar to the 
radial measure of competition that we assume that the relevant core for each school 
district includes all of the districts with at least one school within a 15-mile radius circle 
around each of the district’s own schools. In addition to that, however, we also assume 
that the relevant periphery for each school district includes all of the districts with at 
least one school within a ring formed by a 15-mile radius and a 50-mile radius circle 
around each of the district’s own schools. We assume that the contribution of the 
districts in the periphery to the concentration index is by half of what would normally be 
counted in a Herfindahl index. Because of the peripheral contribution, the ring HHI of 
concentration for a district would always be smaller than (or in some cases equal to) the 
15-mile radius HHI of concentration. Table 19 displays the pairwise correlations 
between the different HHIs presented in this section, and Table 20 reports their summary 
statistics. 
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TABLE 19.—PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE HHIS, TEXAS DATA 
  a b c d e f g h 
HHI-CBSA-ALL a 1.00               
HHI-R15-ALL b 0.72 1.00             
HHI-R25-ALL c 0.66 0.73 1.00           
HHI-R50-ALL d 0.53 0.55 0.62 1.00         
HHI-County-ALL e 0.87 0.67 0.63 0.48 1.00       
HHI-CBSA-PUB f 0.99 0.72 0.66 0.53 0.87 1.00     
HHI-R15-PUB g 0.71 0.98 0.73 0.56 0.68 0.72 1.00   
HHI-R25-PUB h 0.65 0.71 0.97 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.72 1.00 
HHI-R50-PUB i 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.98 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.61 
HHI-County-PUB j 0.87 0.67 0.63 0.48 0.99 0.87 0.68 0.64 
HHI-CBSA-ACC k 0.99 0.72 0.66 0.53 0.87 0.99 0.71 0.65 
HHI-R15-ACC l 0.71 0.99 0.73 0.55 0.67 0.72 0.98 0.71 
HHI-R25-ACC m 0.66 0.73 0.99 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.97 
HHI-R50-ACC n 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.99 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.62 
HHI-County-ACC o 0.87 0.67 0.63 0.48 0.99 0.87 0.68 0.64 
HHI-Rings-ALL p 0.73 0.96 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.74 0.95 0.76 
          
  i j k l m n o p 
HHI-R50-PUB i 1.00               
HHI-County-PUB j 0.48 1.00             
HHI-CBSA-ACC k 0.52 0.87 1.00           
HHI-R15-ACC l 0.54 0.67 0.71 1.00         
HHI-R25-ACC m 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.73 1.00       
HHI-R50-ACC n 0.98 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.62 1.00     
HHI-County-ACC o 0.48 0.99 0.87 0.67 0.63 0.48 1.00   
HHI-Rings-ALL p 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.96 0.78 0.76 0.68 1.00 
Note: The tags following the HHI names denote the market definition and the set of 
competitors. 
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TABLE 20.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE HHIS, TEXAS DATA 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 0.318 0.233 0.059 1 
HHI-R15-ALL 0.4 0.258 0.014 1 
HHI-R25-ALL 0.241 0.18 0.014 1 
HHI-R50-ALL 0.131 0.111 0.027 0.812 
HHI-County-ALL 0.391 0.222 0.116 1 
HHI-CBSA-PUB 0.331 0.237 0.065 1 
HHI-R15-PUB 0.414 0.263 0.014 1 
HHI-R25-PUB 0.249 0.185 0.014 1 
HHI-R50-PUB 0.136 0.118 0.027 1 
HHI-County-PUB 0.391 0.222 0.116 1 
HHI-CBSA-ACC 0.33 0.238 0.067 1 
HHI-R15-ACC 0.401 0.26 0.014 1 
HHI-R25-ACC 0.241 0.181 0.014 1 
HHI-R50-ACC 0.131 0.112 0.027 1 
HHI-County-ACC 0.391 0.222 0.116 1 
HHI-Rings-ALL 0.266 0.166 0.024 0.906 
Number of observations = 952 
Note: The tags following the HHI names denote the market definition and 
the set of competitors. 
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Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24 present the estimation results of the 
model in (23) with different measures of competition. First, the results show that holding 
everything else constant, measuring the HHI with three different sets of competitors does 
not change the signs or significance of the results. That is, the sign and significance of 
the marginal effect of concentration on cost inefficiency is not sensitive to using 
different measures of concentration. Moreover, actual value of the marginal effect of 
concentration does not seem to change much as the sets of competitors used to measure 
the HHI change. For example, if HHI-R15-ALL is the concentration measure, the 
marginal effect of concentration is 0.0225, but if the concentration measure is HHI-R15-
PUB or HHI-R15-ACC, then the marginal effect of concentration is 0.021 or 0.022, 
respectively. 
Secondly, using different market definitions seem to change the degree of 
marginal effect of concentration in a positive and relatively small range. The marginal 
effect of concentration with the HHIs measured with the market defined as counties are 
somewhat smaller than that of HHI-CBSAs. For instance, the marginal effect of 
concentration is 0.03 when HHI-CBSA-ALL is used, but it is 0.0198 if HHI-County-
ALL is used. Furthermore, as the radius of the radial measures of concentration increases 
the marginal effect of concentration increases. To give an example, the marginal effect 
of HHI-R15-ALL on cost inefficiency is 0.0225, while the marginal effect of HHI-R25-
ALL on cost inefficiency is 0.0355 and the marginal effect of HHI-R50-ALL on cost 
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TABLE 21.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
CBSA-
ALL 
HHI-R15-
ALL 
HHI-R25-
ALL 
HHI-R50-
ALL 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.771 *** -0.750 *** -0.740 *** -0.725 *** 
(0.131) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.069 *** 0.067 *** 0.066 *** 0.063 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.094 *** -0.093 *** -0.093 *** -0.095 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.254 ** 0.235 ** 0.241 ** 0.236 ** 
(0.108) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-1.034  -0.672  -0.696  -0.725  
(1.455) (1.420) (1.414) (1.428) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.228 ** 0.218 ** 0.224 ** 0.218 ** 
(0.102) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.367 ** 0.364 ** 0.343 ** 0.336 ** 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.521  -0.516  -0.460  -0.459  
(0.322) (0.322) (0.321) (0.322) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.176 *** 0.175 *** 0.175 *** 0.168 *** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
-0.074  0.129  0.137  0.123  
(0.605) (0.602) (0.600) (0.601) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
0.039  -0.104  -0.110  -0.095  
(0.432) (0.430) (0.429) (0.430) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.019  -0.016  -0.018  -0.010  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.137  0.178  0.202  0.210  
(0.239) (0.241) (0.240) (0.242) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.135  0.097  0.078  0.068  
(0.219) (0.221) (0.220) (0.222) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.281 *** 0.282 *** 0.285 *** 0.282 *** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.077  -0.070  -0.068  -0.056  
(0.120) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.238  0.299  0.265  0.266  
(0.480) (0.479) (0.479) (0.485) 
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TABLE 21.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
CBSA-
ALL 
HHI-R15-
ALL 
HHI-R25-
ALL 
HHI-R50-
ALL 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.040  -0.024  -0.027  -0.015  
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-1.043  -0.947  -1.015  -0.909  
(0.744) (0.749) (0.741) (0.748) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
7.018 ** 6.604 ** 6.832 ** 6.475 ** 
(2.774) (2.790) (2.762) (2.787) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.699 *** 0.692 *** 0.681 *** 0.699 *** 
(0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-3.228 *** -3.075 *** -3.171 *** -3.285 *** 
(0.895) (0.886) (0.882) (0.897) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.536 *** 5.306 *** 5.439 *** 5.613 *** 
(1.427) (1.411) (1.406) (1.430) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.105  0.120  0.105  0.095  
(0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.121) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.101 ** -0.115 ** -0.113 ** -0.110 ** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.015 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.349  -0.403  -0.314  -0.611  
(0.653) (0.639) (0.645) (0.626) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.253  2.373  2.128  2.902 * 
(1.713) (1.672) (1.692) (1.630) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.493 *** 0.484 *** 0.481 *** 0.473 *** 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.344 ** -2.790 ** -2.789 ** -3.005 *** 
(1.109) (1.105) (1.095) (1.088) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
0.997 ** 1.186 ** 1.181 ** 1.281 *** 
(0.498) (0.496) (0.492) (0.489) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.131 ** -0.156 *** -0.166 *** -0.159 *** 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
Observations 952 952 952 952 
Log Likelihood 870.9 869.5 872.3 872.3 
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TABLE 21.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 1 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
CBSA-
ALL 
HHI-R15-
ALL 
HHI-R25-
ALL 
HHI-R50-
ALL 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.655 *** 1.660 *** 1.649 *** 1.698 *** 
(0.288) (0.299) (0.255) (0.322) 
HHI 
1.411 *** 1.051 *** 1.681 *** 2.638 *** 
(0.412) (0.378) (0.451) (0.787) 
Constant 
-5.526 *** -5.465 *** -5.422 *** -5.520 *** 
(0.442) (0.486) (0.364) (0.498) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
27.310 *** 27.098 *** 27.820 *** 27.258 *** 
(2.580) (2.653) (2.616) (2.617) 
Constant 
-9.154 *** -9.129 *** -9.269 *** -9.114 *** 
(0.466) (0.494) (0.462) (0.484) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 22.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
County-
ALL 
HHI-
CBSA-
PUB 
HHI-R15-
PUB 
HHI-R25-
PUB 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.743 *** -0.771 *** -0.749 *** -0.742 *** 
(0.131) (0.132) (0.130) (0.130) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.066 *** 0.069 *** 0.066 *** 0.066 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.095 *** -0.094 *** -0.093 *** -0.094 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.238 ** 0.250 ** 0.231 ** 0.240 ** 
(0.105) (0.108) (0.105) (0.105) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-0.747  -1.020  -0.634  -0.693  
(1.424) (1.456) (1.419) (1.414) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.219 ** 0.225 ** 0.215 ** 0.222 ** 
(0.099) (0.102) (0.100) (0.099) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.365 ** 0.368 ** 0.366 ** 0.346 ** 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.524  -0.522  -0.518  -0.466  
(0.323) (0.322) (0.322) (0.321) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.173 *** 0.177 *** 0.177 *** 0.175 *** 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
0.016  -0.083  0.121  0.147  
(0.598) (0.605) (0.602) (0.600) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
-0.023  0.046  -0.098  -0.117  
(0.428) (0.432) (0.430) (0.429) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.016  -0.019  -0.016  -0.018  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.197  0.137  0.179  0.198  
(0.241) (0.240) (0.241) (0.240) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.081  0.136  0.096  0.081  
(0.221) (0.219) (0.221) (0.220) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.283 *** 0.281 *** 0.281 *** 0.284 *** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.065  -0.075  -0.067  -0.065  
(0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.118) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.224  0.232  0.293  0.262  
(0.481) (0.480) (0.479) (0.479) 
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TABLE 22.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
County-
ALL 
HHI-
CBSA-
PUB 
HHI-R15-
PUB 
HHI-R25-
PUB 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.031  -0.039  -0.022  -0.025  
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-0.921  -1.037  -0.911  -1.015  
(0.744) (0.744) (0.751) (0.741) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
6.472 ** 6.996 ** 6.475 ** 6.834 ** 
(2.774) (2.776) (2.798) (2.761) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.686 *** 0.699 *** 0.697 *** 0.681 *** 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-3.116 *** -3.195 *** -3.034 *** -3.144 *** 
(0.895) (0.899) (0.890) (0.884) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.367 *** 5.483 *** 5.236 *** 5.398 *** 
(1.428) (1.434) (1.419) (1.408) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.116  0.106  0.120  0.107  
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.108 ** -0.100 ** -0.115 ** -0.114 ** 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.028 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.402  -0.371  -0.408  -0.318  
(0.638) (0.648) (0.637) (0.644) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.388  2.321  2.387  2.136  
(1.670) (1.698) (1.668) (1.690) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.490 *** 0.496 *** 0.484 *** 0.480 *** 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.738 ** -2.411 ** -2.820 ** -2.822 ** 
(1.110) (1.108) (1.104) (1.095) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
1.160 ** 1.024 ** 1.198 ** 1.194 ** 
(0.498) (0.497) (0.496) (0.492) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.161 *** -0.138 ** -0.159 *** -0.170 *** 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) 
Observations 952 952 952 952 
Log Likelihood 868.1 869.9 869 872.2 
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TABLE 22.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 2 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-
County-
ALL 
HHI-
CBSA-
PUB 
HHI-R15-
PUB 
HHI-R25-
PUB 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.648 *** 1.666 *** 1.666 *** 1.649 *** 
(0.259) (0.284) (0.299) (0.254) 
HHI 
0.935 ** 1.269 *** 0.982 *** 1.614 *** 
(0.388) (0.400) (0.370) (0.437) 
Constant 
-5.398 *** -5.494 *** -5.462 *** -5.425 *** 
(0.384) (0.429) (0.483) (0.360) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
28.216 *** 27.462 *** 27.076 *** 27.823 *** 
(2.592) (2.580) (2.647) (2.611) 
Constant 
-9.314 *** -9.177 *** -9.122 *** -9.267 *** 
(0.457) (0.464) (0.491) (0.460) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 23.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R50-
PUB 
HHI-
County-
PUB 
HHI-
CBSA-
ACC 
HHI-R15-
ACC 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.726 *** -0.743 *** -0.751 *** -0.750 *** 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.064 *** 0.066 *** 0.067 *** 0.067 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.095 *** -0.095 *** -0.094 *** -0.093 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.233 ** 0.238 ** 0.243 ** 0.236 ** 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-0.719  -0.747  -0.758  -0.671  
(1.429) (1.424) (1.420) (1.421) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.215 ** 0.219 ** 0.223 ** 0.219 ** 
(0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.341 ** 0.365 ** 0.366 ** 0.364 ** 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.469  -0.524  -0.522  -0.517  
(0.324) (0.323) (0.323) (0.322) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.170 *** 0.173 *** 0.175 *** 0.175 *** 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
0.119  0.016  0.062  0.128  
(0.601) (0.598) (0.598) (0.602) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
-0.092  -0.023  -0.054  -0.103  
(0.430) (0.428) (0.428) (0.430) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.011  -0.016  -0.014  -0.017  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.214  0.197  0.182  0.179  
(0.242) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.064  0.081  0.096  0.097  
(0.222) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.282 *** 0.283 *** 0.284 *** 0.282 *** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.051  -0.065  -0.075  -0.069  
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.251  0.224  0.257  0.294  
(0.484) (0.481) (0.484) (0.479) 
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TABLE 23.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R50-
PUB 
HHI-
County-
PUB 
HHI-
CBSA-
ACC 
HHI-R15-
ACC 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.013  -0.031  -0.036  -0.024  
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-0.889  -0.921  -0.989  -0.947  
(0.750) (0.744) (0.741) (0.749) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
6.404 ** 6.472 ** 6.765 ** 6.602 ** 
(2.793) (2.774) (2.762) (2.791) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.701 *** 0.686 *** 0.691 *** 0.692 *** 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-3.237 *** -3.116 *** -3.207 *** -3.070 *** 
(0.897) (0.895) (0.893) (0.887) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.545 *** 5.367 *** 5.499 *** 5.299 *** 
(1.432) (1.428) (1.424) (1.412) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.102  0.116  0.105  0.121  
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.111 ** -0.108 ** -0.108 ** -0.115 ** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.601  -0.402  -0.391  -0.404  
(0.626) (0.638) (0.645) (0.638) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.877 * 2.388  2.375  2.379  
(1.631) (1.670) (1.691) (1.671) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.474 *** 0.490 *** 0.496 *** 0.485 *** 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.995 *** -2.738 ** -2.590 ** -2.785 ** 
(1.090) (1.110) (1.113) (1.105) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
1.276 *** 1.160 ** 1.104 ** 1.183 ** 
(0.490) (0.498) (0.499) (0.497) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.161 *** -0.161 *** -0.138 ** -0.157 *** 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) 
Observations 952 952 952 952 
Log Likelihood 871.5 868.1 870.1 869.3 
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TABLE 23.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 3 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R50-
PUB 
HHI-
County-
PUB 
HHI-
CBSA-
ACC 
HHI-R15-
ACC 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.726 *** 1.648 *** 1.601 *** 1.664 *** 
(0.335) (0.259) (0.250) (0.301) 
HHI 
2.371 *** 0.935 ** 1.210 *** 1.027 *** 
(0.751) (0.388) (0.377) (0.377) 
Constant 
-5.516 *** -5.398 *** -5.382 *** -5.460 *** 
(0.519) (0.384) (0.355) (0.488) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
27.280 *** 28.216 *** 27.794 *** 27.116 *** 
(2.629) (2.592) (2.595) (2.654) 
Constant 
-9.110 *** -9.314 *** -9.272 *** -9.130 *** 
(0.491) (0.457) (0.457) (0.494) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 24.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R25-
ACC 
HHI-R50-
ACC 
HHI-
County-
ACC 
HHI-Rings-
ALL 
log(Enrollment), linear 
-0.740 *** -0.724 *** -0.743 *** -0.736 *** 
(0.130) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.066 *** 0.063 *** 0.066 *** 0.065 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Enrollment), joint 
-0.093 *** -0.095 *** -0.095 *** -0.093 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), linear 
0.241 ** 0.236 ** 0.238 ** 0.248 ** 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), squared 
-0.698  -0.716  -0.747  -0.680  
(1.415) (1.428) (1.424) (1.423) 
log(Change in TAKS 
passing rate), joint 
0.224 ** 0.218 ** 0.219 ** 0.230 ** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, linear 
0.343 ** 0.337 ** 0.365 ** 0.348 ** 
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, squared 
-0.460  -0.459  -0.524  -0.483  
(0.321) (0.322) (0.323) (0.323) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses, joint 
0.175 *** 0.169 *** 0.173 *** 0.171 *** 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Lagged passing rate, linear 
0.138  0.119  0.016  0.177  
(0.600) (0.601) (0.598) (0.602) 
Lagged passing rate, 
squared 
-0.111  -0.092  -0.023  -0.134  
(0.429) (0.430) (0.428) (0.430) 
Lagged passing rate, joint 
-0.017  -0.010  -0.016  -0.012  
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Percent low income 
students, linear 
0.202  0.209  0.197  0.182  
(0.240) (0.242) (0.241) (0.241) 
Percent low income 
students, squared 
0.078  0.069  0.081  0.094  
(0.220) (0.222) (0.221) (0.220) 
Percent low income 
students, joint 
0.285 *** 0.282 *** 0.283 *** 0.282 *** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, linear 
-0.068  -0.056  -0.066  -0.072  
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, squared 
0.265  0.269  0.224  0.328  
(0.479) (0.485) (0.481) (0.480) 
169 
 
TABLE 24.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R25-
ACC 
HHI-R50-
ACC 
HHI-
County-
ACC 
HHI-Rings-
ALL 
Percent limited English 
proficiency, joint 
-0.027  -0.015  -0.031  -0.022  
(0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, linear 
-1.015  -0.902  -0.921  -0.907  
(0.741) (0.748) (0.745) (0.757) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, squared 
6.831 ** 6.452 ** 6.473 ** 6.481 ** 
(2.762) (2.788) (2.774) (2.819) 
Percent Special Education 
Students, joint 
0.681 *** 0.700 *** 0.686 *** 0.702 *** 
(0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138) 
Percent High school 
Students, linear 
-3.171 *** -3.279 *** -3.117 *** -3.213 *** 
(0.882) (0.897) (0.895) (0.887) 
Percent High school 
Students, squared 
5.440 *** 5.605 *** 5.369 *** 5.509 *** 
(1.406) (1.431) (1.428) (1.413) 
Percent High school 
Students, joint 
0.105  0.096  0.116  0.104  
(0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) 
log(Distance), linear 
-0.113 ** -0.110 ** -0.108 ** -0.117 ** 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) 
log(Distance), squared 
0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(Distance), joint 
0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.028 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), linear 
-0.314  -0.607  -0.402  -0.475  
(0.645) (0.626) (0.638) (0.641) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), squared 
2.127  2.893 * 2.388  2.507  
(1.692) (1.630) (1.671) (1.680) 
log(Hedonic predicted 
salary), joint 
0.481 *** 0.474 *** 0.490 *** 0.462 *** 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), linear 
-2.780 ** -3.000 *** -2.740 ** -2.748 ** 
(1.096) (1.088) (1.110) (1.109) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), squared 
1.177 ** 1.279 *** 1.161 ** 1.174 ** 
(0.493) (0.489) (0.498) (0.498) 
log(High school 
comparable wage), joint 
-0.166 *** -0.159 *** -0.161 *** -0.141 *** 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Observations 952 952 952 952 
Log Likelihood 872.4 872.2 868.1 872.4 
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TABLE 24.—MODIFIED MARGINAL EFFECTS WITH DIFFERENT HHIS – 4 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
HHI-R25-
ACC 
HHI-R50-
ACC 
HHI-
County-
ACC 
HHI-Rings-
ALL 
Explanatory Variables for Cost Inefficiency Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
Chapter 41 
1.648 *** 1.702 *** 1.648 *** 1.677 *** 
(0.255) (0.324) (0.259) (0.447) 
HHI 
1.686 *** 2.592 *** 0.935 ** 2.161 *** 
(0.451) (0.774) (0.388) (0.811) 
Constant 
-5.424 *** -5.515 *** -5.398 *** -5.721 *** 
(0.365) (0.500) (0.384) (0.839) 
Explanatory Variables for Idiosyncratic Error Variance Function, log(  
 ) 
1 / log(Enrollment) 
27.818 *** 27.255 *** 28.216 *** 26.198 *** 
(2.616) (2.618) (2.591) (2.882) 
Constant 
-9.268 *** -9.113 *** -9.313 *** -8.956 *** 
(0.462) (0.485) (0.457) (0.608) 
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double 
asterisk (**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means 
significance at the 10% level. 
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inefficiency is 0.0559. In addition, when the markets are defined as rings, the marginal 
effect of HHI-Rings-ALL on cost inefficiency is 0.0464. That is, while all of the 
measures of concentration we explore indicate a positive and significant relationship 
between the cost inefficiency and the HHI, different market definitions result in different 
levels of marginal effects of HHIs on inefficiency. According to the results presented 
above, the marginal effect of concentration lies somewhere in the [0.019, 0.056] range. 
In conclusion, the findings presented in this section indicate that the sign and 
significance of the relationship between concentration and cost inefficiency are not too 
sensitive to adding or dropping the private schools. Changing the definition of education 
markets, on the other hand, changes the degree of the relationship significantly over a 
small range. Yet, all of the measures of concentration we employ validate the 
relationship. 
3.6. Endogeneity in the Stochastic Cost Frontier Model 
In general, stochastic cost frontier models potentially have endogeneity problem 
because of several reasons. When specifying a stochastic cost function in education 
context, cost is expressed as a function of outputs and inputs. If cost is jointly 
determined with some of the output variables, then the specification creates an 
endogeneity problem. For example, educational quality indicators such as changes in 
passing rates are outputs that are possibly endogenous.
23
 Moreover, some of the input 
                                                 
23
 Output quantity indicators can also be argued to be endogenous. However, since it is commonly 
assumed in the literature that enrollment as exogenous, we follow the literature and make that exogeneity 
assumption. 
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prices can be endogenous especially if they are calculated with weights based on features 
that are subject to choice. To give an example, any average wage is weighted with 
respect to some specific teacher characteristics which are to be chosen by the school 
district through hiring process. This selection makes any average wage indicator 
endogenous. Furthermore, if a translog specification is used to model the cost frontier, 
endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables in the cost function would swell the 
overall endogeneity of the model due to the interaction terms of the endogenous 
variables. Finally, the endogeneity problem gets even more complicated if some of the 
variables explaining the cost inefficiency are simultaneously determined with cost. The 
presence of endogeneity results in a parameter inconsistency problem for the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the stochastic cost frontier model. For instance, if the cost 
inefficiency is explained with a measure of competition in the education market, that 
measure of competition would be simultaneously determined with the district cost, 
which would results in endogeneity. 
In minimum distance estimations, instrumental variable (IV) methodology is 
generally applied to deal with the endogeneity problem. In maximum likelihood 
estimations, however, the general IV methodology cannot be directly employed. 
Estimation of inefficiency in a stochastic cost frontier, on the other hand, requires 
maximum likelihood estimation. To the best of our knowledge, the econometric 
methodology to address the endogeneity problems in stochastic frontier models 
appropriately is yet to develop, and as a reflection, econometric software packages 
supporting stochastic frontier analysis cannot account for endogenous regressors. Guan 
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et al. (2009) present an early attempt to handle the endogenous frontier regressors by 
following a two-step estimation method. In the first step, they estimate the frontier 
parameters with GMM on a differenced model, and after solving the endogeneity 
problem, they use the residuals from the GMM to estimate the efficiency using a 
maximum likelihood method in the second step. It is important to emphasize that their 
second-step is not an estimation of predicted inefficiency on a set of covariates, which is 
disapproved in the literature due to severe biases (see Battese and Coelli (1995) and 
Wang and Schmidt (2002)). Even though their methodology would be somehow 
applicable to cost frontier models with cross-sectional data, they do not offer a solution 
for endogenous determinants of cost inefficiency. 
The degree of cost inefficiency can be partially a response to the outcomes of the 
cost ineffieciency which would cause endogeneity. Assume that because of idiosyncratic 
factors, a district has a highly cost efficient administration. That would mean that the 
spending of that administration is relatively not wasteful, and hence, is more productive. 
Other districts in the same education market may be consolidated to the cost efficient 
district just to take advantage of the wise spending character of its administration. 
Moreover, the cost efficient district’s being relatively more productive because of their 
being relatively more cost efficient is another attractive factor why other districts would 
want to consolidate the cost efficient district. However, if districts get consolidated, the 
competition in that education market would decline, which would, in turn, cause more 
wasteful expenditures and increase the cost inefficiency of the administration. The 
endogeneity here negatively biases the estimated effect of competition on cost 
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efficiency. In other words, the effect of competition on cost efficiency is underestimated 
in our stochastic cost frontier estimation results presented in Table 2. Unfortunately, the 
current econometric literature offers no guidance about the suitable methods to deal with 
the endogenous cost inefficiency components. Even though decomposing cost 
inefficiency into an exogenous and an endogenous part to address its endogeneity 
problem would be an interesting dimension of stochastic frontier models to be explored, 
this kind of a methodological search is out of the scope of this paper. 
3.6.1. Potential Instrumental Variables 
Even if there was a complete and well-defined econometric methodology 
developed in the literature which was to require following an IV technique to cope with 
the endogeneity problem in stochastic cost frontier models (including the endogeneity in 
cost inefficiency), the very first step in that methodology would be to diagnose the 
instruments for their exogeneity and relevance in order to verify their validity. Hence, 
our first objective is to find valid instruments—if there is any—to handle the 
endogeneity in our model. However, as stated by Angrist and Pischke (2009) finding an 
instrument with relevance, exogeneity, and strength is very difficult. Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker (1995) explain that if the selected instruments are poor, then there are 
inconsistency and finite-sample bias due to these instruments, which are worse than the 
biases due to endogeneity. In addition, Murray (2006) further explains that the invalidity 
and weakness of instruments undermines the credibility of the estimates severely 
because of the smaller estimated standard errors and incorrect confidence intervals. 
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Therefore, if the instrumental variables are detected to be weak, then considering all the 
variables as exogenous is better. 
Turning back to our stochastic cost frontier model, since the benefits of having 
the flexible form of specification offset the costs (Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor, 2011a), 
we chose the translog specification. Nevertheless, this decision induces a greater 
possibility of identification problems because of the increased number of potentially 
endogenous variables. That is, in a translog specification, all of the interaction terms of 
the endogenous variables would also need an instrument each as well as the endogenous 
variables themselves. To give an example, two potentially endogenous variables and 
nine exogenous variables in a Cobb-Douglas specification would mean a total of 23 
potentially endogenous variables in a translog specification including the potentially 
endogenous interaction terms. However, the order condition for identification requires 
that the number of excluded instruments should be at least equal to the number of 
endogenous regressors. Moreover, the rank condition for identification requires that the 
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. Since both order 
and rank conditions must be satisfied for identification, the translog specification may 
increase the likelihood of an identification problem. Also, if the correlations between the 
excluded instruments and the endogenous regressors are not zero but small, weak 
identification problem arises. Again, an endogenous translog specification may be more 
prone to weak identification because of the increased number of required instruments. 
Furthermore, the exogeneity of the instruments in a stochastic frontier environment 
cannot be tested in general, but if the number of instruments we use exceeds what is 
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necessary, our model would suffer the overidentification problem. Tests such as 
Sargan’s statistic or Hansen’s J-test for different estimator can be used to get some 
inference about the exogeneity of the instruments. However, since the number of 
instruments required for our translog specification is already large, we avoid—where 
possible—increasing the number much more to prevent an undetected overidentification 
problem in our stochastic frontier setting. 
In order to avoid the potential endogeneity due to input prices, as explained in the 
data section, we use hedonic wage indices that are independent of the choices of the 
school districts. Instead of following an IV methodology, however, we follow the 
approach followed by Imazeki and Reschovsky (2006) and Gronberg, Jansen and Taylor 
(2011b) and put these indices in the model directly in place of average measures of wage 
to prevent further complications due to instrumenting. Unfortunately, a similar strategy 
is not available for endogenous output and cost inefficiency variables. Therefore, we 
explore various sets of potential instruments for these variables to evaluate applicability 
of these instruments in a yet-to-come complete IV methodology for stochastic frontier 
models. 
In our model, the two educational quality indicators, change in TAKS passing 
rate and percentage of students taking advanced courses, are the outputs that are possibly 
endogenous. Possible determinants of the local demand for education and the interaction 
terms of these determinants with the exogenous determinants of cost can be considered 
as prospective instruments for our educational quality indicators and all of their 
interaction terms. The set of determinants of the local demand for education we consider 
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using includes four variables: the share of households in the district with school age 
children, the share of district population over age 65, the share of adult district 
population with at least a bachelor’s degree, and the share of owner-occupied housing 
stock.
24
 
Furthermore, some measures of benchmark competition in the surrounding 
education markets and their interaction terms with the exogenous determinants of cost 
can also be taken as potential set of instruments for the endogenous educational quality 
terms including their interaction terms.
25
 The benchmark measures of competition we 
explore using are the lagged values of percentage of students taking advance courses in 
the surrounding campuses and the lagged values of percentage of students who passed 
the TAKS in the surrounding campuses. The number of lags of these two measures is 
limited by the data availability. Our model already includes the TAKS passing rate from 
two years previously (2004-05). Moreover, the TAKS replaced the Texas Assessment of 
Academic Skills (TAAS) in Texas in the 2002-03 school year so TAKS data is 
unavailable before 2003-04 school year. Hence, the only available lagged value of 
percentage of students who passed the TAKS is three years previously (2003-04). The 
lagged values of percentages of students taking advance courses are available from the 
1993-94 school year. However, we explore using only the three years lagged (2003-04) 
value of the percentages of students taking advance courses in order not to increase the 
number of instruments unnecessarily. For each district, we determine two different sets 
                                                 
24
 The data come from Census 2000 voter demographics. The determinants of demand for education we 
use are similar to those used by Imazeki and Reschovsky (2006). 
25
 The idea is similar to the copycat behavior model formalized by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) that 
demand for education outcomes in a district is affected by the outcomes in the neighboring education 
markets. 
178 
 
of surrounding campuses: the first set of campuses includes the campuses which are out 
of the boundaries of that district, but the closest to one of the campuses in that district, 
compared to the other campuses outside of that district.
26
 The second set of campuses 
includes the campuses, which are out of the boundaries of that district, but the second 
closest to one of the campuses in that district, compared to the other campuses outside of 
that district. Then, using the data of the campuses in the first set, we calculate the 
enrollment weighted average of the three years lagged values of percentage of students 
who passed the TAKS. This variable constitutes one of our benchmark measures of 
competition. By following the same procedure, we create other three benchmark 
measures using one of the two sets of campuses and one of lagged values of the 
variables we decide to use. 
Moreover, the concentration indices we use to measure competition in the 
education market explain the cost inefficiency in our model. However, our indices of 
concentration are simultaneously determined with the district cost, which results in 
endogeneity. In order to alleviate the endogeneity problem, instruments such as those 
presented in Hoxby (2000) can be used. Hoxby explains that streams played an 
important role in the delineation of the school district boundaries in the eighteen and 
nineteen centuries and hence these natural boundaries are key determinants of supply of 
school districts even though they are not limiting the student transportation today. In a 
comment, Rothstein (2007) offers alternative categories of streams grouped into two 
                                                 
26
 The distance from a campus to another campus is calculated by using the haversine formula. The 
haversine formula calculates the shortest, great-circle (or as the crow flies) distance between two points 
over the surface of the earth. The coordinates of the campuses are available from NCES Common Core of 
Data. 
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different size categories as instruments. We follow Hoxby and Rothstein and use the 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Geographic Names Information System (GNIS) data to 
create two categories of streams based on the length of the streams defining streams 
longer than 3.5 miles as large, and others as small.
27
 We consider using the counts of the 
two different types of streams in a district’s county as two separate instruments for our 
endogenous concentration measure. Summary statistics of all of the instrumental 
variables we explore using are presented in Table 25. 
 
3.6.2. Addressing the Endogeneity 
Since there is no well-established econometric methodology in the literature 
about how to address the endogeneity in the cost inefficiency, we first examine a model 
similar to the baseline model presented in Table 17 but exclude all of the variables 
explaining the variances of one-sided and two-sided errors. In order to instrument the 
endogenous education quality variables and all their interaction terms, we use eight 
aforementioned education quality instruments, their squared terms, their interaction 
terms with each other, and their interaction terms with the exogenous cost frontier 
determinants. 
                                                 
27
 The data we use is the one Rothstein mentions in his comment as the “alternative version of GNIS data” 
which includes coordinates of two points for each stream in each county: one of the points is the origin 
where that stream starts traversing that county, and the other point is the destination where that stream 
ends traversing that county. The length between these two points is calculated by using the haversine 
formula. 
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TABLE 25.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percent households with school 
aged children 
0.360 0.079 0.139 0.909 
Percent population over age 65 0.252 0.081 0 0.525 
Percent adults with at least 
bachelor’s degree 
0.154 0.085 0.021 0.787 
Percent owner-occupied housing 
stock 
0.762 0.102 0 0.966 
3 years lagged percent taking 
advance courses in the closest 
neighborhood 
0.073 0.068 0 0.512 
3 years lagged passing rate in 
the closest neighborhood 
0.677 0.116 0.198 0.970 
3 years lagged percent taking 
advance courses in the second 
closest neighborhood 
0.071 0.070 0 0.742 
3 years lagged passing rate in 
the second closest neighborhood 
0.688 0.109 0.230 0.970 
Count of small streams in the 
district’s county 
21.6 22.2 0 117 
Count of large streams in the 
district’s county 
33.2 18.4 0 69 
Number of observations = 951 
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust identification and instrument relevance statistics from 
the first stage regression of the IV estimation are presented in Table 26. As presented in 
the table, the Hansen’s J test does not reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments 
are valid. The underidentification tests of Kleibergen and Paap (2006), on the other 
hand, cannot reject the null hypothesis that our equation is underidentified, that is, the 
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matrix of reduced-form coefficients on the excluded instruments is not full column rank. 
Furthermore, the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is equal to 0.75. Critical 
values of the statistic is not available in the literature but since the statistic is the 
generalization of the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald F statistic, the critical values 
presented in Stock and Yogo (2005) can be used for inference. Looking at their Table 1, 
if thirty excluded instrumental variables are used for one endogenous variable, the 
critical value of the statistic is 21.42 if the bias of the IV estimator is set to 5% of the 
bias of the OLS. The table is restricted to three endogenous variables and thirty 
instruments at most. However, the critical value appears to be decreasing as the number 
of endogenous variables increases, or the number of excluded instruments increase 
above a certain level. Even so, we infer from the values in their table that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis with a statistic as small as 0.75, that there is a weak 
instrumental variables problem. Finally, we test the relevance of potentially endogenous 
regressors with Anderson and Rubin (1949) and Stock and Wright (2000) tests which are 
robust in the presence of weak instruments. The tests reject the null hypothesis 
suggesting that endogenous regressors are not irrelevant. However, these tests are jointly 
testing the validity of overidentifying restrictions, and for that reason, the suggestion of 
relevant endogenous regressors is not too strong. 
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TABLE 26.—FIRST STAGE STATISTICS OF THE IV ESTIMATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable 
Shea’s 
Partial     
Partial    
F Statistic 
(116, 779) 
p-value of 
F Statistic 
Change in TAKS passing rate 0.1314 0.1723 1.98 0.000 
× Enrollment 0.1246 0.1444 2.03 0.000 
× Change in TAKS passing 
rate 
0.1977 0.3262 1.07 0.300 
× Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.1657 0.1869 1.52 0.001 
× Lagged passing rate 0.1379 0.1586 1.91 0.000 
× Percent low income students 0.1282 0.2118 1.82 0.000 
× Percent limited English 
proficiency 
0.2108 0.2683 1.64 0.000 
× Percent Special Education 
students 
0.1728 0.2041 1.73 0.000 
× Percent high school students 0.1721 0.1846 1.98 0.000 
× Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
0.1091 0.1783 1.91 0.000 
× Hedonic predicted salary 0.1259 0.1549 1.98 0.000 
× High school comparable 
wage index 
0.1015 0.1649 2.01 0.000 
Percent taking advanced courses 0.2126 0.2182 2.53 0.000 
× Enrollment 0.2388 0.2193 2.64 0.000 
× Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.1790 0.2615 2.27 0.000 
× Lagged passing rate 0.2099 0.2320 2.58 0.000 
× Percent low income students 0.1933 0.2197 2.36 0.000 
× Percent limited English 
proficiency 
0.2227 0.2440 2.10 0.000 
× Percent Special Education 
students 
0.1980 0.2006 2.58 0.000 
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TABLE 26.—FIRST STAGE STATISTICS OF THE IV ESTIMATION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
Variable 
Shea’s 
Partial     
Partial    
F Statistic 
(116, 779) 
p-value of 
F Statistic 
× Percent high school students 0.2695 0.2047 2.52 0.000 
× Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
0.2413 0.2180 2.16 0.000 
× Hedonic predicted salary 0.2392 0.2503 2.92 0.000 
× High school comparable 
wage index 
0.1990 0.2275 2.65 0.000 
Underidentification Tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
2(94) = 79.10 p-value = 0.8646 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
statistic 
2(94) = 105.86 p-value = 0.1896 
Weak Identification Test 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic 
0.748  
Weak-Instrument-Robust Inference 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(116, 779) = 3.21 p-value = 0.0000 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 2(116) = 455.28 p-value = 0.0000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 2(116) = 163.10 p-value = 0.0000 
Overidentification Test of All Instruments 
Hansen’s J Statistic 2(93) = 94.818 p-value = 0.4281 
Number of Observations = 951 
Number of Regressors = 79 
Number of Instruments = 172 
Number of Excluded Instruments = 116 
Note: First stage F, underidentification, weak identification, and weak-identification-
robust test statistics are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Our second analysis in this section is based on further assumptions. First, since 
we suspect that the weak instruments problem presented in Table 26 may essentially be 
attributed to the large number of excluded instruments, we restrict our translog 
specification to a Cobb-Douglas specification. That way, we decrease the number of 
endogenous variables in the cost equation and hence the number of instruments required 
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to handle the endogeneity, so that we can examine if the weak instrument problem is 
completely due to our translog specification. Table 27 presents the heteroskedasticity-
robust statistics for identification and instrument relevance from the first stage of IV 
regression of the Cobb-Douglas model. The robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 
for the weak identification test is 0.39. The corresponding Stock and Yogo critical value 
for eight excluded instrumental variables and two endogenous variable at 5% relative 
maximal IV bias is 17.70. Hence, weak instrumental variables problem is still present in 
a restricted Cobb-Douglas specification. It can also be inferred from the Partial R
2
 of 
Shea (1997) presented in the table that even though both of the endogenous regressors 
are weakly identified, identification of the change in TAKS passing rate is weaker. We 
conclude that the instruments commonly suggested in the literature for educational 
quality weakly identify the educational quality, and hence, treating the educational 
quality measures as exogenous would provide better estimates. 
Our final inspection in this section is about the endogeneity of our concentration 
measure. Since we suspect that the HHI we employ in the variance of cost inefficiency is 
endogenous, and the literature does not offer a well-established procedure to handle the 
endogeneity in the one-sided error, in order to at least have an inference about the degree 
of HHI’s possible endogeneity, we include the HHI-CBSA-ALL as a determinant of cost 
in a Cobb-Douglas specification, which resembles the model of Imazeki and Reschovsky 
(2006). Additionally, we model the variance of   with the Chapter 41 variable and the 
variance of   with the inverse of log enrollment. The first column of Table 28 presents 
  
185 
 
 
TABLE 27.—FIRST STAGE STATISTICS OF THE IV ESTIMATION, 
COBB-DOUGLAS MODEL 
Variable 
Shea’s 
Partial     
Partial    
F Statistic 
(8, 933) 
p-value of 
F Statistic 
Change in TAKS passing rate 0.0038 0.0038 0.40 0.920 
Percent taking advanced courses 0.0697 0.0693 9.92 0.000 
Underidentification Tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
2(7) = 3.16 p-value = 0.8696 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
statistic 
2(7) = 3.20 p-value = 0.8656 
Weak Identification Test 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic 
0.393  
Weak-Instrument-Robust Inference 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(8, 933) = 21.68 p-value = 0.0000 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 2(8) = 176.82 p-value = 0.0000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 2(8) = 73.39 p-value = 0.0000 
Overidentification Test of All Instruments 
Hansen’s J Statistic 2(6) = 11.231 p-value = 0.0815 
Number of Observations = 951 
Number of Regressors = 12 
Number of Instruments = 18 
Number of Excluded Instruments = 8 
Note: First stage F, underidentification, weak identification, and weak-identification-
robust test statistics are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
the stochastic frontier estimation results of this specification with HHI in the frontier 
function. Since there is not a direct equivalent of IV regressions with stochastic frontier 
models, in order to have another, maybe a more appropriate, reference for the IV 
regression, in the second column of Table 28, we also present the OLS estimation results 
of the Cobb-Douglas cost function with the same explanatory variables but excluding the 
Chapter 41 variable and the inverse of log enrollment.  
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TABLE 28.—ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH COBB-DOUGLAS COST FUNCTION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
Cost Frontier 
with HHI 
OLS GMM 
log(Enrollment) 
-0.763 *** -1.029 *** -1.060 *** 
(0.126) (0.134) (0.145) 
log(Enrollment), squared 
0.067 *** 0.098 *** 0.102 *** 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
log(Enrollment), cubed 
-0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(Change in TAKS passing 
rate) 
0.194 ** 0.250 ** 0.263 ** 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.117) 
Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.162 *** 0.244 *** 0.210 *** 
(0.048) (0.053) (0.081) 
Lagged passing rate 
-0.016  0.048  0.054  
(0.048) (0.054) (0.067) 
Percent low income students 
0.304 *** 0.251 *** 0.247 *** 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.047) 
Percent limited English 
proficiency 
-0.099 ** -0.094  -0.071  
(0.050) (0.067) (0.067) 
Percent Special Education 
Students 
0.544 *** 0.441 *** 0.633 *** 
(0.130) (0.147) (0.165) 
Percent High school Students 
0.203 * 0.328 *** 0.222  
(0.122) (0.118) (0.178) 
log(Distance) 
0.013 ** 0.025 *** 0.011  
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
log(Hedonic predicted salary) 
0.485 *** 0.890 *** 0.830 *** 
(0.098) (0.112) (0.162) 
log(High school comparable 
wage) 
-0.069  -0.135 ** 0.042  
(0.049) (0.062) (0.133) 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 
0.074 *** 0.152 *** 0.345 *** 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.117) 
Constant 
11.194 *** 11.892 *** 11.780 *** 
(0.343) (0.348) (0.133) 
Chapter 41 (in log(  
 )) 
1.843 ***   
(0.206)   
Constant (in log(  
 )) 
-4.732 ***   
(0.226)   
1 / log(Enrollment) 
(in log(  
 )) 
24.668 ***   
(2.491)   
Constant (in log(  
 )) 
-8.642 ***   
(0.416)   
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TABLE 28.—ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH COBB-DOUGLAS COST FUNCTION 
(MULTIPLE PAGES) 
 
Cost Frontier 
with HHI 
OLS GMM 
Observations 951 951 951 
Log Likelihood 766.1   
Note: The dependent variable is log(Expenditure per pupil). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Triple asterisk (***) means significance at the 1% level. Double asterisk 
(**) means significance at the 5% level. Single asterisk (*) means significance at the 
10% level.  
 
The heteroskedasticity-robust statistics for identification and instrument 
relevance from the first stage of IV regression of the Cobb-Douglas model with HHI is 
presented in Table 29. We treat the educational quality measures as exogenous and 
instrument the endogenous HHI with two different counts of streams in a district’s 
county. As illustrated in the table, the Hansen’s J test does not reject the joint null 
hypothesis, so the instruments for HHI are valid. Moreover, the Kleibergen and Paap 
underidentification tests reject the null hypothesis, so the matrix of reduced-form 
coefficients on the excluded instruments is of full column rank, and the model is not 
underidentified. In addition, the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is equal to 
27.08. The Stock and Yogo critical value corresponding to two excluded instrumental 
variables and one endogenous variable at 10% relative maximal IV size is 19.93, 
suggesting that null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected as well. Finally, the 
tests for the relevance of potentially endogenous regressors reject the null hypothesis of 
irrelevant endogenous regressors. 
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TABLE 29.—FIRST STAGE STATISTICS OF THE IV ESTIMATION, 
COBB-DOUGLAS WITH HHI 
Variable 
Shea’s 
Partial     
Partial    
F Statistic 
(2, 935) 
p-value of 
F Statistic 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 0.0514 0.0514 27.08 0.000 
Underidentification Tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
2(2) = 37.45 p-value = 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
statistic 
2(2) = 55.08 p-value = 0.0000 
Weak Identification Test 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic 
27.079  
Weak-Instrument-Robust Inference 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(2, 935) = 11.44 p-value = 0.0000 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 2(2) = 23.28 p-value = 0.0000 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 2(2) = 23.34 p-value = 0.0000 
Overidentification Test of All Instruments 
Hansen’s J Statistic 2(1) = 14.451 p-value = 0.0001 
Number of Observations = 951 
Number of Regressors = 15 
Number of Instruments = 16 
Number of Excluded Instruments = 2 
Note: First stage F, underidentification, weak identification, and weak-identification-
robust test statistics are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) explain that in the presence of arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the standard IV estimator. 
We find that Pagan and Hall (1983) general test statistic is 59.8, and at 2(15), the 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Therefore, we estimate the 
second stage of our IV regression with GMM. The results from the second stage GMM 
regression is presented in the third column of Table 28. As can be seen, the coefficient of 
HHI in the GMM column is more than the double of the coefficient of HHI in the OLS 
column verifying that the effects of HHI on cost would be underestimated if its 
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endogeneity is not controlled. The coefficient of HHI in the cost frontier estimation is 
even smaller compared to 0.345 in the GMM column. Even though the results in the 
GMM column are not acquired by a direct IV estimation of the model in the cost frontier 
column, this finding gives us an idea about the degree of underestimation of the 
coefficient of HHI. In order to have a more accurate impression of the underestimation 
of the effects of HHI on cost inefficiency, however, a different methodology should be 
developed to properly address the endogeneity of the inefficiency variables. 
3.7. Simulations 
Log expenditure per pupil of an existing district can be predicted by adding an 
estimate of   to the estimate of log cost per pupil of that district. It can be said that the 
point estimates of   offered by Jondrow et al. are suitable to predict the log expenditure 
per pupil of an existing district, as presented in equation (31), which is rewritten below 
   ̂ 
   (     
                  )   ̂     
  ̂ 
   ̂   (35) 
where   
  is a vector of variables in the translog specification,  ̂  and  ̂  are the 
maximum likelihood estimates of    and    , respectively, and  ̂    (       ). In case 
of a hypothetical district, however, since we do not have that hypothetical district’s 
actual log expenditure per pupil, we cannot estimate the district’s  . Hence, a point 
estimate of   conditional on  , such as those a la Jondrow et al., cannot be acquired for a 
hypothetical district. In this paper, we propose an original methodology to simulate the 
log expenditures per pupil of hypothetical districts. 
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In simulation, what we are really interested in is to predict the log expenditure of 
a hypothetical district, and therefore, our aim is to find an estimate of   conditional on  . 
For instance, if the matter of investigation is the trade-off between a cost variable, say 
enrollment, and a cost inefficiency variable, say competition in the education market, 
while holding other variables constant at a specified level, we can evaluate the changes 
in the predicted log expenditure per pupil as size and competition change, by using an 
estimate of   conditional on  . This would allow us to draw a figure with iso-
expenditure curves at different levels of the predicted log expenditure per pupil and 
assess the trade-off between two variables determining the predicted log expenditure per 
pupil. We illustrate such an example in Section 3.7.1 below. 
Alternatively, in a consolidation scenario, in order to evaluate if there are cost 
savings after consolidation, we need to estimate log expenditure per pupil of the 
consolidated district. Certain assumptions about how the variables explaining cost and 
cost inefficiency change after consolidation would be necessary. Once those assumptions 
are made, however, log expenditure per pupil of the consolidated district can easily be 
estimated using our methodology. We further illustrate the use of our methodology by 
simulating a consolidation scenario in Section 3.7.2 below. Since any evaluation of the 
conditional effects of   on the log expenditure per pupil of a hypothetical district and 
any simulation of a consolidation scenario requires a point estimate of   conditional on 
 , our proposal constitutes a useful methodological contribution. Our proposed 
methodology can also be used to examine hypothetical firms and simulate merger 
scenarios in a stochastic production frontier analysis. 
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In the methodology section we assume that     [      
  ] and define   
  
    (       
 ). Our   has a half-normal distribution and the scaling property, that is, 
basic half-normal distribution of   is not a function of  , and therefore, would not 
change as   changes. Since the mean of any variable with half-normal distribution can 
be written as √   √ ⁄  where    is the variance of the normal distribution determining 
the half-normal distribution of the variable, we define  ̂ as28 
 ̂   (     )  
√    
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
 √    (       ) (36) 
Table 30 and Table 31 present summary statistics of  ̂,  ̂   and  ̂  , and the correlations 
between each other. 
 
TABLE 30.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE ESTIMATES OF COST 
INEFFICIENCY 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 ̂ 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.23 
 ̂   0.08 0.06 0.02 0.62 
 ̂   0.06 0.07 0.00 0.62 
Number of observations = 952 
 
                                                 
28
 If   is assumed to have the scaling property with a different distribution, say truncated normal,  ̂ can be 
defined as    (    )     where    is the mean of the truncated normal distribution, which is equal to 
  
 (
   
 
)  (
   
 
)
 (
   
 
)  (
   
 
)
  where   and   are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution 
determining the truncated normal distribution, and   and   are the truncation minimum and maximum 
boundaries. 
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TABLE 31.—PAIRWISE CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENTS OF THE ESTIMATES OF COST 
INEFFICIENCY 
  ̂  ̂   
 ̂   
0.643  
(0.000)  
 ̂   
0.573 0.974 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Note: Significance levels are in parentheses. 
 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 present a scatterplot of  ̂ against  ̂  , and their 
histograms. As can be seen in those tables and figures, the correlation between  ̂ and  ̂   
is positive and higher than 0.6, and they are over a similar range with almost identical 
means and comparable standard deviations. Hence, for the existing districts, our  ̂ is 
relevant to the point estimates of   offered by Jondrow et al. 
FIGURE 24.—SCATTERPLOT OF THE ESTIMATES OF COST INEFFICIENCY 
 
193 
 
FIGURE 25.—HISTOGRAMS OF THE ESTIMATES OF COST INEFFICIENCY 
 
Moreover, since we assume that        (    
 ), expected value of   would be 
equal to 0. Thus, we write the expected expenditure per pupil of a hypothetical district as 
   ̂ 
   (     
                  )   ̂     
  ̂ 
   ̂  (37) 
For different hypothetical districts, the variables        or   would be different. Hence, 
certain assumptions about these variables are necessary for simulation purposes. In the 
following two sections on simulation exercises, we explain our assumptions in detail 
about these variables. 
Finally, if we take the derivative of equation (36) with respect to one of the   
variables as follows, we get the marginal effects of the variables that explain the 
variance of cost inefficiency on the cost inefficiency of the hypothetical district. 
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  ̂
   
 
√    (      
 )    √ 
√ 
 
  
 
 (38) 
 
3.7.1. Iso-Expenditure Curves 
In Figure 26, we present iso-expenditure curves which summarize the trade-off 
between the competitive effect and scale effect. We generated the iso-expenditure curves 
for six different levels of expenditure per pupil holding all cost factors except for 
enrollment constant at sample mean values and setting the Chapter 41 dummy variable 
equal to 1,
29
 while allowing HHI-CBSA-ALL to be flexible. These assumptions allow us 
to hold all variables other than the two under immediate attention (enrollment and HHI) 
constant and focus at the trade-off between the two variables. That is, each iso-
expenditure curve presents all possible pairs of   and HHI that would result in the same 
level of expenditure when other variables affecting the expenditure are fixed. In the 
figure,                  , so               is perfect competition and 
              is monopoly. Just like the cost curve in Figure 3b, the shapes of iso-
expenditure curves are not the traditional U-shape, again, due to the inclusion of the 
cubic enrollment in cost function. There are three different regions in the figure: the first 
region is from 50 to 20,518 students, the second region is from 20,518 to 303,028 
students, and the third region is from 303,028 to 736,972 students. 
                                                 
29
 If the Chapter 41 dummy variable was set to be equal to 0, all of the iso-expenditure curves would shift 
downwards by  ̂    ̂   ⁄      . In other words, the six iso-expenditure curves presented in the figure 
would represent a lower level of expenditure per-pupil than that shown in the legend. Since the shapes of 
the iso-expenditure curves and local maximums and minimums would not change with the assumption to 
set Chapter 41 dummy to either 0 or 1, the results presented in this subchapter are not dependent on this 
assumption. 
195 
 
FIGURE 26.—ISO-EXPENDITURE CURVES 
 
It can be seen in the figure that in the first region, expenditure per pupil decreases 
as enrollment or competition increases. The maximum expenditure per pupil on the 
figure is $17,253 and that point is at where enrollment and competition are equal to 50 
and 0 relatively. The minimum expenditure per pupil, on the other hand, is at enrollment 
equal to 20,518 and competition equal to 1. At that point, per pupil expenditure is 
$7,268. Between these two points are a whole range of iso-expenditure curves 
representing different levels of expenditure per pupil between $7,268 and $17,253. One 
of these curves is presented as E3 on the figure. Expenditure per pupil on the E3 curve is 
about $9,319. This level of per pupil expenditure can be attained by a large district of 
size 1,015—median enrollment of our sample—if the district is a monopoly. The same 
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level of per pupil expenditure can also be attained by a rather smaller district with 412 
students, if the district is in a perfectly competitive environment. 
The competitive effect and the scale effect work in the opposite directions over 
the range from 50 to 20,518 students. To give an example, assume that district A has 573 
students and the competition in their education market is about 0.5. Point A on the E3 
curve represents the initial position of district A. Suppose another district, say district 
A2, in the same education market consolidates into district A and their total enrollment 
is less than 20,518 students. This consolidation would decrease the competition in their 
education market to a level below 0.5, which would push point A downwards to a higher 
level of expenditure per pupil. At the same time, the enrollment in the consolidated 
district is more than 573 students. Therefore the increase in enrollment would move 
point A rightwards to a lower level of expenditure per pupil. The final position of point 
A is ambiguous because the result depends on the size of district A2, and the number and 
size of the other districts in the same education market. Assume, for instance, that after 
consolidation, competition would become 0.2. In that case, if the size of district A2 is 
less than 201 students, then the competitive effect would dominate the scale effect and 
per pupil expenditure after consolidation would be more than $9,319. Conversely, if the 
size of district A2 is more than 201 students, then the scale effect would dominate the 
competitive effect and expenditure per pupil after consolidation would be less than 
$9,319. If the size of district A2 is exactly equal to 201, then the scale effect would 
perfectly balance out the competitive effect and the consolidated district would end up 
on the E3 iso-expenditure curve again. 
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In the first region, the iso-expenditure curves presenting higher levels of per 
pupil expenditure are steeper than those presenting lower expenditure per pupil levels. 
This has an interesting implication: at any given level of competition, holding everything 
else constant, the smaller the size of the district, the bigger the amount of per pupil 
savings after consolidation. Moreover, for the same reason, over this region, smaller 
districts are more likely to end up on a lower iso-expenditure per pupil curve and be cost 
saving after consolidation. 
In the figure, there are diseconomies of scale in the second region meaning that 
expenditure per pupil decreases as enrollment decreases. In this region, more 
competition would also decrease the per pupil expenditures. The maximum per pupil 
expenditure in this range is about $8,344 at enrollment equal to 303,028 students and 
competition equal to 0. The minimum expenditure per pupil is again $7,268 at 
enrollment equal to 20,518 and competition equal to 1, and in between these two points 
are different levels of per pupil expenditures between $7,268 and $8,243. 
The competitive effect and the scale effect work in the same directions in the 
second region. To illustrate, assume that district B has 90,000 students and the 
competition in their education market is 0.6. Point B on the E5 curve shows their initial 
expenditure per pupil level which is equal to $7,633. Suppose that another district from 
the same education market, say district B2, consolidates into district B and their total 
enrollment at the end is less than 303,028 students. Decrease in competition due to 
consolidation would move point B downwards. Moreover, the increase in size would 
move the point to the left. Since both forces push the point to a higher level of 
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expenditure per pupil, the change in the expenditure per pupil is not ambiguous in this 
case. The consolidated district’s expenditure per pupil would be more than $7,633 and 
this result would not depend on the size of district B2, or the size and number of the 
other districts in their education market.
30
 The only way to decrease per pupil 
expenditures in the second region is to deconsolidate district B. Creating some new 
districts from district B would increase the level of competition in their education market 
and move point B upwards. Also deconsolidation would decrease the size of district B 
which would move point B to the left. Unless this leftward scale effect does not carry 
point B to far beyond E5 curve, the per pupil expenditure of district B would be less than 
$7,633. 
The third region of the figure is very similar to the first region in that there is a 
trade-off between the competitive effect and scale effect. That is, if consolidation makes 
a district’s size grow beyond 303,028 students, then any additional enrollment would 
decrease the expenditure per pupil. On the other hand, the iso-expenditure curves are 
flatter over the third region compared to their own extensions over the first region. This 
means that holding other variables constant, consolidation is relatively less cost saving 
for a district of size greater than 303,028 compared to a district of size less than 20,518. 
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 If the assumption about the total size of the consolidated district is relaxed the result can change. In 
order to get a different result, however, the size of the consolidated district should be beyond 750,000, 
which is not displayed in the figure. 
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3.7.2. Simulation of a Consolidation Scenario 
In January 2011, Texas State Representative Fred Brown, R-Bryan, proposed a 
bill (House Bill 106) which suggests reducing the number of public school districts in 
Texas from 1,235 to 254—only one school district for each county.31 He advises that the 
savings from administrative costs would be billions of dollars each year, which, he says, 
could go back to the public education sector in Texas to improve its quality. 
Nevertheless, as we presented, actual outcomes of such a consolidation scenario depends 
heavily on multiple effects of school district consolidation. 
Since the outcomes of a possible consolidation scenario is ambiguous, it is 
important to analyze the cases with the right specifications to have sound predictions. In 
order to have a better understanding of the outcomes of a consolidation scenario offered 
by Fred Brown, we provide a series of simulations that draw attention to how the 
magnitude of the trade-off between competition and size can affect the findings. 
Evaluating a real life consolidation scenario is one of the significant features of this 
study. Our econometric analyses and findings make more sense with a simulation of the 
actual world, and such an exercise allows us to capture the results visually and highlight 
the efficiency trade-off we found on maps. 
It is important to note that our simulation exercise here is different than 
evaluating the monetary outcomes of a consolidation scenario using only a fixed school 
district funding formula without considering the competitive effect of consolidation. In 
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 Currently, some of the states in the U.S., such as West Virginia, Maryland, Nevada, Florida and 
Georgia, are mostly county-district states. Hawaii is a state-district, with only one school district for the 
whole state but five counties. 
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real life, if the funding formula does not get changed to accommodate the changes in the 
competitive environment after consolidation, the competitive effect of consolidation 
would reflect itself in changes in the output quality rather than causing a change in 
expenditures per pupil. In our simulation exercise, however, we analyze the competitive 
effect of consolidation on per pupil expenditure holding every other variable constant. 
That is, we estimate the expenditure per pupil required to produce a certain level of 
output quality before consolidation, and compare that with the consolidated district’s 
estimated expenditure per pupil required to produce that same level of output quality as 
before consolidation. To give an example, if competitive effect of a consolidation 
dominates its scale effect, then increased cost inefficiency of the consolidated district 
may reflect itself in decreased output quality. Holding everything else constant, the 
output quality may be increased to its previous level if expenditure per pupil is 
increased. Because they need to increase their expenditure per pupil to establish the 
same level of output quality as before, we call this type of districts as “losers” after the 
consolidation.  
Our simulation exercise and findings in this section are based on the reasoning 
above. We showed that school district consolidation would involve a trade-off between 
competition among school districts and their size. Since, these forces work in opposite 
directions, consolidation of school districts does not necessarily result in cost savings. In 
some districts, expenditure per pupil can increase after consolidation if the loss caused 
by the decrease in the degree of competition they face dominates the savings from scale 
economies. Hence, after consolidation, along with some per pupil cost-saving winner 
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districts, there can be some loser districts whose per pupil expenditures are more than 
their per pupil expenditures before consolidation, ceteris paribus. For larger districts, 
being a loser district even with a slight increase in per pupil expenditure after 
consolidation would mean big losses in total expenditures. Moreover, at the state level, 
total losses can outweigh total savings after consolidation; that is, not every 
consolidation scenario is necessarily favorable in overall. 
In order to determine the winner and loser counties, we compare the sum of the 
predicted log expenditures of the districts in a county before consolidation, and the 
predicted total expenditure of the county after consolidation.
32
 We predict the log 
expenditure per pupil of a district by using equation (37) with the actual variables of that 
district and the coefficient estimates from our stochastic frontier estimation presented in 
the “HHI-CBSA-ALL, Linear” column in Table 17.33 Although the districts with 
missing values were excluded in our regressions, in order to have a completer picture of 
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 It can be argued that the comparison should be between the actual total expenditures of the districts 
within a county, and the predicted expenditures of the county after consolidation. Although we found that 
this comparison does not change our results qualitatively, we think that comparing the predicted 
expenditures before and after is a better comparison with a more accurate analogy. 
33
 Even though using the same formula to predict the log expenditures before and after consolidation 
constitutes a proper assessment methodology, one can also use equation (35) to calculate the sum of the 
predicted log expenditures of districts in a county before consolidation, to compare that with the predicted 
total expenditure of the county after consolidation calculated by using equation (37). We find that if such a 
methodology is followed, the number of districts incurring losses after consolidation is more than that 
presented in this section, and the total gains for the state after consolidation is less than that presented in 
this section. However, we also find that following this methodology would not chance our qualitative 
findings critically. 
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winners and losers, we fill in the missing values with state averages of the variables.
34
 
However, we excluded two counties due to complex non-availability of data.
35
 
We use equation (37) and the coefficient estimates from our stochastic frontier 
estimation presented in the “HHI-CBSA-ALL, Linear” column in Table 17 also to 
predict the log expenditure per pupil of a county after consolidation. However, since the 
values of the variables determining the log expenditure per pupil of a hypothetical 
county district are unavailable, predicting the total expenditure of a county after 
consolidation requires some assumption. First, we assume that after consolidation, the 
total enrollment of a county would be equal to the total enrollment of the districts in that 
county before consolidation. This assumption is plausible considering that the total 
enrollments in counties would not change much especially right after a county level 
consolidation. Secondly, we assume that the average remoteness of a consolidated 
county to a major metropolitan is the average remoteness of the districts within that 
county to a major metropolitan area. We recalculate the HHI-CBSA-ALL measures of 
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 Replacing the missing values with county averages instead of state averages can be an alternative 
approach. Although following this alternative approach causes quantitative differences, our general 
conclusions in the simulation section about the efficiency trade-off, and winners and loser after 
consolidation do not change. 
35
 We excluded Loving County from the simulation analysis because their school system was completely 
closed and consolidated into Wink County's ISD in 1972 due to the on-going low levels of enrollment. 
Bowie County is excluded from the simulation analysis because Texarkana metropolitan statistical area 
encompasses Miller County in Arkansas as well, which complicates the calculation of the competition 
measure we use in this section. 
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counties after consolidation assuming that there would be no changes to the private 
schools after the public district consolidation. We also recalculate the Chapter 41 status 
of the counties after consolidation using the original formula used to determine the 
Chapter 41 status of the districts. That is, we determine the status by comparing the 
county’s total tax base in the previous year over the county’s total Chapter 41 WADA 
with $319,500. Finally, we assumed that rest of the variables of a county after 
consolidation are the enrollment weighted averages of those variables of the districts in 
that county. For example, we assume that a county’s change in passing rates after 
consolidation would be equal to the enrollment weighted average of the change in 
passing rates of the districts in that county. The underlying assumption, again, is that the 
enrollment in a county would not change immediately after a county level consolidation, 
and hence, the consolidated county’s characteristics would reflect the enrollment 
weighted averages of its districts’ characteristics. The summary statistics before and 
after consolidation are presented in Table 32 and Table 33. 
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TABLE 32.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BEFORE CONSOLIDATION 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Enrollment 4,427 12,674 22 202,449 
Change in TAKS passing rate 0.012 0.051 -0.286 0.4 
Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.183 0.086 0 0.853 
Lagged passing rate 0.703 0.106 0.407 0.985 
Percent low income students 0.532 0.186 0 0.999 
Percent limited English 
proficiency 
0.077 0.093 0 0.687 
Percent Special Education 
Students 
0.123 0.033 0 0.305 
Percent High school Students 0.285 0.078 0 0.557 
Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
107.9 81.6 3.4 365.3 
Hedonic predicted salary 1.206 0.092 1 1.463 
High school comparable wage 
index 
3.059 0.451 2.493 3.995 
Chapter 41 district 0.193 0.395 0 1 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 0.32 0.231 0.059 1 
Number of observations = 1011 
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TABLE 33.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AFTER CONSOLIDATION 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Enrollment 17,761 63,169 83 736,972 
Change in TAKS passing rate 0.011 0.028 -0.108 0.113 
Percent taking advanced 
courses 
0.193 0.066 0.041 0.636 
Lagged passing rate 0.7 0.078 0.435 0.883 
Percent low income students 0.553 0.135 0.189 0.913 
Percent limited English 
proficiency 
0.083 0.081 0 0.547 
Percent Special Education 
Students 
0.122 0.025 0.06 0.267 
Percent High school Students 0.298 0.037 0 0.48 
Distance from major 
metropolitan areas 
132.8 85.4 8.4 363.7 
Hedonic predicted salary 1.194 0.083 1 1.463 
High school comparable wage 
index 
2.917 0.389 2.493 3.995 
Chapter 41 district 0.183 0.387 0 1 
HHI-CBSA-ALL 0.854 0.213 0.337 1 
Number of observations = 252 
 
Figure 27 presents a Texas county map of winners and losers after the Fred 
Brown consolidation. Out of 254 counties, 184 are cost saving winners, and 28 incur 
losses after consolidation. There are 40 unaffected counties, which are already county-
districts before consolidation and their HHI are equal to 1. The predicted total 
expenditure of Texas before consolidation is 32.5 billion dollars. We found that the total 
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gains for the state after consolidation would be about 1.3 billion dollars—similar to but 
probably less than what Fred Brown estimated. 
FIGURE 27.—TEXAS MAP OF WINNERS AND LOSER AFTER THE CONSOLIDATION 
 
A closer look at the winners-losers map would help us see the trade-off between 
competition and size. Some of the biggest counties in Texas in terms of enrollment, 
including Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, El Paso and Travis, are losers after the 
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consolidation. Bexar, El Paso and Travis have enrollments less than 300,000 but more 
than 100,000 students. Bexar County, for example, is one of the 8 counties in Greater 
San Antonio—one of the biggest metropolitan areas in the U.S. In 2007, there are 39 
public school districts in Greater San Antonio and 15 of them are in Bexar. Before 
consolidation, the level of HHI in Bexar districts is 0.101. After consolidation, the HHI 
increases to 0.590. At the same time, consolidation changes the size of the districts. 
Before consolidation, the average school district enrollment in Bexar is 19,297 students 
with smallest having 872 students. After consolidation, the enrollment in the new Bexar 
County-district is 289,451 students. The change in scale is huge, but too huge that the 
consolidated district ends up experiencing diseconomies of scale which couples up with 
the increased cost inefficiency mainly due to weakened competition. On the other hand, 
in 2006, Alamo Heights ISD is the only Chapter 41 district in Bexar. After 
consolidation, Bexar County becomes a property-poor district. There is a minor increase 
in the cost efficiency due to this change but at the end, their overall loss per pupil is 
$217. 
Tarrant, Dallas and Harris, on the other hand, are in the second region of 
declining average costs as their enrollments are more than 310,000. Therefore they may 
be expected to experience some cost savings after consolidation. Our simulation results, 
however, present that in case of these counties, the competitive effect dominates the 
scale effect and they become losers after consolidation. For example, in Harris, HHI 
before consolidation is 0.058, but after consolidation, their HHI increases to 0.455. They 
lose much of their competition due to consolidation and the decrease in competition 
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level causes a negative pressure on their cost efficiency, which increases their per pupil 
expenditure significantly. In addition to that, the smallest district in Harris is Huffman 
ISD with 3,045 students, and the average district size is 36,849 students. Even though a 
couple of districts in Harris such as Aldine ISD and Houston ISD experience some 
savings due to the big change in total enrollment, other, rather smaller districts such as 
Spring ISD, Tomball ISD and Sheldon ISD suffer an eventual increase in their predicted 
cost per pupil. Since some districts cannot benefit from decreasing average costs and 
there is a considerable change in the concentration, the negative effects on the 
expenditure per pupil is big enough to dominate, and actually dwarf the positive effects 
of becoming a property-poor district after consolidation and scale effect’s cost savings in 
a couple of districts. Harris County-district’s eventual loss is $271 per pupil. 
Significance of the competitive effect is maybe more evident for counties such as 
Bastrop, Kendall or Chambers, which belong to the biggest core based statistical areas of 
Texas, and have total enrollments less than 15,000 students. These counties are in the 
primary region of declining average costs, and for that reason, would wrongfully be 
expected to save costs if the districts within these counties consolidate. Since the 
lessening degree of competition in these core based statistical areas impact the cost 
inefficiency of these counties up to a level that wipes out their scale savings, they turn 
out to be losers after such a consolidation scenario. In Bastrop, for instance, there are 
four districts which are all property-poor. Average enrollment in Bastrop is 3,406 
students, and the smallest district in Bastrop has 181 students. Consolidation increases 
the HHI from 0.131 to 0.337, and size to 13,623 students. There are significant savings 
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due to the change in size. Nonetheless, these savings are offset by the change in 
competitive environment and Bastrop ends up being a loser after consolidation. 
Aransas County is an example of a single district county, which is in Corpus 
Christi CBSA and has an enrollment of 3,244 students. Their HHI is 0.286, and 
predicted expenditure per pupil is $7,937 before consolidation. After consolidation, 
however, their HHI increase to 0.606 and the associated competitive effect dominates 
the economies of scale and increases the predicted per pupil expenditure to $8,225—a 
loss of $288 per pupil. 
Comal County is another county in Greater San Antonio. There are 2 districts in 
Comal in 2007, one of which is a property-rich district, and their average enrollment is 
10,600 students. After consolidation their level of HHI would increase from 0.101 to 
0.590 as well. In this case, however, the total enrollment of the consolidated district is 
21,199—a range with high scale savings which is sufficient enough to offset competitive 
effects. Moreover, the district after consolidation is a property-poor district, which also 
contributes to the expenditure per pupil savings. Therefore, although there are negative 
competitive effects on cost efficiency, these effects get dominated by the scale and 
Chapter 41 effects, and Comal County-district is a winner after consolidation with 
savings of $290 per pupil. 
Val Verde County is also a winner after our consolidation scenario. There are 
two districts in Val Verde and they do not have much competition in their education 
market to begin with. After consolidation, their HHI increases from 0.862 to 0.896. 
However, when the smaller district of size 199 consolidates with the bigger district, there 
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are big savings due to economies of scale. Furthermore, although one of the districts of 
Val Verde is property-rich, Val Verde is property-poor in overall. Hence, there are 
associated efficiency effects due to becoming property-poor after consolidation. These 
savings outweigh the small loss due to the change in competitive environment, and 
hence, the county saves $60 per pupil after consolidation. 
The results presented in this section are dependent on our original specification 
of cost inefficiency. A misspecified model of cost, which does not include competition at 
all, would generate a different result than our finding above. In order to investigate the 
effects of competition, we first exclude it from our specification and conduct our 
simulation exercise using the estimates from this misspecified model. Our results are 
striking. When the simulation is run with the estimates from the misspecified model, the 
number of winner counties increases to 196. The number of losers, on the other hand, 
decreases to 5 after consolidation. Harris, Dallas and Bexar counties are losers solely 
because of the diseconomies of scale. Travis and Collin counties, however, are property-
rich districts after consolidation.
36
 Thus, their overall losses are due to both losses due to 
changes in the size and additional cost inefficiency due to the new Chapter 41 status. 
The total gains of the state with consolidation are about 2 billion dollars—700 million 
dollars more than what our correctly specified model with competition predicts. 
Therefore, it is evident that ignoring the competitive effect creates a misleading 
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 Five of the seven districts in Travis are property-rich districts. Wealth per student ratio in Travis after 
consolidation is more than 350,000 which would correspond to an overall property-rich status. Collin 
County’s case is similar to that of Travis County. 
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impression that consolidation is more cost saving than it actually is, because many 
counties who would actually oppose consolidation appear as cost saving winners. 
Secondly, as an alternative examination of the effects of competition we fixed the 
total competitive effects on the predicted log expenditures of the districts in a county 
before consolidation equal to the total competitive effect on the predicted expenditure of 
the county after consolidation.
37
 By this, the corresponding losses due to the competitive 
environment before and after consolidation cancel each other out when comparing the 
predicted expenditures, and hence, competitive effect would not play a role in 
determining the winners and losers. The easiest way to do so is to set the HHI measure at 
the same constant level equal to 0 across the state before and after consolidation. Again 
we find that paying no attention to the competitive effect leads us to overestimated 
conclusions in favor of consolidation of school districts. We find that the total saving of 
the state in this case is around 1.9 billion dollars with the same 5 counties as losers. 
Therefore, the models ignoring the potential efficiency implications of competition in 
the education markets can result in miscalculated and misjudged assessment of the 
benefits of consolidation or deconsolidation proposals. 
3.8. Concluding Discussion 
To summarize the major results in this study, first, findings from the stochastic 
cost frontier analysis support our competitive efficiency hypothesis. A decrease in the 
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 That is, we set ∑ (  ̂        )    
 
    (  ̂         )  ∑   
 
    , where   denotes the number of 
districts in a county,       is the concentration measure of the districts before consolidation,  ̂   is  ̂ of 
the county after consolidation, and       is the concentration measure of the county after consolidation. 
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competitive structure, which is measured as an increase in the education market 
concentration, increases the school district cost inefficiency. We find that the marginal 
effect of concentration on cost inefficiency is equal to 0.03. Secondly, we present that 
there are economies of scale up to a district enrollment of 20,518. We also report a 
region of weak diseconomies of scale for districts with a total enrollment bigger than 
20,518. Moreover, our simulation exercises illustrate the significance of the trade-off 
between the competitive effect and the scale effect. We show that in some cases of 
consolidation, competitive effect can actually dominate the scale effect resulting in an 
overall increase in the district expenditure per pupil after consolidation. When viewed 
from a public policy perspective, our finding implies that the competitive effect should 
also be considered when a district consolidation proposal is made with savings due to the 
economies of scale in mind. 
In addition to the major finding of this study, we also provide some sensitivity 
analysis. We show that the effects of competition are robust to measuring the 
competition with different sets of competitors. Conversely, we present that the 
competitive effect is mildly sensitive to using different definitions of the education 
markets. When different definitions of the education markets are used to measure the 
market concentration, we find that the marginal effect of concentration on district cost 
inefficiency remains significant and positive but lies in a range of [0.02, 0.06]. 
Furthermore, we control for the endogeneity of competition with several instrumental 
variables and report indirect evidence that the effect of competition on school district 
efficiency may be underestimated due to the endogeneity.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I analyze the effects of competition on education markets 
outcomes. My first essay explores the effects of different concentration measures on 
school personnel salaries. In my second essay, I evaluate the significance and sensitivity 
of the effects of various measures of competition on school district cost inefficiency. 
In conclusion, the effects of competition are hardly responsive to measuring the 
competition with different sets of relevant competitors in an education market. My 
findings using different definitions of the education markets, however, indicate the 
opposite that the effects of competition change significantly when the market definition 
of the concentration measure changes. Still, variation in the estimated effects of 
competition with different definitions of markets is considerably small relative to the 
estimated competitive effects with a generally preferred CBSA definition of markets. 
Also the sign and the significance of the effect of competition do not change in most of 
the cases especially if the measure concentration is based on an appropriate definition of 
education markets. 
Moreover, I control for the potential endogeneity of the concentration measures 
employed in my essays. The interpretation of the results from my endogeneity analyses 
is that the hypothesized effects of competition may be underestimated due to the 
endogeneity. This interpretation supports my general conclusions that competition is a 
multi-dimensional concept and the true discovery of its effects on education market 
outcomes depends on considering its many facets.  
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APPENDIX A 
In order to analyze the marginal effect of each variable that explains the variance 
of cost inefficiency on the cost inefficiency, we take the derivative of  ̂   with respect to 
that    variable. In this appendix, we present how we calculate   ̂     ⁄ . First, let’s 
rewrite equation (29) 
 ̂    (       )        {
 (      ⁄ )
   (      ⁄ )
} (39) 
where     (    
 ) (  
    
 )⁄  ,         √        ,   
      (       
 ),  ( ) is 
the standard normal density function, and  ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution. Now, let   equal to the derivative of     with respect to 
  , that is 
  
    
   
 
        
    
  
(       ) 
 (40) 
where    is the coefficient of   . Moreover, let   equal to the derivative of    with 
respect to   , that is 
  
   
   
 
        
  
  (       )   
 (41) 
Finally, let   equal to the derivative of  (      ⁄ ) [   (      ⁄ )]⁄ , that is 
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(42) 
So we write the derivative of  ̂   with respect to that    as 
  ̂  
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}        (43) 
 
